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This dissertation is an ethnography of transnationalism in recent working-class 
migration from Pakistan. Using multi-sited research, I track the state-subject relationship 
present in the process of transnational migration. This study focuses on Pakistan as a 
sending country and examines the movement of its labor diasporas. The Middle East, 
Europe and North America (primarily the United States) are the main sites of destination 
for the transnational labor investigated. Since the 1970s transnational labor migration has 
created significant economic and cultural changes in Pakistan. To understand these 
changes I conducted ethnographic research of the migration industry primarily in Lahore 
and the province of Punjab, Pakistan. This research centered on migrant narratives, the 
formation of transnational subjectivities and the role of the state in transnational 
migration. 
The experience of working class labor migration is structured by the labor-capital 
relationship. The state mediates this process through material controls and the discursive 
conception of a citizen-subject. In Pakistan, the particular modernity present between the 
state and transnational labor migration manifests itself in the formation of migrant 
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subjectivity. This subjectivity is shaped through secular and religious categories that 
frame transnational conceptions of class and race. 
Chapter One, explores the place of the secular in the experience of modernity and 
Islam. This is important in situating the place of labor migrant narratives and the 
possibilities of secular and religious imaginaries. Chapter Two sets the stage for the 
ethnographic work of this dissertation through an examination of development literature 
in South Asia as it relates to labor history and labor migration. Chapter Three is an 
extensive ethnography of the system of the migration industry as it produces labor 
migrations and an exploration of the racial and class implications of these labor flows. 
Chapter Four begins an ethnographic study of the state through the issue of subject 
formation and the concept of the production of legality and illegality. Chapter Five 
explores the role of moral panics and racism as forms of representations of labor and 
migrants. Chapter Six explores two narratives of transnational labor migration, one 
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Introduction: Traffic in the Diaspora: Pakistan, Modernity  
and Labor Migration 
 
 
During my fieldwork in Lahore, Pakistan, in early 2001 a political activist asked me what 
I thought of the word globalization. I laughed and replied that this word was used for 
everything these days. He agreed noting that there were so many definitions that the word 
had become meaningless. But as we talked we begin deciphering two general groupings 
of these definitions based in connecting globalization with the opposing frameworks of 
neoliberalism and imperialism. In this first sense globalization stands for economic and 
political liberalization. In this meaning, globalization is defined by the possibilities of 
market capitalism and the expansion of multinational capital. Hand in hand with this idea 
of capitalism is a conception of democracy and the freedoms such practices create. From 
this point of view, social science, primarily through the policy making of economists, 
works at the behest of the state and international institutions to craft controlled, carefully 
constructed, models in the calculation of how to improve the lives of individuals and 
populations. This conceptualization of market reform is at the heart of the neoliberal 
thinking. In this approach, economic development is based in a philosophy of efficiency 
and the creation of a competitive global market of exchange. Social change and economic 
development are then dependent on the ability of a society to adapt to global competition. 
But this is not just a societal issue, for such a model of globalization places faith in the 
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transformative possibilities of individualism. As a maxim of neoliberalism, the individual 
is the subject from which the change of societies and populations takes place. 
 In contrast to this approach, globalization is increasingly viewed in the context of 
a newly configured imperialism and the domination of so-called developing countries of 
the South by the developed countries of the North.1 In this scheme imperialism has 
transformed from the overt exploitation of the colonial model to the indirect control of 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. But as many observers have noted, such institutions are primarily guided by the 
foreign policy interests of the US government. Such a relationship between state and 
transstate institutions speaks to the complexity of the concept of the state. Indeed, the 
dominance of the US is obvious in the recent pattern of interventions abroad through 
military force and economic sanction in the Middle East. These acts of control at a global 
level demonstrate the relevance of how this overt use of power mirrors the colonial 
model. Wars on terrorism are wars of American empire.2 The idea of a global market of 
exchange is then understood as the imposition of global relations of unequal power. Such 
power relations benefit imperial countries in their economic and political dominance of 
subordinate countries. This notion of empire replicates the capitalist mode of production 
of colonial models but differs in how the exploitation of capital is extracted. In other 
words, globalization in this analysis has become the euphemism for maintaining imperial 
relations of power on a world scale. 
                                                          
1 Increasingly this dominance is defined by the hegemony of US imperialism. 
2 For example, writers such as Micheal Ignatieff (2003) have argued for a ‘responsible’ American 
imperialism in US military interventions. 
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 In either sense, globalization has its aims firmly in the efficient and rapid spread 
of capitalism. This modality of globalization as accelerated capitalism has rightly been 
called late capitalism following Marxist analysis of the history of capital (Jameson 1991; 
Mandel 1978). In this conception, the efficiency and rapid growth of the capitalist 
economic system is marked by the advancement of a capitalism that organizes a global 
order. That is to say that the spread of global capitalism is achieved through the historic 
movement of capital and its universalizing logic. Multiple forms of capitalism are then 
encapsulated by the logic of a single dominant capitalist mode of production. The state in 
this era of late capitalism seeks to manage the accumulation of capital in a form referred 
to as state monopoly capitalism (Jessop 1982, 1990; Poulantzas 1968, 1978). This stage 
of the control of capital by the state is tied to the universalizing impulse of capitalist 
modernity in which all economic systems must be unified under a single global economy. 
This is achieved through the exertion of imperialist power and the creation of an 
economic empire. As an economic system, capitalism seeks to organize all aspects of 
social and cultural life. The states role is to then organize this system of capitalism 
through the tactics, strategies and rationality of a neoliberal governmentality (Ferguson 
and Gupta 2002; Foucault 1991). 
 As capital crosses borders in its global spread, labor also becomes transnational. 
The state as it seeks economic capital, also seeks to control and manage its labor supply. 
In this sense, to fit the needs of the state, domestic labor supplies become transnational in 
the complex patterns of capitalism and the global market. This dissertation explores the 
state production of transnational labor migration and the systems of subject formation 
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that are a consequence of this relationship. The ethnographic component of this research 
was conducted primarily in Pakistan in an examination of its labor diaspora. In my 
research I found that migration to multiple points in the diaspora in the search for work 
creates a complex process of state mediation and subject formation. The interaction 
between the state and labor migrants has resulted in a shift in the patterns of migration 
and the ways in which workers make sense of themselves within global migrations. 
 In terms of globalization, labor migration has become a central component of the 
capitalist system. As I argue, the role of the state has much to do with the shape of these 
transnational migrations. These flows increasingly follow a pattern of multiple migration 
circuits in which transnational labor migrants find access to work and the accumulation 
of forms of capital. This process is in large part mediated by the state and state-like 
institutions. In terms of the theory of the state, I argue that the state concept is complex 
and multi-faceted. This is to say that the state is not an integral, absolute concept. Rather, 
the state is fractured under the neoliberal model in which non-state institutions produce 
state effects alongside those of the state. Thus, the effect of the state can be found in 
multiple arenas without direct state intervention. Such a relationship is created through 
the state reproduction of itself as an ideological state apparatus that maintains a 
compacted notion of a complete and powerful state. As Timothy Mitchell observes, the 
state produces its effects in multiple fields through its reified and disembodied 
appearance through state and non-state actors (1991). 
 Hence, in this ethnography I explore how the concept of the state is produced as 
other institutions reproduce state effects. On the one hand, in the case of the Pakistani 
 5 
state, are international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF that 
provide a template for market reform. On the other are corporations in the private sphere 
responsible for contracting transnational labor that was once the domain of the state in the 
public sphere. The state seeks to balance these spheres of international and private 
interests while reproducing them as its own. This multiplicity of state effects mediates the 
process of transnational labor migration by controlling such populations and creating a 
system from which multiple migration circuits take place. As I argue, these migration 
circuits are mutually constitutive of a system of subject formation of diasporic 
consciousness through the social categories of identity formation. 
 
 
Multiple Migration Circuits 
Conceptualized as a transnational labor history, this research investigates the 
contemporary routes of migration flows from Pakistan and the role the state plays in 
producing such flows. Contemporary migrations to locations in the Middle East, Europe 
and North America are explored as patterns of several migration circuits. In Roger 
Rouse’s research into migrations between Mexico and the United States, he dubbed the 
fluid pattern of movement between the two countries a migration circuit (1991, 1995). In 
my research I examine this pattern of a migration circuit in terms of step migration, and 
the gradual formation of a migration circuit between countries that include the 
movements to and from multiple regions. For many Pakistani migrants the goal is to 
reach the United States. As such the US functions as an important figure in the 
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imaginaries of diasporic consciousness. To make it to this destination can involve the 
navigation of several locations in accumulated migrations as opportunities make 
themselves available. In this study the pattern of radial migration from one location to 
another is expanded to a model that conceives of migration as transitory and configured 
in multiple migration circuits. One-way migrations from home to host countries are 
transformed into a complex pattern of multiple migrations. This process is partially 
managed and organized by the state in Pakistan that includes its own public 
responsibilities, as well as the private sphere of contracting companies and the various 
actors that participate in the migration process referred to as the migration industry. 
Hence a key site of this ethnography is the examination of the processes and conditions 
of how the state of Pakistan regulates migration flows through the migration industry. 
 This project was sparked by an interest in certain research questions that revolved 
around transnational migrants that seek capital abroad. What is it that drives labor 
migrants from their homelands? How is it that economic migration affects the social and 
cultural understandings of the world? How is the desire for economic gain cultivated 
through social and cultural mechanisms? How do the discourses of the global economy 
relate to transnational migrants? How do global relations of power manifest themselves in 
the relationships of everyday practice? For labor migration this follows the familiar 
relationship of capital to labor as it is controlled by the state. The place of the state in 
relationship to labor migration is such that as it mediates the processes of globalization it 
creates particular formations from which experiences of subjectivity emerge. Hence the 
state as an integral component of how migration is produced and patterned. 
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 To explore such a proposition, I examine the role of the state in the history of how 
migration is socially produced by formal and informal means. It is frequently assumed 
that the option to migrate is an individual choice, but how might this choice be influenced 
by social, economic and political factors, and how is this knowledge circulated? For 
example a large flow of labor migration to the Middle East during the 1990s dramatically 
decreased due to the Gulf War and the saturation of the Middle East labor market. Even 
though the labor demands of the Middle East have since resumed, labor migrants shifted 
attention to other markets for their labor. 
 Hence, as an example of the movement of labor and capital, how might one 
understand the political economy of oil and its distribution next to and against the labor 
migrations of South Asians to the Middle East? What is the relationship of such 
commodities to the growth of transnational migrations, and how do such economies 
produce and pattern such migrations? The political economy of the state and the 
exchange of commodities certainly shape the demands for the supply of labor in 
particular ways. As I discuss in Chapter 2 and 4, transnational labor migration from South 
Asia has much to do with shifts in the role of the state and the influx of petrodollars into 
the Middle East. For Gulf Countries this increased cash flow resulted in massive 
construction projects and the need for transnational migrants to provide their labor. For 
South Asian countries sending workers to the Gulf, this was an enormous boon to 
domestic economies. The significance of which, for a country in dire economic straits 
like Pakistan, was of significant political and social impact. For the labor migrants 
themselves, access to travel, work and wages, created new social relationships in terms of 
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economic and cultural changes stemming from the dynamic process of migration. In 
Pakistan, migration became a popularly conceived motif in the 1980s and 1990s with 
references in the media to the ‘Dubai chalo’ working-class migrants and the ‘Amrikan’ 
overseas Pakistani.3 Labor migrants from Pakistan were not only going to the Gulf and 
the US, indeed Pakistanis were finding their way to places all over the globe in search for 
work, education and opportunity. 
 The study of globalization presents new challenges to the study of ethnography in 
terms of tracking such transnational migrations. In pursuing the question of how labor 
migrations are linked to globalization, this dissertation explores the transnationalism of 
recent working-class migration from Pakistan. The aim is to trace some of the ways in 
which labor diasporas are placed within the global economy through state regulation. As 
such this is an ethnography of capitalism and globalization that elaborates the Pakistani 
experience of how South Asian migrations relate to the concepts of class formation, 
Muslim identity, and modernity. The importance of seeing this research as regional and 
comparative is crucial to the experience of labor migration. Pakistani migrations share 
many parallels with other South Asian countries. Indeed, many in working-class 
migrations find themselves in categories that essentialize their social identity when 
working abroad. This is partially a result of the process of framing ‘labor’ and ’worker’ 
as class categories, but also to racialized and gendered discourses of identity. This is to 
                                                          
3 ‘Dubai chalo’ translates as ‘Let’s go to Dubai’, a popular reference to the largely working-class migration 
to Gulf countries from the 1970s and its peak in the 1980s. Although these movements continue, popular 
references in the 1990s and currently are more frequently made to the professional class overseas 
Pakistanis. This group spans the globe, as much as the working-classes, with the US figured as the ideal 
destination. ‘Amrikan’ is then ‘American.’ This relationship is long standing with implications in US-
Pakistan relations. For a parody see Sadat Hasan Manto’s Letters to Uncle Sam (2001). 
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say that class position in a society is based on the kind of work one does and the access to 
capital. In this sense class can be comparatively analyzed in terms of societal conceptions 
of work and the value attributed to such labor. Class is indeed a cultural construct that 
must be understood through its intersections with other social categories of analysis. 
Thus, transnational labor migrations from Pakistan have their own particular histories that 
must be placed in the larger framework of regional and global patterns of labor migration. 
 
 
Labor and Capital, Diaspora and the Nation-State 
In recent years the growth of diaspora and transnational research has led to important 
theoretical insights. Specifically, such research goes beyond the traditional area studies 
approach toward accounting for the fluidity and flexibility of the migration experience. 
This project continues this critical approach of diaspora studies and the exploration of the 
nation-state. In the experience of diaspora, the state frames the nation as a transnation. 
Thus the categories of nation formation are linked in important ways to the interventions 
of the state and the framing of the diaspora. This work explores the issue of identity 
formation explicitly in terms of the concepts of class and race and their relationship to 
diaspora and transnationalism. 
 As an overarching question in terms of cultural diasporas, this research considers 
the role of religion, specifically Islam, in the concepts of diaspora, migration and 
modernity. It asks what the role of religion is in diaspora theory in the example of 
Muslims and diasporas and how such a conceptualization changes the approach to the 
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study of globalization. Further, in the understanding of migration to globalization, I argue 
for the importance of connecting theories of modernity to understand the complexity of 
the migration experience. Modernity is a central framing theory of globalization. It is the 
modernity-modernization pairing of new and old discourses of development that creates 
economic, political and social relationships between nation-states, and hence the 
transnational migrant through the navigation of these systems of states and migration. As 
I argue, modernity is not just a condition, but an uneven process that must be understood 
in terms of many alternative modernities (Chapter 1). The state in this process constructs 
subjects through multiple understandings of subject position. Hence the economic 
subject, the legal subject, the religious subject, the racial subject, etc., are crafted in 
relationship to the state as one autonomous subject. 
 Following the arguments of Gilroy (1993) and Robinson (1983) in terms of the 
specific migrations of enslaved Africans to the Americas as pivotal to the formation of 
Western capitalism and modernity, I argue that transnational labor migrants from 
Pakistan are involved in the creation of a similar formation. Gilroy argues for a counter-
modernity called the black Atlantic (4, 1993) that was created out of the fraught 
relationship of slavery to capitalism. The black Atlantic acts as an oppositional discourse 
of modernity that is in contrast to the dominant universalist modernity of Europe and 
America. Rather than a counter-modernity in this sense, I argue in terms of an alternative 
modernity that has been crafted in the Muslim world through the concept of Islamic 
modernity. In this experience of modernity the neoliberal state arbitrates secular and 
religious categories. This is a framework from which Muslim labor migrants from 
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Pakistan participate in cultural systems of subject formation. These social networks of 
affiliation, and disaffiliation, are organized through the metaphor of the umma, or the 
Islamic community. From this perspective, multiple formations of pan-Islamic linkages 
emerge according to various hierarchies of social and cultural identity. Further, I argue 
that discourses within Islamic modernities are framed in terms of religious and secular 
narratives as part of this particular formation that are then authorized by state processes 
of encompassment. This is to say that transnational practices of social organization are 
then located in the national consciousness through the mediation of the state. For 
transnational labor migrants this results in a complex formation of diasporic 
consciousness or subjectivity. 
 The key aspects of social identity that I examine in this study are class, race and 
religion, in terms of constructing notions of diaspora. Aihwa Ong has argued that the 
cultural politics of identity be understood in terms of cultural struggle (1991). As Ong 
argues, cultural struggle does not discount the potentialities of understanding the 
particular formations of transnational migrations (1999). In Pakistan the largest flows of 
migration are male and working-class. Hence an important component of identity 
formation in Pakistan is found in the dynamics of working-class populations and the 
masculine experience of transnationalism. This masculinity is complicated in the 
experience of migration in which the family must be refigured to maintain a patriarchal 
order. The social effects of class, race and religion are intimately connected to these 
newly configured patriarchies. These categories have differential meanings in various 
sites of the diaspora and as such specific migration circuits have particular effects on 
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subject formation. Hence the dynamic of structure and agency in identity formation is 
complex, shifting and contingent. But this is not to say that subject formation is only in 
flux, for it is configured through static conceptions at particular moments through 
regimes that manage relations of power. For transnational labor migrants such formations 
have particular discursive and material meaning to their subjugated positions. 
 In this research I have actively sought to understand working-class migrations 
from Pakistan, as opposed to professional migrations. Although working-class migrants 
of Pakistan have received some scholarly attention, the focus generally of research on 
transnational migrations from South Asia tends to focus on the professional classes. In 
the case of Pakistan, one reason for this is an academic liberalism that seeks solutions 
from the transnational elite. Working-class migrations are proportionately much larger 
than the professionals, but it is the hope of large scale investment by the diasporic elite 
that raises such attention and focus. Indeed, the problem of gaining a high rate of foreign 
direct investment has plagued the Pakistani state for many decades. While remittances 
from working-class migrants have kept the economy afloat in cash and the circulation of 
goods, the development of industry through capital growth and foreign capital investment 
has stumbled. The Pakistani government in this circumstance has attempted to target 
wealthy transnationals for investment to little effect. 
 The focus of working-class migrations from Pakistan has a particular history that 
emerges out of the crisis of the Pakistani state in the 1970s. The organization of domestic 
labor unions in Pakistan was effectively crushed by the late 1970s under the Bhutto 
regime, a pattern that originates in the 1950s. The failure of organized labor to gain 
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adequate protections from domestic trade union laws played an important role in the 
flight of laboring classes toward transnational sites. Indeed, in the 1970s as domestic 
labor unions were weakened, Pakistan saw an enormous growth in transnational 
migration to the Gulf and Northern regions such as Europe and North America. 
 By exploring how working-class migrants from Pakistan negotiate 
transnationalism, I track how this migration is simultaneously produced and patterned in 
the global economic system. The production of migration as I argue must be read through 
an analysis of the political economy of globalization. Similarly the patterns of migration 
that emerge from labor diasporas from Pakistan are historically grounded in the 
economic, social and political relationships of globalization. Hence the choice to migrate 
is framed within structures that provide this possibility in the first place. In other words 
the shape of the global economy produces the need for labor in certain forms and at 
certain times. The production of the migration process then follows certain patterns that 
depend on social and cultural networks. Thus the choice for someone to migrate from a 
rural village in Pakistan to Dubai or New York, for example, does not emerge out of thin 
air. It follows a distinct pattern that is dependant on a number of factors. For one, the 
process of migration is always dependent on other people. That is, someone always 
knows someone else in a system of social networks that aid in the migration process. But 
for the option as such to exist in the first place, has to do with the broader issues of the 
political economy of globalization and the location of the state in this process. The 
production of migration and its patterning is both global and local. The political economy 
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of globalization that creates these migrations is also formative in constituting the life-
worlds and subjectivities of migrant laborers. 
A critical approach to the study of race and its relationship to religion is also a 
necessary component of this analysis. Following the various Asian American works that 
critically engage the idea of race (e.g. Lowe 1996; Okihiro 1994; Prashad 2000, 2001), 
this research applies this approach to the transnational significance of race. For Muslim 
diasporas, race is constituted through religion in a logic particular to Western modernity 
(Al-Azmeh 1993, Miles 1989). By constructing Islam as Europe’s Other, racial thinking 
transmutes biological phenotype into cultural categories such as religion. At this 
historical conjuncture, the analysis of these categories has become of paramount 
importance. Central to this argument are the effects of the categories of race and religion 
in the system of multiple migration circuits. These effects are found in popular discourses 
that are importantly mediated by the state (Chapter 5). Hence, how race is understood as 
a differential experience in the various nodes of the migration circuits. For example the 
hierarchies of class and race in the Middle East differ from their usage in Europe and 
North America. These multiple experiences are constituted in a differential diasporic 
consciousness and subjectivity (Chapters 3 and 6). 
 The multiple social, economic, and political relationships created through the 
migration process are then formative of migrant life-worlds. To understand the lived 
experiences of labor migrants, the concept of diasporic imaginaries is deployed in 
relation to migrant subjectivity. Through the negotiation of transnationalism, labor 
migrants actively construct diasporic imaginaries that are framed by state control and 
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social categories of identity such as nation, class, race, religion and gender. The concept 
of the imaginary opens up the possibility of understanding the many ways in which life-
worlds are constructed. Life-worlds, as Marx referred to them, are constructed in and 
through the connection of the economic to the social and cultural. These relationships are 
reflected in everyday practice and in a critical discourse of the world. Hence for labor 
migrants, the act of migration is a formative experience that shapes subjectivity. 
Imaginaries within these life-worlds tell us much about labor migrant subjectivity in 
terms of how social being is created and understood. 
 Diasporic imaginaries in these migration circuits are crucial to the navigation of 
the migration process. Through structures that shape diasporic imaginaries and the 
agency of migrant subjectivity these identities are formed. Labor migrant existence is at 
once formulated in terms of the state, as subjects within the state system. For 
transnational migrants the state is a key component to the formation of social and cultural 
identities in terms of the legal construction of migrants and citizens (Chapter 4). These 
discursive controls have their material effects in controlling patterns of migration and 
creating migrant subjectivities. Agency in this experience is manipulated through the 
state and also outside of it, that is, through structures that claim to be outside of the state. 
In the examples I give of Pakistani labor migrants, this kind of possibility is found in the 
transnationalism of certain Islamic religious groups and the mobilization for transnational 
workers’ rights. Both argue through and against the state in that they seek elements of 
social justice not offered by the state. Within this emerging diasporic public sphere of 
labor migrants, identity is structured around several key concepts such as race, class and 
 16 
gender (Chapter 5). For Pakistani labor migrants, I argue that religion is also an important 
organizing principle of identity and the experience of migration. Indeed, in terms of 
identity, many transnational workers understand themselves through the context of 
religion and the discourses of cultural and social categories (Chapter 6). 
 Following recent anthropological work this study pursues the social and cultural 
components of capital as they relate to its economic form to understand the complex of 
the labor-capital relationship. Pierre Bourdieu’s work has consistently grappled with the 
many forms of capital including economic, social, cultural, educational, symbolic etc 
(1977, 1993, 1998). Bourdieu relies on Marx’s outlining of economic capital,4 but his 
intervention focuses on the multiple forms of capital in social and cultural life and their 
conversion within society. How forms of capital gain value in fields of power is an 
important part of his analysis. As he states: “In every epoch there is a constant struggle 
over the rate of exchange between the different kinds of capital, a struggle among the 
different fractions of the dominant class, whose overall capital is composed in differing 
proportions of the various kinds of capital” (Bourdieu 1993, 34). This is to say that 
capital is constantly changing in value depending on the relationship to power, conceived 
here in the sense of access and privilege5 (Bourdieu 1998). Bourdieu’s model of capital 
relies on the idea of economic capital as it moves through markets and finds its value in 
commodities. The model of economic capital of Marx is the metaphor for understanding 
the real and imagined social relationships established in fields of power and exchanged as 
various forms of capital. The meanings of these forms of capital are to be found in the 
                                                          
4 See Marx Capital, Vol. 1 (1967[1867]) and Althusser’s Reading Capital(1979). 
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everyday. For example, social capital can be seen in one configuration as simply 
connections and networks of influence, whereas symbolic capital can be viewed through 
the ideas of status and prestige. This combines the ideas of Marx and Weber to 
understand the relationships that make social class and give it their meaning. 
Anthropologists have used these insights in terms of thinking through the effects of 
capital and daily life and the production of forms of neoliberal capitalisms. This analysis 
is useful in thinking or the various ways in which capitalism operates in social life, and 
through the nation-state.6 
 Other recent anthropological work has also influenced this study of 
transnationalism by broadening the understanding of global economies to social life 
(Appadurai 1996; Basch, Schiller and Blanc 1994; Clifford 1997; Glick Schiller, Basch, 
and Blanc 1992; Rouse 1991; Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Following the effects of capital 
illuminates how labor migrants fare in dual labor markets. Certainly, labor migrants are 
an important part of the competition embedded in the global marketplace. But the 
flexibility with which this process has taken place requires greater scrutiny. Thus, using 
ethnographic examples to understand the dynamic of labor and capital, this work 
examines how the state shapes transnational migration under structures of capitalism.7 
 The literature on labor migration from Pakistan has covered issues concerning 
development, poverty, return migration, remittances and has mainly focused on migration 
to the Middle East (Addleton 1992; Amjad 1989; Arif and Irfan 1997; Azam 1995; Gilani 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 In this sense, Bourdieu thinks of capital and class in terms of Weber’s notion of status, see  Weber (1946). 
6 For example the Comaroff’s work on capitalism (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; 1997; 2000) and Aihwa 
Ong’s work on cultural and flexible citizenship (Ong 1996, 1999; Ong and Nonini 1997). 
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1985; Levebvre 1999). The anthropological literature on migration from Pakistan has 
made important contributions to understanding the social change in household structures, 
accumulation and development (Lefebvre 1999, Werbner 1990). This project contributes 
to this body of literature by focusing on the relatively untouched subject of labor 
migration to the US from the perspective of Pakistan. In so doing it invokes the use of 
imaginaries to place the US as a site of diasporic destination. Also, this research furthers 
the knowledge of the transnational experience of migration both in a sending country and 
a receiving country. On the US side, this investigation will add to the growing literature 
in South Asian American studies through its emphasis on diaspora and transnationalism.8 
Migration, like trade, is one aspect under the management of the state that is both 
national and international. As an ethnography of the state this work seeks to establish the 




To elaborate the theoretical concerns of this project I conducted an ethnography of the 
migration industry in Pakistan. This includes state-controlled emigration, labor brokers/ 
promoters, migrant trafficking, and the formation of transnational communities. The role 
of the Pakistani state in the control of migration flows is only a small proportion of actual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 See for example the valuable work of Sassen (1988) on the relationship of labor and capital to such things 
as foreign direct investment and remittances. For the application of this to South Asia see Bagchi (1999). 
8 See for example Jensen 1988; Khadelwal 2002; Kumar 2000; Leonard 1992; Lessinger 1996; Prashad 
2000; Shankar and Srikanth 1999; Shukla 2003, as well as the related works in Asian American Studies 
such as Cheng and Bonacich 1984; Hu-DeHart 1999; Lowe 1996; Kwong 1997; Okihiro 1994; Ong, 
Bonacich, and Cheng 1994. 
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migration. This is due to the many routes of migration that are not tracked by the state 
apparatus. However, the study of the state reveals insights into the legal construction of 
the migration process. Further, the legal production of migrants is integrally related to 
their illegalization and the role the state has in this process. And although the state 
directly controls a small proportion of transnational migration, its reach is substantial in 
the ideological construction of juridico-legal subjects that are beholden to the state 
system. 
 Much of this research involved documenting the contracting system for labor 
migrants. Brokers and promoters function as independent subcontractors to various state 
actors. The process of contracting, once exclusively the domain of the state, is 
increasingly a decentralized private relationship between contractors and employers. This 
relationship raises various questions for the role of international law and workers rights. 
By comparing the historical relationship of different periods of international migration 
and labor this exploration of the contracting system adds a comparative component to the 
ethnographic analysis. For example, contracting systems have been in use in the South 
Asian diaspora from early colonial times to present. Hence, one thread of this research 
examines how the current conditions of contracting in a postcolonial country compare to 
those of prior migratory movement to the Caribbean and Africa during the colonial era 
and early movement to Europe and the United States (Chapter 3).9 
This ethnographic research on the contracting system of Pakistan involved in the 
employment of labor migrants examines the role of the state in controlling the nation as a 
 20 
migratory subject and hence a trans-nation. The population of transnational migrants is 
partially controlled by the state and increasingly by subcontractors in the private domain. 
As such these brokers and promoters of the migration industry operate under the 
supervision of the state. The importance of this site is that it provides work abroad for all 
migrant subgroups from professional to unskilled, rural to urban.10 As such this system 
offers insight into the experiences of migrants of a diverse background. Interviews and 
oral histories with labor migrants were conducted in addition to the gathering of official. 
Government officials were interviewed and quantitative data was collected from various 
government offices and independent institutions. In keeping with ethnographic practice, 
all interviewees were given pseudonyms unless they were public interviews with state 
officials. 
Moreover this project examines the multiple migration circuit from Pakistan to 
the United States. As a receiving country, the US is a final destination for many migrants 
who have previous contact with other points in the Pakistani diaspora in a pattern of step 
migration. This includes places as diverse as the Middle East, Europe and Africa. By 
mapping how this migratory process currently occurs my concern is to compile the 
cultural knowledge gained in the multiple migrations that form a diasporic circuit 
between Pakistan and the US. In this regard I examine the motivations and conditions 
under which migration takes place. Certainly much of the movement between Pakistan 
and the US is direct. However for many labor migrants who do not have direct access, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 Among others see Ramdin (2000) on the Caribbean; Gregory (1971) on Africa; Anwar (1979) for the UK; 
Cheng and Bonacich (1984) and Jenson (1988) for the US. See also Tinker (1974, 1977) for a general 
overview of South Asian migration. 
10 For a report on the relationship of contract labor to labor migration see Vijay Prashad (1994). 
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they resort to alternative means to migrate to the US. These methods have become part 
and parcel of the global migration industry. By exploring the migration industry, I map 
the routes in which migrants pursue greater access to resources. 
 Data collection consisted of two levels. First, the general national and regional 
demographics of migration, and second the specific transnational experiences of 
migrants. Documents concerning official statistics and records were collected from 
various state and international agencies. State agencies included mainly sub-agencies of 
the Ministry of Labor such as the Bureau of Emigration and the Overseas Pakistanis 
Foundation. Controlling the flows of undocumented migrants is mainly the jurisdiction of 
the Federal Investigative Agency. Information from the National Archives in Islamabad, 
Pakistan, were also obtained. Interviews with various officials within the state system of 
controlling migration were conducted. Information and interviews were also conducted 
with international agencies in their offices in Islamabad including the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank and the International Labor Organization. I also interviewed 
former employees of these organizations mainly the World Bank.  
 According to the Government of Pakistan, Punjab has the highest number of labor 
migrants and private contracting companies. I conducting most of my ethnographic 
research in the city of Lahore, a regional protectorate of the Punjab where most of the 
promoters/contractors are located. The official figures for labor migration provide an 
important insight into both formal and informal migration yet the depth of the actual 
migration occurring between Pakistan and the US is uncertain (see Azam 1995 on 
Pakistani migration). Interviews of transnational migrants were conducted mainly in 
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Islamabad and Lahore. Lahore was the main site of ethnographic investigation into the 
particular locations and experiences of the migration industry. Interviews were also 
conducted in other parts of the province of Punjab including Gujranwala, Raiwind, 
Faisalabad and several small villages outside of these locations. In this sense much of my 
research relies on the obvious shift in rural to urban migration in the mobility toward 
transnational locations. Research in Pakistan was conducted during the summers of 1998 




Chapter One, following the work of Edward Said questions the place of secular criticism 
in the experience of modernity and Islam. This is important to situate the place of labor 
migrant narratives in secular and religious imaginaries. Chapter Two sets the stage for the 
ethnographic work of this dissertation through an examination of the development 
literature in South Asia as it relates to labor history and labor migration. Using the work 
of Gunnar Myrdal to understand the place of the concepts of race and class, this chapter 
proposes that the history of development economics in South Asia has understood labor 
migrants primarily as economic subjects with little or no agency. This description is 
based on prior racial and class constructions that are derived from culture of poverty 
theories. The result of this approach to economic subject making is a process of economic 
migration that eludes development analysis. Chapter Three is an extensive ethnography 
of the system of the migration industry as it produces labor migrations and an exploration 
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of the racial and class implications of these labor flows. As a labor history it describes the 
processes of exploitation in these labor diasporas and compares contemporary labor 
migration to that of the indentured labor of the 19th and early 20th century. The parallels 
of these two historical moments provide insight into the role of labor contracts in the 
formation of the social experience of labor migrants. Chapter Four begins an 
ethnographic study of the state through the issue of subject formation and the concept of 
the production of legality/illegality. Negotiating the terms of the state system for labor 
migrants is therefore also an important aspect of how the labor of migrants is constructed. 
As legal subjects labor migrants are placed within the fields of power of the state based 
on a dynamic between legal and illegal practices and subjectivities. Chapter Five explores 
the role of moral panics and racism as forms of representations of labor migrations. By 
examining the construction of the category of the Muslim in Europe and North America 
this chapter analyzes the rhetoric of race, terror, fear and peril. Chapter Six explores two 
narratives of labor migration one secular and the other religious in contemplating the use 
of utopias in labor migrant imaginaries. This chapter explores how secular and religious 
narratives are intertwined in parallel arguments in their relationship to the concept of 
social justice. 
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This chapter agues for the place of transnational labor migration in the social and cultural 
formation referred to as Islamic modernity. This formation places Muslim migrants in 
relation to one another through the multiple systems of subject formation that is 
organized through the properties of pan-Islam. In the multiple migrations of transnational 
workers from Muslim countries such as Pakistan, this formation of an Islamic modernity 
is integral to subject formation through the social and cultural framework of Islam. The 
state as a product of this modernity frames these subject positions through its role as a 
mediator of migration. Here Islamic modernity, it is argued is a structural formation, from 
which to understand the state and migration. Thus the Pakistani nation-state is integrally 
related to the transnational flows of its citizen-subjects. Hence, the cultural formation of 
Islamic modernity provides a framework to understand the relationship between the 
postcolonial nation-state and transnational migrants. 
 As a point of entry into to the debate between Islam and modernity, I consider the 
role of transnational migration and the formation of communities based in religious and 
secular reason. That is to say that through the act of migration an important process of 
subject formation is taking place for Muslims that involves both Islam and modernity. 
Further, I attempt to disengage modernity from its singular vision as an exclusively 
Western domain. Modernity is defined in terms of the parameters of a set of values 
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considered universal and a product of the European Enlightenment. As such it seeks to 
spread these values across the globe. Certainly, this is a practice and project of a 
universalizing modernity, but such homogenizing discourses do little to help comprehend 
the diversity of the experience of modernity. Indeed, rather than arguing against 
modernity and its values, I suggest spaces from which to salvage understandings of 
modernity in its plural form. My approach remains committed to secular struggles 
through an argument that seeks the potential in connecting Islam to modernity. Finding 
connections of the secular in discourses of modernity and Islam, as I argue, is vital to 
complex understandings of subjectivity and practice.  
 Through a review of the recent literature on alternative modernities and the 
general scholarship that theorizes Islam and modernity, this essay outlines the theoretical 
framing of this dissertation. The construction of Islamic modernities requires complex 
readings of social and cultural histories. Importantly, this debate raises the point of how 
secularism can be understood in religious modernities. By connecting concepts of work 
and labor to the idea of secularism and religion it is argued that these relationships are 
creating new cultural forms. As a final point this essay raises the point of how intentions 





The period since World War II has thus intensified the recruitment and employment of working classes on 
an international scale. Some 11 million ‘temporary workers’ from the Mediterranean region were at work 
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in the booming industrial centers of West Germany, France, Switzerland and the Benelux countries in the 
late 1960s…In the United States, the labor market was partly restructured by the northward movement of 
Afro-Americans displaced from the rapidly mechanizing South; by a nearly threefold increase in the 
number of working women between 1950 and 1970; and by the immigration of laborers from Mexico and 
the Caribbean. The oil-producing countries of the Middle East began to import a working class recruited 
among Egyptians, Palestinians, and Indians. Labor migration has also grown apace in Africa and Latin 
America… 
 Capitalist accumulation thus continues to engender new working classes in widely dispersed areas 
of the world. It recruits these working classes from a wide variety of social and cultural backgrounds, and 
inserts them into variable political and economic hierarchies. The new working classes change these 
hierarchies by their presence, and are themselves changed by the forces to which they are exposed. On one 
level, therefore, the diffusion of the capitalist mode creates everywhere a wider unity through the constant 
reconstitution of its characteristic capital-labor relationship. On another level, it also creates diversity, 
accentuating social opposition and segmentation even as it unifies. Within an ever more integrated world, 
we witness the growth of ever more diverse proletarian diasporas. 
Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (1982), 383 
 
1. 
October 2000, Dubai Airport, U.A.E.: I am sitting in duty-free Dubai on my way to 
Pakistan and mulling over the complexity of my situation. Here I am in this amazing 
global city built by the great concrete and glass heights of unfettered capital that I have 
nominally experienced through countless layovers. Although the obvious importance of 
this location as a hub for the movement of South Asian workers to the Arab world and 
various northern countries is readily noticeable, this time things are different. I am on my 
way to Pakistan to study worker-class experiences in transnational migration. Their 
movement to and fro, in and out of national boundaries in the pursuit of capital to ease 
their lives, and pursue the possibilities of their life-chances are some of the issues I will 
tackle. My experience in Dubai over the years has created this strange familiarity. In this 
node for travelers from seemingly every continent there is a semblance to other major 
international airports that act as holding areas for travelers. The little time I have spent 
here in transit gives me the simplistic yet fresh sense of the newness of this city and its 
glaring globalism. This is a city full of Asian migrants managed by local Arabs. This is 
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nothing particularly unusual. This could have easily been Riyadh, London, Doha, New 
York, Hong Kong, or the countless other places where South Asian diasporas have found 
their place. Crossing countless borders seeking work, trade, and cash, for those who seek 
it, has become commonplace. In the repository of my tourist ethnography I imagine the 
workings of a complex international labor market. I, too, had become used to this place 
Dubai has become: a Middle Eastern center of a kind of cosmopolitanism. I notice how 
my fellow travelers are also intertwined in these rituals of the international airport 
system. Sharing a newspaper in London a middle aged man from Karachi begins chatting 
with me about cricket scores. He lives in New York now and runs a gas station. He hopes 
to bring his children to the US for a proper education. I ran into him in the Dubai 
departure lounge and he beckons me to sit with him and other male Pakistani returnees. 
In a familiar avuncular tone he says that they will take care of me. 
Unlike other worldly cities in Muslim countries such as Cairo or Istanbul, Dubai 
has been  rapidly built in the last few decades by embracing petrodollars to create a future 
fantasy not only a present fantasy, the kind that many Gulf countries are still high on. The 
United Arab Emirates has planned beyond its oil based present in a future based in 
commerce, technology, and recreation. In terms of architecture and urban planning this 
translates into ambitious projects of an audacious scale. Islands are being created where 
once there were none in the shape of a palm tree and a map of the world for recreational 
resorts and upscale hotels. Other projects in Dubai are at the cutting edge of the global 
economy including an internet city, a media city and a state of the art financial center.1 
                                                 
1 For more on this urban history and its relationship to global capitalism see Elshestawy (nd.). 
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The promise of Dubai’s modernity, and for some a hyper-modernity, is based on the labor 
of a globalized working class. Hidden within the spaces of these modern built forms is 
the work of those who go unacknowledged. Although hidden in the compressions of 
labor and value placed in built form, the space of working class labor is undeniable. It is 
perhaps akin to what Ackbar Abbas (1997) in the context of Hong Kong calls the politics 
of disappearance. It is there yet not there in the acts of forgetting and making 
relationships invisible. For transnational labor, their work is made invisible by the 
workings of capitalism and the seemingly free flows of capital. Yet is such labor that 
makes the construction of capitalism possible. 
Here in this place that is, strictly speaking, not my research site, I am struck by 
two issues: one, the problem of areas and research boundaries, and two, the astonishing 
fact of capitalism. Both issues are a quandary of time and space. The first a problem in 
my research, the second the issue that my research is tracking. I’m on my way to Pakistan 
as a Fulbright scholar, with the critique of the US governments investment in area studies 
and the public image of American culture in my thoughts.2 There is a growing disjuncture 
between area studies research agendas and the spread of capital and labor. As a scholar of 
Pakistan I am supposed to study within the confines of the nation-state. As a scholar of 
US ethnic and diaspora studies my research agenda goes beyond the confines of the 
geographic boundaries of Pakistan. Here in Dubai, a city that represents a transnational 
zone of how capitalism cares little for boundaries of the nation-state yet nonetheless 
works through them, the logistics of my research agenda begin to plague me. Pakistan, 
                                                 
2 Thanks to Lisa Sánchez-González for the mandatory reading: Nancy Snow’s Propaganda, Inc.: Selling 
America’s Culture to the World (1998).  
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specifically the city of Lahore, is my main research site where I will seek out the 
narratives of working-class transnational labor, many who are intimately familiar with the 
Gulf and its cities. Indeed many participated in the building of Dubai among other urban 
cities as the multinational labor that crafted these cities into material fact. How does one 
make sense of experiences in multiple locations (subjects, places, cities, states, etc.) from 
a single location? 
As I mull over my thoughts of the possibilities of ethnography in the transit 
lounge, I recall an earlier trip and the larger questions it raises for my research. Over a 
year earlier during a weekend stopover I ventured out in the obscene June heat of Dubai 
to get a sense of the city. For my eyes, used to the population explosions of cities such as 
Lahore, Cairo and New York, the deserted downtown was striking. In the midst of 
buildings in this Islamic architectural style of modernity3, it seemed like most people 
were either in a car or in an air-conditioned building. But it wasn’t completely desolate. 
Along with tourists from mostly Europe and Australia, we passed construction sites filled 
with crews predominantly from South Asia. Indeed, my trips to the kingdoms of the 
United Arab Emirates (mostly Abu Dhabi and Dubai) were always full of interactions 
with workers from all over Asia. Whether in the service economy (hotel, restaurant and 
shopping staff; bus and cab drivers; medical and domestic workers) or manual laborers 
(construction workers), this capital driven economy is clearly creating new relationships 
with it’s multicultural workforce. To see this newly built environment come up over the 
years was a bit eerie. Ghostly buildings with their distinctive modern Islamic forms 
                                                 
3 In architectural history this is referred to postmodernist Islamic architecture. 
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seemingly hovering over waves of sand and heat. Empty now but soon to be filled with 
suit wearing, perfumed staff. Workers burnt in their grayish-bluish brown garments 
walking and laboring seemingly everywhere. Here is the point where old meets new and 
a point of modernity translating into capitalism. I wonder, is this a signpost of Islamic 
modernity? What might that mean? Is this a modernity of the new that has overtaken the 
traditionalism of the past? Does Islam inevitably clash with the precepts of modernity of 
the Western kind? It surely can’t be the case that there is only one kind of modernity that 




I had just finished a conversation with an Indian worker in charge of the lost and found. 
Going through security, someone accidentally has taken off with gifts for a friend I am to 
visit in Cairo. Our duty-free London bags must have been identical, so I am left with their 
assortment of expensive perfumes. Ironic, how material goods themselves become 
indistinguishable. Instead of finding my bags, I have this valuable conversation with this 
security officer. He’s been in Dubai for the last three years. I’m immediately struck by 
how friendly he is; it’s as if no one ever asks him the generic questions of home, country 
and work that I am. He tells me how lucky he was to land a job at the airport, “I wouldn’t 
want to work out in that heat,” he tells me. “But you know even though I want to go back 
home, I feel comfortable here. The work and the people you meet are great.” When I ask 
him what he thinks of his place in this city he replies: “I mean, it’s our work, people from 
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India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines, this is an Asian city.4” I ask him 
what that means since the UAE is technically in the Asian continent. “It’s not only for 
Arabs, its for all Asians. We come to work and build for our employers and then we go 
back home or we go somewhere else. Slowly things will change here, and more people 
from abroad will stay.” I ask him how long he planned on staying in Dubai. He was filled 
with dreams of going back home and getting married and maybe even going elsewhere. 
He was filled with the confidence of success in Dubai and he felt he could meet the 
challenge of any new place. I was a bit more cynical. He said he would endure hardship 
for the sake of his family and his children. In Dubai he felt like he was comfortable but 
there would come a time to move on. 
 This conversation, as casual as it was, revealed the many layers of my own 
ethnographic questions. Indeed, these questions were based on certain assumptions, 
although not altogether wrong, but would prove difficult in reconciling as I navigated 
through my project. Using the theoretical tools of political economy, labor history, and 
diaspora studies this project addresses the workings of capitalism in a global market set in 
modernity. The idea of maintaining a successful economy in modern terms is to maintain 
a growing, prosperous middle class. Further, this idea of a market driven economy must 
be exported to all other economies. 
                                                 
4 There are several reasons why he may not have initially mentioned Pakistan. It wasn’t until later that I 
told him that was my final destination. And in all likelihood the number of Pakistanis in the service sector 
is considerably less compared to other nationalities. Only recently have Pakistan nationals been recruited in 
this sector mostly in the medical, business and information technology arenas. This is due to the complex of 
state control, educational requirements and the popular construction of the Pakistani in the Gulf as a 
brawny working class laborer rather than a brainy service economy worker. 
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What I had witnessed in the migration patterns from the subcontinent throughout 
its labor diasporas to the Gulf, Europe and North America, is a pattern in which the 
bodies of laborers are chasing capital all over the globe. These laborers are taking part in 
the construction of a certain kind of modernity both literal and metaphoric. For the part of 
European and American capital, this means the preservation of well-established modes of 
production. In the Gulf States petrodollars are creating something new, a different kind of 
modernity that is quite stark. This is an important point, because this is modernity, a 
particular form for sure, but nonetheless the thing itself. But what needs to be made clear 
is how this localized form of modernity relates to Islamic culture and Muslims. Much of 
the analysis of the debate between Islam and modernity has often glossed them over as 
universalizing projects. And as such these assumptions take for granted operational 
definitions of modernity as Western modernity and its particular meanings. But how 
might one imagine Islamic modernity, not really as an alternative to modernity,5 but as 
another form? Further, how might one understand the relationship of Islamic modernity 
to capitalism as Anouar Majid (2000) has recently asked in the vein of the ground-
breaking work of Samir Amin (1974; 1985; 1989)? 
My ethnographic tourism is a point of entry for this research. Indeed, it is central 
to the contemplation of the thorny debate over Islam and modernity. Both concepts are 
reified as a representation of particular belief systems. Islam represents a religious 
community through its imagined community of believers, the umma. Modernity is a 
                                                 
5 This is more the point of right-wing Islamism that enacts a fundamentalism that is counter to the ideas of 
modernity in all its forms. In doing so it deploys modernity towards its absolutist ends of an Islamic state 
and Islamic hegemony. See Sayyid (1997) on this point. 
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product of the European Enlightenment with its conception of the universal subject. Islam 
as a category is seen as a religious category that is reduced to Islamism as a practice.6 
Such a view is not only the scope of a Western Orientalist gaze, but also prevalent within 
Muslim societies as well. Modernity, politically associated with the ideas of secular 
democracy and capitalism is given the valence of good, while Islam, read as religious and 
theocratic hence anathema to democracy, is bad. This reading offers little space to 
maneuver between these two concepts – both seemingly opposed to one another. The 
argument I am introducing, however, seeks a historically nuanced understanding of their 
relationship. Further, it questions the possibility of a complex entity called Islamic 
modernity as a social, economic, political, cultural and historical formation, as well as but 
not exclusively a religious one. Also in question is whether this formation is 
appropriately named Islamic modernity or Muslim modernity.7 Indeed Islamic modernity 
is the more fraught term. Comparatively a Christian modernity, Hindu modernity, or 
Jewish Modernity might share certain aspects of form in terms of thinking of religion as 
theology.8 However, the particularities of an Islamic modernity emerge when thinking of 
                                                 
6 Islamism is generally a gloss for multiple sets of practices associated with orthodox Islam. As a term it 
makes more sense then the popular term Islamic fundamentalism. This latter term conflates political 
ideology with the social and cultural. Recent ethnographic scholarship has focused attention on 
differentiating between Islamist and Islamic movements in relation to the concepts of piety, see Hirschkind 
(2001) and Mahmood (2001). 
7 Eqbal Ahmad eloquently points out the distinction between Islam and Muslim in its political meaning. 
The former referring to a religion and the latter to groups of people, and hence a more secular connotation 
(Ahmad 2000, 136-7). I rely on this distinction but would like to further elaborate on the concept of 
secularism and Islam. My use of Islamic comes from the insistence that secular discourses be recuperated 
in Islamic history. The point of which is to connect it to the secularism of progressive struggles of 
modernity. 
8 Hefner (1998) argues that these contemporary religions face structural problems in their interaction with 
modernity, an argument that relies on the secular-religious split. Yet, oddly his conclusions seem to point in 
the direction of a pluralism in religion that incorporates the secular. This is perhaps true, but one wonders if 
the secular ever disappeared from the religious since the concept of the secular emerges from religion 
rather than the other way around. See Asad (1993, 2003).  
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religion as culture. In this sense the history of Islam is not only a religious sphere but a 
social one. Indeed part of this history is the place of secularisms within the worldview of 
Islam, rather than outside of it, as traditionally thought in the emergence of secularism 
from Christianity. Hence, this is to argue that there are secular spaces within Islam. As 
such these are important points of connection that offer the possibility of mutual struggle. 
Part of this project is to disentangle the meaning of Islam and modernity in an 
effort to dislodge their parochial meanings. As I argue, much of the dialectic between 
Islam and modernity in my research has to do with migration. As ideas and concepts 
migrate, they come and go with the movements of groups of people. The process and 
effect of migration is central to both Islam and modernity. This process and interaction of 
migration with Islam and modernity plays a pivotal role in the construction of migrant 
subjectivities. As shared experiences, migration for both Islam and modernity is a point 
to enter secular history and the rationality of both religious and secular discourses. 
 
 
The Shape of Modernity 
Within the framework of Eurocentrism’s impossible project, the ideology of the market – with its 
democratic complement, assumed to be almost a given – has become a veritable theology, bordering on the 
grotesque. For the progressive unification of the commodities and capital markets alone, without being 
accompanied by gigantic migrations of populations, has absolutely no chance of equalizing the economic 
conditions in which different peoples live. 
Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (1989), 112 
 
In Samir Amin’s cogent description of European modernity is an apt description of the 
dilemma of Enlightenment thought. Indeed, the liberalism of Enlightenment values is 
predicated on notions of equality and democratic principle. Therein lies the problem. 
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With the process of capitalism inherently based on differentiation and hierarchy, how 
does one make claims to the possibilities of reconciling these differences toward a future 
based in equality. This notion of equality it might be argued is the sense in which the 
modern state views its subjects – citizens are equal in the eyes of the law. Equality in 
social relationships is then the possibility of individual achievement. Competing in the 
system of unequal relationships of capitalism provides the sense of similar conditions. 
But similarity and equality are not the same thing and hence the impossibility of this 
project. Nonetheless the idea of the struggle for freedom inherent in democratic 
principles is perhaps the antidote to this dilemma. The idea of freedom provides a more 
processual understanding to struggles for social and economic rights in ways that equality 
cannot. Equality then is a state of being, or an ideal type, from which the state is assumed 
to operate; freedom is an endless struggle for rights and recognition. 
 Modernity itself is a fraught category that for long has attempted to universalize 
the aims of market and democratic logic. Migration is itself an essential part of 
modernity. This global phenomenon of modernity has taken many shapes and forms. In a 
special issue of the journal Public Culture entitled “Alter/native Modernities,” Dilip 
Gaonkar describes modernity as a dialectic between societal modernization and cultural 
modernity (1999,1). Societal modernization constitutes cognitive and social 
transformations that are the  
idealized self-understanding of bourgeois modernity historically associated with the 
development of capitalism in the West that called into existence not only a distinctive 
mode of production but also a new type of subject – an agent who was set free from 
constraints imposed by tradition to pursue its own private ends and whose actions 
were at once motivated by acquisitiveness and regulated by “(this) worldy 
asceticism.” (2) 
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This new subject is the secular, rational, individual contained within the social vision of a 
modern community. Encapsulated within the modern form of capitalism and ruled 
through the democratic auspices of the state, the self is imagined in terms of the 
instrumental rationality of the state. Opposing this set of ideas of order and discipline is 
another modernity, as Gaonkar argues, that is cultural modernity.9 Here the bourgeois 
modernity of technical efficiency is substituted by an emphasis on creativity and the 
imagination that gained prominence in modern aesthetics. The goal of which is to 
concentrate “spontaneous expression, authentic expression, and unfettered gratification of 
one’s creative and carnal urges” in the heroic pursuit of fleeting “glimpses of beauty, 
premonitions of happiness, and a modicum of wisdom”(3). The worldly asceticism of 
social modernization is opposed by the desires cultural modernity. Here this mysticism of 
modernity celebrates a subjectivity that is entangled in many worlds at once. This conflict 
creates a double vision more akin to Dubois’s idea of double consciousness, a mode of 
being that is fragmented by modern life yet seeks unity and participation within it.10 This 
dialectical reading sees subjectivity as split into at least two modes that owe their 
existence to the fractures within the meaning of modernity. 
 Gaonkar extends this idea of doubleness to represent the tensions found 
throughout theories of modernity. Hence the trajectory from Weber to Habermas are 
                                                 
9 In another essay in this volume by Charles Taylor entitled “Two Theories of Modernity” (1999) this idea 
is split between the acultural and cultural models of modernity that roughly match Gaonkar’s views on 
social modernization and cultural modernity. Taylor’s argument places acultural modernity, with its 
universalist and ahistorical tendencies, in opposition to cultural modernity from which the idea of plural 
modernities emerge. See also Taylor’s influential tome on Western modernity and subject formation 
Sources of the Self (1989). See also Lisa Rofel (1999) who thinks in terms of the creative and destructive 
tendencies of modernity. 
10 Oddly, Gaonkar makes use of ‘double consciousness’ (1999, 3) but makes no reference to W.E.B. 
Dubois. One can only surmise that Gaonkar sees this ‘other’ modernity as trapped in the unmarked 
modernity of the European white male subject. 
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associated with societal modernity and from Baudelaire to Foucault with cultural 
modernity. In his reading this dialectic of oppositionality and difference is conjoined 
through a set of mutual interconnections. As Gaonkar argues this dualism of modernity 
contains a value-laden oppositionality: modernity has its bright side and its dark side. 
This is true for both kinds of modernity, the societal and the cultural. Indeed, in this 
dialectical thinking there is a built-in and necessary slippage in this relationship based on 
the idea of difference. For both oppositions contain bright and dark sides and are linked 
to one another through their possibilities and contradictions. Neither type of modernity is 
inherently bright or dark, good or bad, but necessarily both. 
 This reading and its ethical account owes much to the Frankfurt school analysis of 
modernity. Gaonkar discusses Horkheimer and Adorno’s important Dialectic of 
Enlightenment(1997 [orig. 1972]) in passing, and does indeed provide an elaboration of 
Habermas’s thought at length. This opening in Gaonkar’s reading of modernity offers an 
opportunity to think through some of the possibilities of alternative modernities. And in 
the spirit of his use of dialectics, I would like to propose another that relies on a more 
mystical reading, rather than metaphysical,11 of theories of modernity. To begin with, 
what Horkheimer and Adorno observed in the Dialectic and elsewhere12 in terms of what 
they call the evil of instrumental reason and the authoritarian state (1997, xv) is 
qualitatively different from the aspects of modernity that are simply bad or dark. This evil 
is the demonic realm of the Enlightenment that perpetuates self-destruction, domination, 
                                                 
11 By this I am also referring to the Frankfurt school theories of language that explore the theological 
dimensions of language. See for example Benjamin’s essay “The Task of the Translator” in 
Illuminations(1968). 
12 See Horkheimer (1996 [orig.1974]), and his essays “The End of Reason” and “ The Authoritarian State” 
in Arato and Genhardt (1998 [orig.1982]). 
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and terror. Such a force can be located from states to subjects. Surely Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s attack on the Enlightenment, coming in the context of the horror of genocide, 
fascism and war, is an indictment of the celebration of modernity.13 In their cultural 
analysis, Horkheimer and Adorno elaborate on their central motif of the role of myth in 
the transition to an industrialized society. In creating this modern idea of society based on 
domination of the social order, and in the manufacture of fear, a new myth is created: 
Domination lends increased consistency and force to the social whole in which it 
establishes itself. The division of labor to which domination tends to serve the 
dominated whole for the end of self-preservation. But then the whole as whole, the 
manifestation of its immanent reason, necessarily leads to the execution of the 
particular. To the individual domination appears to be the universal: reason in 
actuality. Through the division of labor imposed on them, the power of all the 
members – for whom as such there is no other course – amounts over and over again 
to the realization of the whole, whose rationality is reproduced in this way. What is 
done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: 
social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective. It is this 
unity of the collectivity and domination, and not direct social universality, solidarity, 
which is expressed in thought forms. (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997[orig. 1972], 21-
22). 
Here their argument echoes Gramsci’s thoughts on the role of state hegemony that is a 
process of coercion and consent. The process of state control masks its power through the 
workings of domination. This new myth, based on the primacy of rational thinking, is 
derived from a system of domination that is a secular version of control substituted for 
the domain of religion: “animism spiritualized the object, whereas industrialism 
objectifies the spirits of men” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997[orig. 1972], 28).14 Secular 
                                                 
13 For a summary of the debate over the relevance of the Dialectic of Enlightenment and the connection of 
the Enlightenment to modernity see Sherratt (2000). Many scholars have dismissed this work as too cynical 
in its approach, but given the circumstances to its writing, their opprobrium is understandable. Nonetheless, 
Horkheimer and Adorno are clearly arguing for a recovery of modernity rather than its abandonment. 
14 Martin Jay translates this as “animism had spiritualized objects; industrialism objectified spirits” (1973, 
260). This translation leaves the meaning of ‘spirits’ as open to the idea of an exterior entity outside of 
humanity and not just the idea of human courage and solidarity. 
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rationalism excises religion and the idea of the nomen, yet merely replaces the terms from 
which this system of domination functions. This shift in modernity concludes that power 
is no longer located in the sphere of religion – but only in the knowable universe of 
secular categories. The state form thus emerges out of a system of religious control and 
structure of power that mimics religious domination. 
 Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of Enlightenment modernity echoes Nietzche’s 
indictment of systems of morality in the Genealogy of Morals (1967), for which they 
have been criticized.15 But what is of greater relevance is their critique in terms of its 
allegorical force. Horkheimer and Adorno make a strong argument to understand the evil 
of modernity in terms of morality. This point of morality as the underpinning of 
modernity gets lost in readings of modernity as exclusively a secular modernity. Here the 
values of modernity are thought of as outside of the dilemmas of morality and 
emotionalism and firmly placed in the supposedly unbiased rationality of secular reason. 
Hence it is assumed that there is no prior history of the values of modernity. Gaonkar’s 
reading is rightly one of a secular modernity, given the lineage and trajectory he wishes 
to establish. But to say there is a secular modernity raises the possibility of religious 
modernities.16 Both act to universalize their claims: the secular to the power of the state, 
and the religious to the power of the state and the divine. The idea of a religious 
modernity complicates the place of the secular as Talal Asad has argued (2003). Rather 
                                                 
15 See Sherratt (2000). 
16 Here I in no way mean to equate religious modernity with theological modernity, even though they are 
related. 
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than eliminating the concept of the secular, religious modernities can encompass the 
secular within a system of power rather than claim its exteriority. 
 Derrida’s essay “Faith and Knowledge” in Acts of Religion(2002) proposes a 
similar connection. To talk of ‘religion without religion,’ and to hence cast the place of 
the religious in the world, he crafts an argument for the mystical in the secular subject. 
This is indeed an argument that places the importance of the divine and the theological as 
a force of power and the political. To talk religion for Derrida is to think of a future not 
only based in faith but in justice. This political reading asserts a reconnection of the 
philosophical to the theological. The former generally seen as a secular practice and the 
latter as religious. The division of these two forms of scholarship, although necessary, 
creates particular methodological problems. How does the unbeliever comprehend the 
believer and vice versa? Does one have to believe to experience the life-worlds of 
believers? Can one be a part-time believer? Is belief necessarily constitutive of 
intersubjective understanding? For Derrida, subjectivity is a naming of an experience. 
Gaonkar’s dialectic of subjectivities split between the technical-social-efficient and the 
creative-cultural-imaginary are what Derrida sees as the traditional opposition between 
reason and mysticism (2000, 57). As Derrida somewhat elliptically argues, prior to these 
forms of subjectivity, and prior to any sense of community, there is a shared abstracted 
space through the metaphor of the desert that unites the Abrahamic religions in a 
potential political project. 
Without this desert in the desert, there would be neither act of faith, nor promise, nor 
future, nor expectancy without expectation of death and of the other, nor relation to 
the singularity of the other. The chance of this desert in the desert (as of that which 
resembles to a fault, but without reducing irself to, that via negative which makes its 
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way from a Graeco-Judaeo-Christian tradition) is that in uprooting the tradition that 
bears it, in atheologizing it, this abstraction, without denying faith, liberates a 
universal rationality and political democracy that cannot be dissociated from it. 
(italics in orig. Derrida 2002, 57) 
For Derrida the secular and the religious are aligned in modern society in overlapping 
ways that has potential in struggles for justice. As moral arguments they are united in 
Western ideas of the law and its practices of jurisprudence. But even further, they become 
ideas to uphold the practices and technologies of modernity. A liberated universalist 
rationality and democracy are then read through their genealogy to the morals of the 
Abrahamic religions. 
 To return to the idea of modernity, secular and religious must be understood as 
inhabiting similar spaces. The advent of secularism in no way obliterated the religious. 
And indeed in the particular developments of alternative modernities, what constitutes as 
secular, and its relation to the religious, has taken on new and quite different meanings. 
Such an orientation allows us to rethink the ways in which modernities are crafted 
through the roles of states, imaginaries, subjectivities, citizenship, and capital. 
 
 
Islam, Muslims and Modernity 
It is quite commonplace to refer to modernity as an exclusive product of European history 
and thought. Surely, the legacy of modernity owes much to the European Enlightenment 
project. This thing named modernity is to be sure a European concept. Modernity as an 
idea and as a history, however, was never isolated. Western modernity of course owes 
much of its moral development to the experience of colonialism and European imperial 
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endeavors.17 From European modernity spawned many other forms of modernity from 
the colonial agenda of creating carbon-copies of others in the original image of the West. 
The program of civilizing the Orient, so well elucidated in the work of Edward Said 
(1978, 1993), created the space from which to carry out colonial experiments. The 
experience of modernity in the Muslim world in many ways is a product of such an 
interaction. As an alternative modernity the limits of this interaction are shaped by the 
on-going struggle to realize this formation. Importantly the connections of this experience 
are co-produced through historical context and the question of how alternative 
modernities are structured. As a political question then, there is the necessity to raise the 
question of how the colonial interaction organized such a modernity. Islam, as a religion 
is also an organizing principle of a life-world. It is understood to be cultural, political, 
economic, and social.18 It is national, international and transnational. Beyond 
fundamentalist and Orientalist readings it is not homogenous, but diverse, contested, and 
dynamic. 
Islamic modernity, I argue, has a far broader meaning than Islamist modernity. 
But as a counter to the Islamist reaction and interaction with modernity, the use of 
Islamic does not discount it. Islamism is at its most fundamental a project of modernity. 
As many authors have argued contemporary Islamism, so-called Islamic fundamentalism, 
is a product of the encounter of Islamic societies with modernity. It is not just a reaction 
                                                 
17 See for example Mehta (1999) treatment of the development of British liberal thought through the 
debates surrounding the experience of empire. Mehta’s argument interestingly connects the concepts of 
reason with sentiments to understand the rational ground of multiple systems of morality. 
18 Many scholars argue that Islam should not be understood as a culture, as Orientalists would have it. On 
the contrary I find it necessary to argue that the Islamic is one cultural element among many, but an 
important one that should not be divorced from cultural discourse. In this vein Al-Azmeh prefers to refer to 
this as social Islam (1993). 
 43
to it but a synthesis of it (Sayyid 1997). The question of modernity and Islam than 
becomes one of how to understand the particular formations of Muslim modernities 
which are necessarily plural. Islam and the Islamic as a world-historical force is itself 
universalist and makes claims to a singular narrative of history. In plural form such 
claims break down into parochial form.19 Secularism, the idea of reform, democracy, 
capitalism, etc., all exist in various forms in Islamic history. But each has underpinnings 
in an ethos that either directly or indirectly is linked in a historical relationship to what 
can be called Islamic society and culture, as much as the experience of colonialism, 
modernization and integration in the global political economy. This confounds certain 
conceptual understandings, in particular whether there is a modernity that is Islamic and 
not in some way connected to Europe. Thus, for example, is there Islamic democracy, or 
Islamic secularism? What might that mean, and what is the use of such entities? 
Secularism, understood as worldly actions that are not solely religious, has 
meaning in Islamic discourses (cf. Al-Azmeh 1993, and in Arabic Al-Ilmaniyya 1992, 
Beirut). But aside from the potential of religious readings of secularism, there is also the 
importance of claiming secularism as a political modality that exists outside of religion 
(but again not necessarily separate from it). Hence, one of the inherent paradoxes in the 
debate of Islam and modernity is the exact place of secularism. In the encounter between 
the two, modernity has made its place within Islamic society but they also exist in 
tension, particularly when it comes to concepts deemed foreign to purist approaches to 
Islamic history. Indeed, for long secularism has been seen as a product of Western 
                                                 
19 Aziz Al-Azmeh’s essays in Islams and Modernities (1993) are quite insightful in articulating this point of 
a universal subject in Islamic discourse and its simultaneous historical plurality.  
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modernity and not implicit within Islamic history. To recoup such a point requires a 
rethinking of the concept of secularism itself. For this analysis it is important to 
understand secularism in tension with religious radicalism, but not necessarily opposed to 
religious readings. The importance of this project is to think of modern forms of 
subjectivity that exist in this tension – as both religious and secular. An anthropology of 
the secular must be interrelated with religious discourses. 
The classic work on Islam’s relationship to modernity is Fazlur Rahman’s Islam 
and Modernity written in 1982. Rahman writes of traditions of education within the 
Islamic world and the intellectual grounds of Islamic modernity. He makes the debate 
quite lively arguing the antecedents of a fully-fledged Islamic modernity. This 
epistemological work argues that the project of Islamic modernity as a grand narrative 
maintains its universality. Although he recognizes the distinct nature of Western and 
Islamic forms of modernity, particularly in terms of educational models, his analysis does 
not elaborate the multiplicity of these universalisms. And although he undoes much of the 
Orientalist thinking that would place Islam as anti-modern, Rahman fails to offer a viable 
alternative to false universals. This ground that Rahman establishes is given a further 
push in Aziz Al Azmeh’s Islams and Modernities (1993). In this complex and nuanced 
set of arguments, Al-Azmeh places the multiple existences of Islam and Western 
modernity in the context of their universalist logic. Through their claims of irreducibility 
and progressivist notions of universal history (Al-Azmeh 1993, 75), both Islam and 
modernity argue a superior vision of the world. But neither is mutually exclusive of the 
other. An Islamic based notion of modernity although quite different from the idea of a 
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Western modernity transforming Islam, cannot be removed from one another. The 
Islamist argument of modernity as a foreign other is of course a historical fallacy. 
European modernity is built on the influences of multiple civilizations as has been argued 
by many fronts now. The existence of any Islamic modernity is as of yet to be widely 
accepted.20 
This problem of universalist thought is in many ways itself everywhere. In 
Clifford Geertz’s landmark essay “Religion as a Cultural System”(1973) he attempts to 
revamp anthropological approaches to the study of religion. These criticisms of the 
anthropology of religion apply to many contemporary studies, that for example in the 
study of Islam assume a universal Muslim subject. In doing so, such approaches ignore 
multiple subject positions that might include both secular and religious categories. What 
is immediately noticeable is Geertz’s emphasis of the religious in the everyday and vice 
versa. This is as if to say that in some way the religious and the secular are inseparable 
even if they are conceptually separate. The secular and religious commingle in a fluid 
discourse. As Talal Asad has pointed out the main problem is Geertz’s universalizing of 
these categories is the failure to question how they come to be conceptualized and 
authorized (1993, 43). The larger processes of power do not belie the implications of 
Geertz’s argument. But as Asad argues historians have tended to view religion as 
emerging from the secular (1993, 2003). This is itself based on the universalist categories 
                                                 
20 Without a doubt contemporary adventures to consolidate American empire has been made in the name of 
forcing countries that have supposedly rejected modernity to enter the modern global order. This is no 
doubt a cover for creating favorable markets for Western economic interests. Thomas Friedman the New 
York Time’s op-ed writer has made it a habit to call for interventions in the Islamic world based on a logic 
that harkens back to colonialism. The gist of many of his arguments places the West as a category as 
progressive, democratic, good, and modern, opposed by the category of Islamic as backward, terrorist, evil, 
and anti-modern. See Friedman 2002.  
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of modernity that essentialize the categories of religion and modernity. This results in the 
thinking of the secular world as real and the religious as imaginary. In the Muslim world 
the post-colonial state has much to do with the mediation of these concepts. It is precisely 
through state control, both consent and coercion, that establishes the framework of the 
religious and the secular. 
Following the work of Charles Hirshkind (2001) and Saba Mahmood (2001) I 
would like to elaborate on these connections between the religious and the secular in 
terms of its practice in certain publics. As Hirshkind has suggested there is a need to 
think in terms of Islamic counterpublics where citizenship is expressed in forms of 
religious reason. This kind of rationality is quite common throughout the Muslim world. 
A deferment of rational and logical argument to ethical forms of reason based in Islamic 
discourse is a mode of increasingly popular expression in the public sphere. Such 
reasoning is based in an ethical imperative for the virtuous as both Hirchkind (2001) and 
Mahmood (2001) direct us. What is important here is that this is a means to pay attention 
to how religious discourse interacts with secular discourse. As a counterpublic, or more 
appropriately a public, with multiple influences located in a scheme of various publics. 
This concept of Islamic counterpublics then allows a range of positionalities in which the 
interaction of religious reason and secular reason are ethical modalities of critique.21 Such 
differentiation is necessary to understanding the complex worlds of subject formation 
within Islamic modernities. 
 
                                                 
21 For recent diasporic examples of this in the Islamic media see the work of Mandaville (2001a; 2001b) 
and Sardar (1993). 
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Secularism: Provincializing Islam and the West 
The moods and motivations a religious orientation produces cast a derivative, lunar light over the solid 
features of a people’s secular life. 
Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System” in The Interpretation of Cultures, (1973), 124. 
 
A rationalized religion is, to the degree that it is rationalized, self-conscious and worldly-wise. Its attitude 
to secular life may be various… 
Clifford Geertz, “‘Internal Conversion’ in Contemporary Bali” in The Interpretation of Cultures, (1973), 
171. 
 
In the Introduction to The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983) Edward Said proposed a 
category of analysis he called secular criticism. This type of critique he offered delves 
into “local and worldly situations” (26) that makes its intention a kind of affiliation, a 
kind of intersubjective connection. By this he is pointing to the necessity of common 
humanity in his world-view and the larger political goal of criticism in pushing forth 
toward human freedom, a position firmly within the position of modernity. This 
humanism is not without its problems. Indeed someone like Ashish Nandy (1990) would 
criticize it as an imposition of external values. But where these ideas come from is 
perhaps less important than the possibilities they create. The use of secular criticism, I 
would argue, provides a possible opening in the impasse between the universalist 
categories of Islam and the West. As such the concept of the secular might offer a contact 
point from which to further common goals of freedom and emancipation as Said has so 
eloquently argued. 
 In the context of India, Nandy rightly argues that the discourse of secularism has 
been used to subvert the concept of religious tolerance (1990). His view is to dismantle 
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the damage that secularism has done in its use of colonial categories, and to revert to a 
pre-colonial/Gandhian notion of religious tolerance. As important as this argument may 
be, this position fails to see the importance of secularism to religious tolerance and 
perhaps gives up too quickly on the necessity for struggles for secularism.22 In a more 
recent context, Kolluri and Mir (2002) argue for the necessity to articulate secular 
subjectivities in their full complexity. They propose an engagement with secularism that 
allows for long-term struggle that far outweighs its colonial baggage. Arguing that the 
experience of secularism in India has created more debate than consensus, such diversity 
offers greater possibilities rather than closing them off. In short, the pursuit of secular 
strategies offers sites of struggle. 
 As a formal methodological category , Said’s idea of secular criticism is a vague 
one. Said refers to notions of historical time and worldliness derived from Vico to 
describe his thinking of how secular criticism operates. As such it is a process of 
historicizing that offers a sense of clarity and precision. This worldliness is also a way of 
knowing and coming to being. Yet, part of the confusion also lies in the place of the 
secular in relationship to categories such as religion and nationalism. In an important 
article, Aamir Mufti (1998) challenges the claim made by Bruce Robbins (1994) that the 
secular is in opposition to nationalism rather than religion. Mufti agrees that secularism at 
times challenges notions of belonging in nationalism, but he differs however in his 
placement of secular criticism, a device he argues is mutually aimed at religion and 
                                                 
22 See Bilgrami’s (1998) critique of Nandy’s argument. Bilgrami comes to this same conclusion on Nandy 
through his argument of promoting the struggle of secularism through the modern state. See also Bilgrami 
(1994). 
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nationalism. Hence Mufti argues that “secular criticism seeks continually to make it 
perceptible that the experience of being at home can only be produced by rendering some 
other homeless.” Further, “secular criticism is aimed at the mutual determinations of the 
religious and the national, at the unequal division of the field of national experience into 
domains marked by religious difference” (1998, 107). The consciousness of a secular 
criticism is based on an ethical imperative that seeks to parochialize universalisms into 
their particularities. Hence, Said uses the shift from filiation to affiliation, from blood and 
kinship to community and connection, to make this clear. This is a move that takes 
originary claims (filiation) and historicizes their local meanings (affiliation) to overcome 
the paradox of inclusion and exclusion in social categories such as nation or religion. 
 Said’s notion of history, however, falls into trouble from the perspective that it 
seemingly purports to stand in for real history. As Asad (2003, 191), in tentative 
agreement with Mufti, argues the secular is as much endowed with power and produced 
as a system of belief as are nationalism and religion. This is a key point in that it raises 
the question of the role of the state in framing the debates over the secular question in the 
public sphere. But as Asad points out state power does not provide the entire picture: 
“objects, sites, practices, words, representations – even the minds and bodies of 
worshipers – cannot be confined within the exclusive space of what secularists name 
‘religion’” (201). Such a naming is a way of creating categories out of fluid social spaces 
– including secular, religious and national. Secular criticism from this perspective then 
has its greatest utility in gauging the multiplicity of social life. This comes with the 
caveat as Said might argue that secular here does not exclude religion, but is mutually 
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constituted by it. Secularism is then a set of practices that contribute to the creation of the 
category of the secular. But the secular is also found in its relationship to religion, hence 
religion is also responsible for the formation of the secular. 
 Forging a connection between the secular discourses of Western modernity and 
that of Islam is a project that seeks to resurrect shared histories. In these histories are 
practices of power that have created this relationship. As Leila Ahmed (1992, 37) notes in 
her landmark work on women, Islam, and gender: Islam and Western civilization have 
shared histories that have been erased by the experience of colonialism and the 
Orientalist practices of erasure and distortion.23 To constitute this shared relationship is to 
reconsider shared practices and their specific configurations. In this sense the secular is 
both similar and dissimilar in the evolution of these two traditions. But this does not 
discount a mutual perspective of a shared reason that is secular criticism. In reality this 
bolsters the argument for its possibility and specificity. 
 
 
Migration and Class: Muslim Diasporas and Diasporic Muslims 
There is a big difference between the Muslims of the diaspora…those whose parents migrated to Western 
lands…and those who still live in the House of Islam. The latter are far more critical because religion is not 
crucial to their identity. It’s taken for granted that they are Muslims. 
Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads, and Modernity (2002), 310-11. 
 
In the context of Muslim diasporas where does one place secular criticism? The 
importance of this lies in the production of narratives in and through state systems and 
                                                 
23 Earlier I pointed out Derrida’s similar position on the history of the Abrahamic religions. An interesting 
project might also compare the modernity of Western philosophy (e.g. Taylor 1989) with that of Islamic 
philosophy (e.g. Al-Azmeh 1986; Fakhry 1983). 
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the migration process. Class as a subjectivity of relational consciousness is a site from 
which to understand how identities and forms of knowledge are produced. Indeed 
religion plays a central role in this but in a spectrum of positionalities. The process of 
migration itself entails different points of subject formation.24 This is important in 
working class diasporas where the accumulation of capital is dependent in maintaining 
reserve pools of international labor. Migration then is a means to pursue capital and 
greater life-chances. But such opportunity is structured by several systems of power, 
predominantly the state and its forms of governmentality that insure its efficient 
exploitation in the production of capital. Even though the state controls access on so 
many levels, this work also seeks to delineate the shape of such subject formation that 
claims to exist outside of the state. Thus, following my argument of the place of secular 
criticism in Muslim subjectivities, is it possible that the secular of the state is separate 
from the secular of an everyday practice of Muslim subjectivity? Are there points of 
incommensurability between governmentality and subjectivity? 
A related point to class is the construction of race and gender in transnational 
flows of working-class labor. Increasingly, race is becoming transnationalized based on 
histories of colonialism and the increasingly global language of differentiation articulated 
through the categories of race, class and gender. Such practices are not always named as 
such, but the identification of these rhetorics and their genealogies is vitally important to 
struggles against categories of oppression. Gender is a much more visible signifier of the 
global work force. Indeed, in many ways working class migrants are gendered in ways 
                                                 
24 Hence immigration privileges the destination, emigration starting points, migration privileges the route, 
and diaspora the roots. 
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that intersect the categories of race and class. Again, such connections are important in 
discussing categories of social identification that are taken for granted. 
The positionalities of labor migrants in the South Asian diaspora mediated by 
class and the access to capital. Working-class migrations are markedly different from 
their professional counterparts. The most immediate difference is state selection by 
northern countries. Status and class position is also an important element. Converting 
such social and cultural capital into its economic forms comes through a certain sense of 
the world – a kind of secular criticism – what Pnina Werbner (1999) in the context of 
Pakistani working-class migrations has called a cosmopolitan attitude. These ethnic 
worlds as she calls them are ways of recreating cultural worlds in new social 
circumstances where competition is stiff and access to capital is limited. This 
cosmopolitanism implies the possibility of multiple positionalities in contradictory 
circumstances. It is a worldliness that exhibits how multiple subjectivities are formed. 
More concretely, in the example of Muslim diasporas it questions the place of what 
religion means in connection to the secular. Further it probes the possibility of a 
continuum between the two where cultural practices are intertwined in religious and 
secular practice. In this context it is pertinent to ask what religious practice entails, and 
for that matter whether the concept of a secular Muslim makes sense.25 
 Here it is important to ask whether a religious diaspora has a focal point, that is 
what are its homelands, or whether it is a cultural diaspora with a religious guise – 
                                                 
25 Akeel Bilgrami in his essay “What is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity” (1992) 
points us in this direction of thinking of the multiplicity of Muslim identity. 
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Muslim diasporas or diaspora Muslims so to speak.26 Again I would defer to the idea that 
to use Muslim connotes a group of people that is organized by cultural themes including 
religion that is more of a secular conception. In terms of an Islamic modernity this makes 
sense, since Muslims of all spectrum exist in a single universalizing world-view. But to 
call this a diaspora is to also localize this experience to a comparative experience of 
cross-cultural diasporas. Muslims then are correctly differentiated into other cultural 
categories such as nation, ethnicity etc. Further, this argument depends on how Muslims 
in the diaspora themselves place the importance of their religious identities in relation to 
other forms of identification. Akeel Bilgrami has argued that the preeminence of Muslim 
as a category of recognition is because of a surplus phenomenology of identity (1992, 
833). This is an excess that is created out of the relations of power and dominance in the 
modern history of Muslims and Islam. This history of subordination and condescension 
by the West has created this residue without a point, a point of identification that unifies a 
commitment to a struggle – ie. the Muslim cause. This is an important organizing 
principle to further the analysis of Muslims in diaspora. It is a forceful conceptualization 
of the growing identification to Islam in Muslim diasporas across the political spectrum. 
 The question then becomes how do Muslims imagine their experience in 
diaspora? What are the concepts of home and imagined community? How is identity 
constructed? Islam itself has prescribed a mapping of diaspora. Indeed, within Islam, 
migration is one of the foundational and recommended elements of the faith. The 
                                                 
26 Relatedly, Boyarin and Boyarin (1993) argue that for some Jews the promised land as a homeland was 
marked within the national boundaries in which they lived. This was an autochthonous relationship to 
places they migrated to, rather than an actual nation-state in the form of Israel. 
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example of the Prophet’s migration is an important and influential moment in the early 
history of Islam. Hadith of the Prophet have also been recorded stating his 
recommendation of travel for Muslims.27 As many scholars of religion in diaspora have 
noted there is a language of diaspora in Islam (Eickleman and Piscatori 1990; Haddad 
1993; Lewis 1994; Metcalf 1996). Based in Arabic it maps the spatial compatibility of 
the Islamic world to that of the non-Islamic world. Its vocabulary includes: dar al Islam 
(land of Islam), dar al aman (land of peace), dar al harb (land of war), dar al ahd (land 
of pact), dar al sulh (land of truce), dara al ahl e kitab (land of people of the 
book[Abrahamic religions]), etc. The word dar here meaning land, abode or house. This 
language of home and away for Muslims certainly does have its meaning. For these 
religion scholars however, this reliance on the language of religious meaning is based 
upon homogenous categories of religious belief. This is not to say that there is no 
complexity, but it does seem far too simple to read Islamic practice outside of the 
possibilities of subjectivity and the heterogeneity of Muslim identity. In other words, it 
assumes there is no meaning for the Muslim outside of religion. Islam as a universalizing 
agent translates into an exclusively religion centered subjectivity. Further, that a secular 
discourse and description of diaspora is not at work from a religious point of view. As 
Talal Asad might point out, the question how this language is authorized and in what 
ways does it reinscribe power. There are also outstanding questions of the multiple ways 
that Muslims identify especially according to national, ethnic or other cultural 
identifications. 
                                                 
27 See Masud’s (1990) textual analysis of migration in Islam. 
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The complexity of Muslim diasporas is further complicated by the possible 
geographic components. Is it possible to think of religious homelands as separate from 
ethnic and national ones? What are the homelands of religious diasporas? And in the case 
of Islam does everyone agree? There is certainly a large degree of interplay between 
religious, national and other forms of cultural diasporas. The task then is to make sense of 
how and when they become important to articulate. Here the role of imaginaries in terms 
of homelands, fantasy, imagined communities and identities offers ways to think beyond 
the essentialized Muslim subject. 
 
 
Ethnographic Imaginaries: Actually Existing Secularism (Taking Back the World) 
A secular subject like history faces certain problems in handling practices in which gods, spirits, or the 
supernatural have agency in the world…Labor, the activity of producing, is seldom a completely secular 
activity in [South Asia]; it often entails, through rituals big and small, the invocation of divine or 
superhuman presence. Secular histories are usually produced by ignoring the signs of these presences. Such 
histories represent a meeting of two systems of thought, one in which the world is ultimately, that is, in the 
final analysis, disenchanted, and the other in which humans are not the only meaningful agents. For the 
purposes of writing history, the first system, the secular one, translates the second into itself. 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provicializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (2000, 72) 
 
What does it mean to see the world as enchanted? For a long time now, the secular 
ethnographic gaze has become accustomed to seeing the world as disenchanted, to use the 
words of Weber. The legacy of objectivist science has very much been a part of the 
modernist project of collecting and understanding knowledge as it exists in the world. 
Such knowledge production has been part and parcel of projects of modernity and 
modernization. The limitations of such projects is based in the failure to complicate 
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categories of analysis.28 The challenge that lies in this work is to undermine traditional 
descriptive modes of ethnographic surveillance of anthropological subjects with accounts 
of how processes of exploitation, labor and capital maintain structures of power. The 
examples of these processes of access and control come in the narratives of the 
experience of labor migrants. As feminist scholarship has long shown the methods with 
which forms of knowledge are made sense of, has much to do with positionality and 
multiple subjectivity (eg. John 1996; Mani 1989; Mohanty 1987). As a tool of 
comprehension and analysis this approach is centrally about starting points. For secular 
social science, then, the study of religion is done through a secular practice. This 
necessary bias has for long has created a particular view of the religious in everyday life. 
Dipesh Chakarbarty’s call to for a reexamination of the non-secular in secular history 
provokes multiple issues within the study of life-worlds. To begin such a process also 
precisely entails an examination of the methods and problems of writing such histories.29 
 Part of this task of writing history has to do with ethnographic time, both secular 
and religious. These differing modalities of space and meaning complicate how 
ethnography is to be understood. For anthropological practice, the ethnographic present 
offers a description of processes understood in secular time. But where are religious 
conceptions to be found? Indeed as Talal Asad provocatively asks “what might an 
anthropology of secularism look like?” (2003, 1), one must also seek to find actually 
                                                 
28 In terms of an analysis of state projects see Scott (1998). 
29 See Chakarbarty’s essay “Translating Life-Worlds into Labor and History” in Provinicializing Europe 
(2000) in particular. 
 57
existing secularism.30 Both the religious and the secular are imagined categories. They 
exist as active imaginaries that combine to form a particular subjectivity. In this 
ethnographic analysis imaginaries are understood as devices for constructing and 
maintaining what Zizek has called ideological fantasies (1989). These are the realms in 
which possibilities are imagined and framed as choices in reality. These are narrative 
structures that allow for a certain realization of forms of action that are themselves 
sedimented in mythological constructions of belief and possibility. Hence to probe the 
constructions of secular and religious categories of discourse is to assert a framing and 
potentiality of action within existing structures. 
 
 
The Case of Pakistan: Islam and Modernity 
In Ayesha Jalal’s Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam 
since 1850 (2000), she traces the historical development of the concept of Islamic 
religious identity in South Asia. As she argues the category of Muslim was reconfigured 
in the shift from the colonial to the modern period. Hence religious identities, in their 
multiple forms, she argues is a central component to the experience of South Asia. 
Further, Jalal finds that the use of the explanatory categories of religious communalism or 
cultural nationalism to explain the articulations of Muslim identity in South Asia as 
                                                 
30 Geertz cheekily forebode this in a footnote stating that some subtle Malinowski will bring the 
anthropology of religion to speed by writing a book called “Belief and Unbelief (or even ‘Faith and 
Hypocrisy’) in a Savage Society,” in his essay ‘Religion as a Cultural System,’ (1973, 109, ftn 33). Here 
unbelief and hypocrisy is in reference to what he calls the anthropological study of religious 
noncommitment.  
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ultimately flawed. Indeed, the utility of such categories is a contextual strategy. As she 
concludes: 
the problem of difference in South Asia as a whole and of Muslim identity in 
particular cannot be addressed without forsaking the dichotomies between ‘secular’ 
and ‘religious’ as well as ‘nationalism’ and ‘communalism’. Just as the first set of 
opposites can be found blending into the thought of a single individual, the second 
binary pair shares a common conception of majoritarianism and minoritarianism in 
the privileging of the religious distinction. The majoritarian premises of Indian and 
Pakistani ‘nationalism’ derive equally form the colonial project of religious 
enumeration. While Indian nationalism asserts its inclusionary idioms in the secular 
garb and Pakistani nationalism in an inclusionary religious mode, neither avoids the 
pernicious process of exclusion resulting from the implicit denial of difference. It is 
the singular and homogenizing agendas of both nation-states which have wittingly or 
unwittingly created the space for religious bigots seeking political power to target 
vulnerable minorities…That the dominant idioms of states, and the ways in which 
these are reflected in elite discourse, so often fly in the face of the shifting structural 
contours of politics at the base is reason enough for abandoning some of their more 
questionable premises. Exploding ‘communalism’ to uncover the manifold and 
contradictory interests driving the politics of South Asia might enable a better 
appreciation of difference as a lived cultural experience. (Jalal 2000, 575-6) 
The place of communalism in debates in India as well as the issue of fundamentalism in 
Pakistan are caught between the categories of secularism and religion as Jalal argues. 
Undoing these categories is to also rethink the connection between the secular and 
religious in a spectrum of subjectivities. In the experience of South Asia, and Pakistan in 
particular, the idea of Muslim identity is complex and myriad. Indeed, a number of 
thinkers have heavily influenced the specific tradition of South Asian Islam from 
Muhammad Iqbal to Abu Ala Maududi.31 Their philosophies and approach to exegesis in 
Islam must be contextualized to other thinkers of the Islamic tradition such as Ibn 
Khaldun, Ibn Rushd, Afghani, Qutb, and Shariati to name a few that grappled with the 
                                                 
31 Iqbal’s most immediate text important to this study is The Reconstruction of Religious Thought(1982). 
For a political analysis of Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami see Nasr (1994). 
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issue of modernity. The influence of their thought in relationship to the development of 
the state in this argument requires a separate study. 
 For this analysis, it is imperative to think of how these narratives of primarily elite 
discourse shape the narratives of local subjectivities though the interaction and travel of 
labor migrants. Indeed, complex systems of religion and religious practice are at work in 
the Pakistani context. The state as it promotes and controls religious practices has also 
played an important part in the shaping of secularism and possibility of its practice. As I 
propose, a reading of labor migrant narratives through secular and religious discourse 
offers the possibility to recoup strategies for liberatory struggle. This requires complex 
readings of the state and the everyday practices of those who navigate these systems. 
Between the secular and the religious lies the ethnographic investigation of this research. 
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Chapter 2: Debt in a Time of Migration: History,  




This chapter argues for the place of transnational labor migrants understood as economic 
subjects of the state. The place of labor migration in relation to the economic 
development of the nation-state is an important site that connects the state to the 
discourse of neoliberalism. As an economic ideology of international financial 
institutions, economic subjects of the nation-state become transnational economic 
migrants. Economic migration, I argue, is interrelated to how the state perceives its role 
in labor migration. The state as an actor in these circumstances induces labor migration 
according to its relationship to the market reforms that are part of the neoliberal 
approach. Hence, there are multiple state effects that are created through the state itself 
and transstate institutions. 
 My concern of this chapter is the of writing of labor migration history and the 
tracking of transnational labor flows. As theorists of globalization argue, the process of 
migration is itself difficult to capture since it involves multiple sites and constant 
movement. Labor migration is in large part structured through a global political economy 
that offers insights into the relationship of labor to capital. Such a structure is also 
responsible for the production and patterns that labor migration follows. As I argue this is 
a systematic relationship to the historical context and effect of the larger schemes of 
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modernization and development. The second issue that is faced in the writing of labor 
migration history is one of methodology. To conduct this type of analysis, multi-sited 
research is an invaluable approach that tracks migratory movement. This involves a 
methodology that invests its thickness in a single subject in multiple places (Marcus 
1995). It is at once a question of the archive, searching through official documents and 
bureaucratic tabulations, and of transforming migrant narratives into life-worlds. 
 Ethnographies of globalization in many ways owe a debt to political economy 
approaches, whether acknowledged or not. Indeed as many scholars of diaspora, 
international migration, and globalization argue, political economy analysis and 
commitment to political communities is increasingly dire.1 As a way of entry into this 
discussion of the political economy of development and its relationship to labor 
migration, I examine the work of Gunnar Myrdal and the implications of his works An 
American Dilemma and Asian Drama.As a problem of ethnography, the connection of 
numerical data to issues of migration process are complicated by how labor migrants 
actually live and the narratives of working class life-worlds. As such I argue for a model 
of historical inquiry that examines structures and processes that are formative of global 
and local histories. This approach requires an investigation into the intellectual debates 
important to the practices of the state and policy institutions in terms of understanding 
how particular structures emerge. As such, Myrdal’s influence in development economics 
offers insight into the role labor migration has played within the political economy of the 
nation-state. Further, I argue that such macroeconomic views are linked to the production 
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of labor migration flows and the local subjectivities of labor migrants. Pivotal to this 
argument is the place of labor migrant subjectivity understood as a life-world in which 
economic decisions and choices are structured by macroeconomic policies. 
 
 
Transnational Labor History 
The task of labor history is to chronicle worker narratives and experiences left out of the 
grand narratives of national histories. Labor history, in its intention, focuses on social 
change and the idea of progressive futures. Local histories of the workplace, labor, and 
their constitution in workers life-worlds offers insight into the processes and practices 
that constitute subject formation. In doing so the work of labor historians has tried to 
understand the relationship if workers interests as they are represented in cultural life. 
This move offers the insight of how subjectivities are made, unmade and remade.2 E.P. 
Thompson’s classic monograph The Making of the English Working Class (1966) 
embodies this concern of the labor historian to record the complexity and vibrancy of 
working class culture. What is remarkable about this work is the chronicling of cultural 
life in terms of secular and religious practices. For Thompson such practices were 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 See for example the trenchant critique of Tölölyan (1996), and Gordon (1991) on the potential directions 
of activist research. 
2 Eric Hobsbawm (1984) offers an outline of the problematic of the labor historian in his collection of  
essays. Also, see Marcus and Fischer’s (1986) essay “Taking Account of World Historical Political 
Economy: Knowable Communities in Larger Systems” for an important review of the overlap of 
ethnography, labor history and political economy. The relationship of  political economy to globalization 
has also received a revitalized attention in anthropology in the last decade, see Alonso (1994), Kearney 
(1995), Nonini (2002). 
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constitutive to the creative acts of working class consciousness. The combination of these 
practices in his study demonstrated the minutiae of class consciousness. 
Thompson’s theory of class has received much attention from a wide range of 
critics.3 His basic argument in the premise of The Making argued that class is relational, 
contingent and mediated. In short, for Thompson class is a historical relationship that 
happens (1966, 9). That is class as a category is a historical one, it is located in secular 
historical time. As such, the context for the formation of class revolves around the idea of 
consciousness. From this point of view class is actively made and constructed. Further, 
one can also argue the need for the place from which class is unmade and remade as a 
process of identity formation. That is, as certain elements of class are constructed others 
can be taken apart. Through this process of creation, this production of identity involves 
an accumulation and layering as well as loss. The flexibility of Thompson’s ideas of class 
were symptomatic of how he approached his subject of study, that is the contradictory 
and complex world of workers cultural lives. 
The simplicity of Thompson’s class theory is complicated throughout his 
ethnographic text. The strength of his description is his account of the myriad world of 
worker subjectivity. Describing this process was far more important than its theorization 
for Thompson, as can be seen in the sheer difference between the short theoretical 
introduction and the lengthy historical ethnography. But more importantly for the concept 
of subjectivity, Thompson focuses on how workers interpret events rather than simply 
                                                 
3 See William H. Sewell, Jr.’s essay “How Classes are Made: Critical Reflections on E.P. Thompson’s 
Theory of Working-class Formation” in Kaye and McClelland (1990) for a critique and elaboration of 
Thompson’s formulation of class. 
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how workers are constructed in historical events. This is important in thinking through 
the complex analysis of subjectivity. Multivocality is certainly now a necessary aspect of 
complex ethnographic work in anthropology. And as much as these narratives must be 
placed within structures of power, it is also important to note the vibrancy of debate and 
the many positions taken on issues. Hence, Thompson is able to combine theoretical 
concepts of structure and agency in his ethnographic descriptions that provide for a rich 
analysis of cultural change. 
A different, yet similar, challenge remains in the current conjuncture of global 
capitalism as it is structured by the dictates of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Globalization has transformed the world marketplace by the demands of capitalism. 
Within this system is the relationship of labor to capital that has intensified the mobility 
of both. The goal of economic globalization is the free movement of capital and the 
controlled management of its counterpart, labor. This movement across borders has 
created a massive pool of working-class migration that exists as a reserve army of labor 
of capitalism. What was once the domain of domestic and national labor pools is 
increasingly international and transnational.4 The flexibility of capital and the use of 
technology creates the need for a transnational labor proletariat. The ease with which 
these labor diasporas are put to work has much to do with the lack of protection, much 
less existence, of international trade unions. Protections for labor migrants come in the 
form of stringent immigration laws that are prohibitive of such flows rather than 
                                                 
4 Lisa Malkki (1994) argues that the international is a transnational cultural form. One might also see 
differences in usage as these concepts relate to the state. International as between states and transnational 
across states.  
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standardizing the industry of labor migration. As legal scholars of immigration law such 
prohibitions are largely politically motivated. The function of prohibition in immigration 
law is an ambiguous category of selective enforcement. 
For labor history, globalization offers tough challenges in terms of making sense 
of workers lives. Recent ethnographic work has focused on globalization from a multi-
sited perspective that emphasizes locality much in the way that Thompson did for the 
English working class.5 But how does one make sense of these labor diasporas 
themselves — the process of movement, the making and unmaking of subjectivities, 
cultural capital etc. This essay makes a proposal for understanding the subjectivities of 
labor migrants through an analysis of the political economy of globalization and its 
relationship to cultural lives and subjectivities. By combining an argument of how 
development as a modernization project has created its own form of analysis, I offer an 
analysis of how economic development has influenced modes of subjectivity for labor 
migrants. This reading of development has to do with understandings of cultural identity 
and economic conditions, most specifically race and poverty. Further I offer a theory of 
class formation in the context of South Asia and through the process of labor migration. 
 
 
Decades of Debt (More Than A Lifetime) 
In the post war era the Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank) began with the promise of growth, prosperity and capital redistribution. 
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This was supplanted by neo-liberalism and its economic goals of structural adjustment, 
privatization and the freeing of economic markets and capital for corporate investment, 
much has changed. As is becoming increasingly clear, the economic project of 
globalization is far more complex and nuanced than policy-makers and economist would 
have us believe. Globalization in the economic guise of neo-liberalism is said to be the 
necessary ingredient to successfully achieve modernity. Modernity in this sense can only 
be achieved through a cocktail mixture of neo-liberal ideas of the economy and the 
market, and democratic principles of openness and freedom.6 Modernity, of course, is 
multiple in its meanings. Yet dominant discourses surrounding neo-liberalism and its 
agenda obfuscate the transition from the variety of liberalism from which it grew. Within 
this macro-view of modernity is also the easily forgotten micro-level of everyday life. For 
many underdeveloped countries undergoing modernization, poverty is one of the central 
questions to address. As ethnographies of development have increasingly shown (e.g. 
Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Gupta 1998) development projects fail to account for the 
upheaval they create in everyday life. Indeed, at the heart of such a dilemma is the 
difference between principle and practice. Development economists once brought the 
hope of liberalism and its implementation in the form of modernization to the third world. 
Such hope has become embodied into a system we now call globalization and neo-
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Some of the best recent work in Asian/Asian American studies is from the perspective of women in the 
global economy. See for example Chang (2000), Louie (2001), Parreñas (2001). 
6 The notion of the economy as a coherent domain is of recent origin that coincides with the launch of neo-
liberal economics in the post-war era. See Mitchell (1998). Foucault made a similar argument in his 
“Governmentality” essay (1991, 99) in terms of the role of the state in the control of the ‘economic’ sphere 
in European history. In its origin, the economic sphere simply referred to the organization of the family 
controlled through the legal-juridical apparatus and other similar means of the state. As the state and the 
nation began to take shape in accordance with the modern conception of the relationship of the nation to the 
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liberalism. Early development approaches are now coupled with the logic of globalization 
as the mandate of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund. The stated goal of such a program has long been to free 
capital and markets to create more capital while in the process creating enormous 
amounts of national debt in the third world. The consequence of such actions has created 
a world of proletarian diasporas following the pattern of labor chasing capital. For 
development economists, however, the emphasis has been inordinately on capital. Labor 
fleeing its indigenous locations is of little concern. This is not to say that such a pattern 
has not been noticed, but rather this is the pattern that is sought without regard to the 
consequences of such upheaval. 
 The shift to neo-liberal policies also saw a shift in approaches to the role of the 
state and state intervention. This turn from the model of the Keynesian welfare state to 
the capital market state reflected the ideological growth of neoliberal governmentality.7 
This was not just an ideological construction, it translated into material forms of control 
and governance. The social concerns of the state increasingly dissipated into the concerns 
of suprastate organizations and forms of transnational governmentality more concerned 
with controlling economic markets and capital. Governmentality, first conceived by 
Michel Foucault as: 
                                                                                                                                                 
state, the economic sphere shifted in meaning. The family as a unit was broadened into the concept of 
populations that were to be controlled and coerced. 
7 For an insightful Gramscian analysis of the state in world politics see Augelli and Murphy (1993). On the 
concept of neoliberal governmentality see Ferguson and Gupta (2002). An early analysis of this shift comes 
in the work of Polanyi (1944) in which he argued that this shift from state to market depended on ideas of 
efficiency and progress. The market here is imagined as some kind of ideal space from which resources are 
properly allocated and the state and its interventions will only corrupt such processes. 
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1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge 
political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led 
towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this 
type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the 
formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, 
in the development of a whole complex of savoirs.  
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of 
the Middle Ages, transformed in the administrative state during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, gradually become ‘governmentalized.’ (1991, 102-103) 
The various technologies of power shape populations through knowledge production 
connected to the state and its governmentality. Apparatuses of the state are then linked to 
political economy knowledges in a rationalized logic of the ‘state of justice.’ As these 
definitions suggest, Foucault maps governmentality in the experience of European 
history. The processes involved for the post-colonial state might be similar but their 
historicization differs since many of the major changes that occur for third world states 
take place in the mid to late twentieth century. Here I am specifically referring to the role 
of international financial institutions and the role they play in constructing populations 
through the political economy of power and government rationality. The era of 
decolonized states relied on national state intervention as a form of controlling the 
domestic economy. But under the economic policies of the IMF, for example, state 
intervention becomes a policy of global integration. Such a shift also marks a change in 
the constitution of state power. Far from being less significant, state power takes on new 
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tactics of regulation and control through these economic policies.8 Indeed, to understand 
Foucault’s idea of governmentality outside of the West, is to apply this concept as 
Western centers (states and suprastate apparatuses) conceive of them in non-Western 
locations. That is, governmentality as a rational of the state is an export item from the 
accumulated experiences of European and Western history. Neoliberal governmentality is 
then an extension of what is already an operational tactic. However, it adds a nuanced 
character to the global effect of governmentality. For international financial institutions 
that operate at the suprastate level, their role in managing economic success is one that 
was previously maintained primarily through state power. Here states are not only 
exerting influence over their own nations but on others as well, hence the impositions of 
imperial state power over others. The imperialism of the multinational age of capital is 
more visibly an empire in which a few nations dictate the affairs of others.9 
 This is apparent in the process of debt accumulation that now exists for third 
world countries. Debt and its relationship to transnational governmentality is one that 
leaves third world debtor states at the beck and call of the economic policies that serve 
the interests of northern countries. Debts accumulated through loans via neo-liberal 
policies are based on a history of state intervention. The theory of these policies is that 
they will create markets that will increase production and contribute to the global market 
                                                 
8 For arguments that suggest the increasing insignificance of the nation state see Appadurai (1996) and 
Miyoshi (1993). These positions fail to see the complexity of diasporas and their histories located in 
oppression and alienation as a product of the state.  
9 This is not to say that military force is out of the question. Hardt and Negri’s (2000) useful arguments on 
this point are misleading in arguing that modes of production and the basic working of capitalism has 
changed. Rather, the shift in apparent imperialism to a covert empire is part of the triumph of 
governmentality and its ability to enforce state power without calling it state action. 
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of goods. The history of such policies has been disastrous.10 Rather than creating jobs 
such policies often contribute to the conditions of massive unemployment (Khan 1999). 
This in turn has created the need for large reserves of international labor and mass 
migrations of labor seeking opportunities in international markets. For long such labor 
migrations have remained on the peripheries of economic policy making. Primarily 
because the attention of such policy making has been at the level of the nation-state and 
more specifically the function of the state apparatus in creating suitable economic 
markets. These policies have ignored the palpable impact of these policies in the 
everyday lives of citizens of debtor countries. Again, this has much to do with the 
conceptual approach and the understanding of labor markets and labor migration. It is to 
this history which I now turn. 
 
 
The Political Economy of Race and Poverty 
Gunnar Myrdal holds an important place in the study of development and development 
economics. As much as he was a pioneer in these fields, he was also a theorist of 
modernity. As such he offers insight into the vision of modernity’s relationship to the 
practices of modernization and development. Myrdal’s work in his volumes on the 
United States and South Asia applied economic models to social problems. This 
development approach was the hallmark of his belief in the value of modernity. This 
same approach continued to be applied in these areas under regimes of neo-liberalism. It 
                                                 
10 The classic work on debt accumulation is Susan George (1992) and the work of the Transnational 
 71 
was his methodology that became the ideological narrative that connected liberal (in 
Myrdal’s case a variant of progressive socialist) economics to the neo-liberalism of the 
international financial institutions that is the current dominant economic paradigm. The 
connection of Myrdal’s development theories and those of neo-liberalism, is situated in 
the place of state intervention. Myrdal’s theory of the state relied on the post-War 
conception of soft states and strong states.11 A soft state is one that lacks in discipline and 
guidance. If the state is only enforced in this condition, efficiency will follow. As such 
the state will then be able to act for the benefit of its citizens through good governance. 
This involved shoring up state power and creating a certain order based in the discipline 
of the bureaucratic apparatus that holds the potential to solve the ills of its population. 
Strong states are further exemplified by a robust economy and efficiency. 
Within this narrative of economic practices, development and state formation, lies 
an often ignored component – that of labor migration and the pursuit of a decent wage. 
This final point raises the issue of how subjectivities are constructed in development 
discourse. Statist approaches to development, progress, and growth target economic 
quality of life as an index of proper development and adequacy in terms of governance. 
But as I will argue the disjunctures of this approach can be read into the gaps of the 
theory of state intervention and structural adjustment. International labor migration is 
itself an obvious consequence of structural adjustment, but its rationality is not. Nor is it a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Institute based in Amsterdam. 
11 See also the work of Rudolph and Rudolph (1984) for a combination of this state theory with a culturalist 
model. 
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central component of development schemes. Yet it is integral to the struggling economies 
of working class South Asians that are the economic subjects of these policies. 
The publication of Myrdal’s work had a profound and widespread impact. An 
American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy12 published in 1944 
became mandatory reading for scholars of race in the US. Indeed it was used and cited in 
landmark civil rights cases.13 Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 
published in 1968, was less well received. Myrdal’s influence in South Asia was perhaps 
not as prevalent as in the US, but was nonetheless important.14 Important critiques of his 
methodology attacked his universalistic approach as ethnocentric (Geertz 1969), and also 
questioned Myrdal’s liberalism in constructing these dilemmas (Wallerstein 1989). 15 
Myrdal’s somewhat simplistic adherence to the values of the Enlightenment is an easy 
target of criticism. The critique of the ethnocentrism of Enlightenment values and their 
application in development and modernization does not change the fact that this approach 
was a highly influential model for many countries to follow. Nor does it contemplate the 
fraught histories of collision and fusion that result from these forced marriages of societal 
                                                 
12 The over 1400 page tome was also issued in a condensed version with the subtitle The Negro in America. 
13 See Baker (1998), Jackson (1990), and Southern (1994). The use of American Dilemma in policy had a 
huge impact on the role of social science. As Lee Baker argues Myrdal engaged with the Howard school of 
race scholars, many of which were influenced be the Chicago school of sociology, most prominently 
Robert Park and Franz Boas’ cultural anthropology (1998, 176-187). Here much of the thinking on race 
was on the ‘negro problem.’ Park was also heavily invested in resolving the ‘oriental problem.’ See Yu 
(2001) and Palumbo-Liu (1999). 
14 On the role of Myrdal’s development theories in India see Harriss (1998). Although Harriss focuses on 
India and Indian development economists, a similar influence can be found in most of South Asia. 
Myrdal’s study focuses mostly on India in terms of countries in the subcontinent. His dismissal of Pakistan 
relies on his belief that Pakistan lacked in personality and individuality (Myrdal 1968, 232). This may seem 
like his theories favored India, however, elsewhere in a strange footnote Myrdal makes the claim that 
Pakistanis blend better with Westerners whereas upper class (high caste?) Hindus appear unsophisticated, 
introverted, tense, and “lacking in humor and the simple graces of togetherness” (331). The cultural racism 
of such claims is apparent, yet it complicates other of Myrdal’s obvious biases. 
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and cultural change. To be sure, there is a modernist condescension in Myrdal’s ability to 
name dilemmas and dramas. But it is not only the ethnocentricity of his values that is 
under attack, the application of these values and the mechanisms through which 
modernizing countries integrate them according to the context of their particular histories 
remains a controversial topic. 
Myrdal’s belief in state social engineering led him to take up massive studies in 
the US to solve the problem of race, and in South Asia to resolve the issue of poverty. His 
methodology remained resolute and changed little from situation to situation. Part of his 
fascination with the US and South Asia was to apply the same principles to entirely 
different situations. This period from the research completed in American Dilemma 
(1944) and Asian Drama (1968) marked the height of Myrdal’s exploratory work on the 
international scene.16 His models of social engineering were based on state intervention 
and the problem of distribution. His belief in social democracy led his argument in 
American Dilemma to see the US racial problem as centrally about economic inequality 
and access. This was then applied to the context of Asian Drama in which the racial clash 
between whites and blacks was replaced with the context of international struggle 
between advanced rich countries and poor ones (Jackson 1990, 332). For Myrdal these 
class division were the main problem that threatened the future of the world. But it 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Apparently a third AD under the working title of African Damnation was never written because of 
Myrdal’s growing cynicism and political scandals. 
16 This is reflected in the collected essays on the Myrdals entitled Models, Modernity and the Myrdals 
edited by Kettener and Eskova (1997). The book begins with an essay by Walter Jackson entitled “Gunnar 
Myrdal, Social Engineering, and American Racial Liberalism,” and ends with the sole essay on Myrdal’s 
work in South Asia in the collection with a similar title by Timo Kyllönen “Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama 
(1968) and Development Studies.” 
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similarly displayed his simplistic ability to interpret two different forms of hierarchy, race 
and class, as based on the same principle. 
Myrdal’s emphasis on state intervention as a central component to achieving the 
progressive and liberalist aims of his economic theories, although simplistic from certain 
angles, opens up interesting point of conversation. In Asian Drama his contention that 
Pakistan’s major dilemma over formation of the state lay in the struggle between 
religious and secular nationalism frames the debate over development in Pakistan. 
Grappling with modernity and its meaning in Pakistan is centrally about this debate (see 
Chapter 1). Yet, he claimed that Pakistan as a soft state had the commitment to 
modernization, but lacked in will and social discipline of its people. Such statements 
deserve further analysis into his rationale. Indeed, Myrdal in using state theories, often 
espoused myths of the lazy native and culture of poverty theories to explain the failure of 
the state. Myrdal’s argument was similar in the context of US race relations. In this case 
there was a strong state but weak people. The force of the argument in American 
Dilemma placed the burden of the problem of race as one of poverty. The solution was to 
come from the realization of elite whites that this could not be maintained. 
This is the basic pattern of Myrdal’s theories. It was up to elites in the state to 
change things for the betterment of their respective countries. For positive progress to 
occur, redistribution has to occur at the societal level at the behest of the state. The role of 
the state is to then manage the crises of the populace.17 This state theory relied on 
                                                 
17 Following a similar policy orientation, the Harvard school of economists involved in advising the 
Pakistan government argued that Pakistan’s economic growth was a result of carefully planned state 
intervention, see Papanek (1967). 
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Myrdal’s brand of economics that saw the idea of socialism as a term for modernization 
(1968, 808). This seemingly odd definition is the ideological framework from which he 
approached the promise of technological modernization. He recognized that technological 
innovation of economies was inevitable and desirable. For him such changes would need 
to focus on the redistribution of resources primarily through state intervention. 
Modernization of societies, for Myrdal, is a function of the state. What is important 
though in his approach is his pairing of the economic with the social and the political. For 
redistribution to occur at the economic level, the organization of societies and cultural 
practices had to be changed. 
For Myrdal there was much to be cautious about in theories of modernization as 
they impacted society and social relationships. Moreover, he was an ardent believer in 
national economies that were self-reliant. In the case of soft states in South Asia, this 
meant guarding against the rapid industrialization of national economies and the 
displacement of the peasantry through technologies of agricultural production. Rightly, 
his reasoning argued that this would create massive levels of rural-urban migration and 
large amounts of undereducated and unemployed reserves. As a policy manual Asian 
Drama did not shy away from predicting the outcomes of such policies. Myrdal was 
scathing in his attacks on modernization theorists who argued that the social 
consequences of such rapid changes were a necessary consequence of modernity. Instead, 
Myrdal argued a position of self-reliance and social responsibility that argued for the 
ethical position that the state maintain the welfare of its people. 
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But Myrdal was self-conscious of theories of modernization and their impact. He 
was well aware that his suggestions were not always heeded, much less possible given 
the complicated situations he was advising. In this context Myrdal is surprisingly glib 
when it comes to the future of labor migration from South Asia. Myrdal and his 
associates argued that labor migration would be of no consequence for the future 
development of South Asia and had relegated the issue to one of their appendices(see 
Appendix 11, ‘Notes on Migration,’ 2139-2149). This was primarily based on his 
approach to modernization that would benefit indigenous populations and the prospects 
of closed populations.18 Here he referred to the stringent immigration polices enacted by 
many Northern countries after the First World War to control their populations and 
growth.19 They further argued that if any migration was to take place it would happen in 
the educated professional classes, of which such migrations would be insignificant 
(Myrdal 1968, 1459-1462). 
Contrary to modernization theorists who called for the mechanization of 
commercial agriculture to create a reserve labor force and urban migration from the 
countryside, Myrdal called for a strengthening of local agricultural production and a 
disciplining of the work ethic to maintain domestic economies. This argument aligned 
itself with postcolonial demands for national self-determination but also made evident 
Myrdal’s inclination toward culture of poverty theories. This was at the time the 
dominant paradigm in certain circles of development. The justification of mechanization 
                                                 
18 This did not prevent them from making the bizarre suggestion that migration could also act as a substitute 
for birth control and hence ease the problems of population growth (Myrdal 1968, 2147-2148). 
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was often based on ideas of the lazy peasantry rather than an understanding of how 
technology influenced social relationships (Scott 1977; 1985). But instead of embracing 
this complex concept of sociality, Myrdal argued in favor of disciplining working 
populations towards greater production and growth. The broad strokes of Myrdal’s 
economic theory resisted the idea of a uniform capitalist system that is the predominant 
thinking of current globalization thinking. Instead his approach relegated the 
interconnectedness of the capitalist system, and the dominance of Northern economies 
over Southern ones, as more of a nuisance to progress. In his vision, national economies 
could become robust without external intervention. Indeed, in terms of World Bank aid 
he agreed with the premise that multilateral aid should supersede bilateral aid in the 
interest of creating multiple political relationships (Myrdal 1968, 682). This tacit 
agreement was to foreshadow the current economic dilemmas that many debtor countries 
face today. This particularly evident in terms of how bilateral and multilateral aid from 
international financial institutions have shaped the global economy. 
Logically, Myrdal and his associates argued that international migration would 
play no major role in the South Asian economies if states were to follow his advice of 
strong state intervention resulting in robust national economies. In his model of strong 
national economies, there would be no need for migration if jobs were made available 
domestically.20 But even as they did, international migration began to take on a new 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Myrdal again surprisingly misses the working class labor migrations from South Asia to the UK after the 
Second World War. Asian Drama published in 1968 also came on  the cusp of the important 1965 
Immigration and Naturalization Act in the US that drew in large professional class migrations. 
20 This is still the predominant argument of economic advisors to the Government of Pakistan many of 
which have been in and out of positions in the World Bank and the IMF. As the state continues to rely on 
international aid it simultaneously makes a domestic argument of national self-reliance. 
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significance that many South Asian states were slow in recognizing. The oil economies of 
nearby Gulf countries demanded cheap labor from surplus reserves, of which South 
Asians were the closest. Myrdal had completely failed to see migration as a vastly 
important source for capital and labor flows to and from South Asia. Given Myrdal’s 
ideological world-view this is understandable. But there was also a darker side to this 
miscalculation. The state interventionist approach divorced of Myrdal’s progressive 
beliefs in redistribution and self-determination have become the mainstay of the 
economic regiments imposed by the structural adjustment of international financial 
institutions. Petrodollars from oil-rich Gulf countries also helped this shift from 
redistribution to debt management through the neo-liberal conception of globalization 
and the state. The influx of capital into the Gulf countries and its rise as an oil power in 
the 1970s via OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties) laid the ground 
work to accelerate greater centralized control of the global economy (Augelli and 
Murphy 1993, 134). This was garnered by American interests in the oil-production of 
Gulf countries and indirect control of Gulf states.21 This also followed massive waves of 
labor migration to Gulf countries in building, construction and eventually to fill positions 
in the service economy. 
For sender countries, labor migration is a tactic to ease the problems created 
through underemployment, unemployment and the surplus of labor created through rural-
urban shifts. Although the link between unemployment and migration seems an obvious 
one by now, structural adjustment policy-makers have little interest. This is not to say 
                                                 
21 On the racist orientation of the US-Saudi corporate relationship see Vitalis’ (2002) compelling history. 
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that structural adjustment has nothing to do with migration, for policy makers it is simply 
not the central issue.22 The unit for development economists in the world of structural 
adjustment is the nation-state. Maintaining the integrity of the nation-state requires a 
particular understanding of the market in economics. This is the market of the domestic 
economy that relies on imports and exports and the production of commodities. The 
attitude of structural adjustment policy-makers is that the movement of people is merely a 
by-product of market economies adjusting to standardization. This is of course jargon for 
years of economic displacement and debt accumulation becoming the burden of working 
people. Decades of loans in the name of development have resulted in higher 
unemployment and less opportunities for South Asian workers (see for example Khan 
1999). The obvious conclusion then, in the face of stifled life chances in home countries, 
is the attraction of working abroad. 
Gunnar Myrdal and his associates enter into this logic through the noble agenda 
of eradicating poverty. And indeed many of the measures they examined looked to the 
effects of the demise of agricultural production and the peasant classes through the Green 
Revolution in South Asia. Here economic categories take on social and cultural effects. 
As economist S. Akbar Zaidi states, the Green Revolution in Pakistan, and for much of 
South Asia for that matter, was a major watershed in the mid 1960s that led to major 
                                                 
22 Both the World Bank and the IMF have carried out various and sundry evaluations of labor migration on 
national economies. See for example Borjas (1999) and Russell and Teitelbaum (1992). But as my 
interviews with administrators for the World Bank in Pakistan demonstrated, such awareness does not 
imply any interest. This was the uniform response of the economists and policy makers I interviewed. Their 
explanation of this was not that migration was unrelated, but that it was intentionally ignored. The value of 
remittances, social and economic capital is of course of unestimable economic value in terms of rural and 
urban life in Pakistan. The Pakistani state has for long taken remittances quite seriously since it directly 
benefits from them. 
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transformations in ‘economic groups and classes, political affiliation, and even culture.’ 
(1999, 21) The social and economic upheaval created by these agricultural changes led to 
an enormous surplus in labor reserves. This was much in line with modernization 
theorists that argued for the necessity of such changes. The result in Pakistan did not 
however lead to the massive growth of industrialization. Instead large pools of labor were 
left without adequate jobs, training and opportunities. Beginning in the 1970s and the 
advent of petrodollars to Gulf countries, South Asian labor migration to the Middle East 
became a major venue of outsourcing. Large construction contracts in Gulf region 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and to a lesser extent 
North African countries such as Egypt and Libya were attracting skilled and unskilled 
workers by the droves. For example it is estimated that in 1981 the Pakistani population 
in the Middle East was some 1,414,000 (Gilani 1985, 29). These numbers were to ebb 
and flow throughout the 80s and to the early 1990s when the Gulf war caused many 
workers to abandon their contracts and to head home. 
Many workers as they went abroad were looking to payoff debts back home and 
to eventually continue with their lives making money to allow them to get married, pay 
for homes, purchase land etc. This in turn created a migratory relationship to work, travel 
and home that has now become commonplace. With no other alternatives in home 
countries beholden to international debt, migrants travel the world seeking work at a 
steady pace and wage. From the Middle East to East Asia to Australia to the migration to 
Europe and North America, Pakistanis and South Asians have formed a modern day labor 
diaspora. Myrdal in the thinking of the 1960s failed to predict this from happening. This 
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was partially a consequence of their development approach that was ahistorical and full 
of the biases of overemphasizing the state and its elite. This agenda of Myrdal’s that was 
fixed on the strategies of economic planning and interventionist policies of the nation-
state failed in pursuing the regional and eventual global consequences of such 
modernization. Indeed, Myrdal was aware of the dangers of modernization but his 
economic strategies did little to stave them off. 
The intellectual history that took Myrdal from An American Dilemma to Asian 
Drama needs a bit more resuscitation. This strand of intellectual thinking reflected an 
idea of modernity that viewed difference in a particular way. In the legacy of 
anthropological ideas, Myrdal’s work repackages the culture of poverty thesis such that 
the idea of pathological cultures can also be understood as stunted economies. And much 
in the way that the logic of structural adjustment has led to massive debt accumulation in 
the third world, the theories of Myrdal were blind to the ways in which working people 
are forced to stave off poverty in the search of a better life. Indeed the policies of 
structural adjustment imposed by the World Bank on countries such as Pakistan has much 
in common with Myrdal’s understanding of the dramas that plague Asia. In the work of 
Gunnar Myrdal is to be read a theory of modernity, of how the practice of development 
economics might have worked out, yet failed so miserably largely in part through 
Myrdal’s ethnocentric assumptions. Such predispositions are based in conceptions of race 
and class that are still prevalent in economic policy making, as well as transnational 
discourses of identity formation. What is clear though, is that in the face of failing 





In the Introduction to Donnan and Werbner’s edited volume Economy and Culture in 
Pakistan: Migrants and Cities of a Muslim Society (1991), they argued in favor of social 
analysis that goes beyond the local community toward a global view. For anthropologists 
this argument has gained wide acceptance. But the reality on the ground is quite different. 
Their arguments stemmed from the realization that their field sites had fundamentally 
changed and that cultural analysis had to follow suit. By the beginning of the 1990s it 
was clear that almost every aspect of social life in Pakistan was directly affected by 
migration and urbanization. Their rationale, following theories of modernity was that as 
life speeds up and the search for economic opportunities increases, movements of 
populations at a mass scale create new and unique circumstances, albeit temporary ones. 
Culture itself is forced to adapt and change at a rapid pace. 
 Their argument was composed in a typically anthropological way. To begin with, 
ethnographic research on Pakistani migration has followed a fairly traditional, in terms of 
discipline, path by focusing on local social structures and stratification. Indeed this 
research has rightly asked questions about kinship, family, biraderi, religion, social 
organization, and at times class and gender. But with the comings and goings of the 
migrant into the anthropological imaginary a simple question of everyday life becomes 
something quite different. What do these categories mean to migrants who might 
transgress these boundaries while perhaps still maintaining them? Communities are 
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obviously changing in fundamental ways, for the definition of community is now at 
stake. For much of the home country migration research in Pakistan these questions have 
examined family structure and home life to understand how going away changes such 
everyday lived experiences. Economic conditions and the reorganization of social life is 
the model on which much of this literature is based. 
Emphasis on how economic conditions are created needs to be explored further. 
Certainly, these are issues that have been discussed in the migration literature (see for 
example Addleton 1992; Amjad 1989; Levebvre 1999). Yet the source of this material 
has more often than not been based on the study of one locale. The relationship of 
different field sites needs to be understood and multiple communities and levels of 
community should be compared. The failed agricultural schemes and the mistakes of 
decades of debt have led to the rural-urban shifts and out-migration of the poorest areas 
of Pakistan primarily from the Punjab and North West Frontier Province. And even 
though there is the push of poverty, underdevelopment is another barrier. It is clear that 
large amounts of labor displacement occurred through the effects of the Green 
Revolution. But the fact of underdevelopment, that is access to education, salaried and 
wage work, certain governmental facilities, has also much to do with where particular 
opportunities are made available. Specifically the availability of such facilities is clearly 
greater in certain provinces than they are in others.23 
                                                 
23 As a side note, both institutionally and symbolically such material circumstances translate into an index 
of ethnicity and race that has much to do with the legacy of colonial theories of the martial races, in terms 
of Punjabis and Pashtos in their abilities as workers and warriors. 
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On the other side of the agenda, migration research has prominently examined 
immigrant life in host countries on the premise that return to a home country seems 
unlikely. Here we engage with ideas of identity and the cultural politics of home and 
away. The relatively established fields of migration research and studies of race and 
ethnicity are fully engaged in these pursuits. The study of diaspora as the connection of 
host and home countries offers the challenge of analysis of migratory communities in 
multiple sites. 
Out of these two streams of host and home research emerges a third link: the 
passage. How is it that migrants, economic, political and otherwise, make their way to a 
destination? This is not only a question of logistics – was it a ship, was it a plane, which 
flight, which documents, which smuggler, how much money – but also of a frame of 
mind. It is a certain consciousness and practice of social capital. At the core it is about 
work, labor and making money. It is about putting forms of knowledge to use in the act 
of migration and migrant subjecthood. Out of this narrative of seeking a better life is also 
a narrative of expectation and the anticipation of certain prospects: the proverbial golden 
dream of making it in the fantasy of the lone superpower the United States. Internal to 
this is a critique of the limitations of labor chasing capital across the globe that is also a 
vital element to a discourse of workers rights and entitlements. A discourse of economic 
freedom of which I will say more in the next section. Out of these research objectives, 
arises the necessity of mutli-sited research. Indeed, the role of the ethnographer is put to 
the test of relevancy in the approach to research. To track economies and migrants, the 
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ethnographic eye is taken to places outside of what is formally known as a community 
and into broader formations of globalization and transnationalism. 
 Paul Gilroy’s work in The Black Atlantic (1993) argues for a diasporic formation 
that spans several continents and multiple locations. Such an approach is instrumental in 
this research. For working-class South Asians in the migration circuits of globalization 
their subjectivity is complex and multiple. Indeed, as I have argued through the example 
of the development economics of Gunnar Myrdal, as economic subjects of the state and 
the global economy, labor migrants form social and cultural relationships through the 
experience of migration. In this regard, recent ethnographic work into the historical place 
of such workers has aided important insights into the subterranean worlds of labor 
migrants. Donald Nonini in a special issue of Critical Asian Studies (2002) outlines the 
importance of studying regimes of globalization and transnational migrants. In an earlier 
essay. Nonini (1997) investigated the new cosmopolitan subjectivities of Malaysian 
Chinese as they navigate the opportunities of the global economy such as smuggling, 
labor contracting and trade. This research follows this similar trajectory and provides a 
detailed ethnography of these practices. Nonini’s project provides the insight of 
comparative processes of migration for transnationals and the shifting modes of subject 
formation and identity. On the US side, Peter Kwong’s book Forbidden Workers (1997) 
is a historical study that offers important comparative details for this project. As an 
expose he chronicles the ways in which Chinese migration to the US is created and 
sustained through particular conditions in both of these countries. 
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 Aihwa Ong’s work on the cultural logics of transnationalism (1999) provides the 
most sustained ethnographic examination. In this wide-ranging study Ong investigates 
the complexity of transnational through a structural argument to understand strategies of 
migration and capital accumulation. In large part, her investigation explores capital 
wealthy transnationals as they reconfigure ideas of family, identity, and work. Indeed, 
this study offers an understanding of what she calls flexible citizenship and the regimes 
under which such strategies of human action flourish. The importance of this concept to 
this work is that it offers a conception of cosmopolitanism for elites that differs for those 
of the working-classes. As an ideological structure, however it combines the interests of 
these groups in the unified desire for capital accumulation and economic opportunity. 
The difference then is in the flexibility, that is the navigation of systems of migration of 
nation-states. As I argue in Chapter 4, citizenship is tied to concepts of illegality and 
framed within debates on migration. As such, this relationship is important to the 
construction of labor migrant subjectivity in the translation of an economic subject into 
social and cultural relationships. This aspect of subjectivity is a particular experience of 
sociality. 
 Across nations migrants take with them their identities and understandings of 
sociality. Through work and the experience of migrancy is produced a story of 
subjecthood. A tale of citizenship to the world, but not only a cosmopolitan kind typically 
relegated to those of the professional classes who bring the privileges of a certain kind of 
education to the new world, but of a working class offering their bodies as collateral to 
make enough to send home remittances to their families and loved ones. Travel is a 
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stepladder from which ones departure is from South Asia, with a layover in the Middle 
East or East Asia, with a final destination to Europe and more so toward the economic 
might of the United States. Legality becomes an issue in containing bodies for their 
brawn over their social lives and history. The documents and status of the immigrant is a 
state of transition in which one is received, and importantly conceived. 
 An important aspect of locality and translocality, that is how places, ideas, and 
cultures travel, is the formation of identities. To return to the model of Gunnar Myrdal’s 
economy of culture, race and class concepts are the world in which migrants enter in 
transnational circuits. Certainly, hierarchy and differentiation is nothing new to them, but 
it is to the new concepts of identification and interpellation that they must adjust. To this 
world of race and class must be added the significant dimension of gender. That a 
majority of working class Pakistani migrants are male, and often reconceptualize their 
communities in terms of bachelor societies is of great significance.24 How these concepts 
of identity are employed in the context of migration is of vast importance to 
understanding transnational labor history. This is also a question of context. What I have 
thus far argued is that political and social identities are placed within economic contexts. 
Indeed for macroeconomic policy makers, migrants are economic subjects with little 
agency. Their lives are manufactured and structured through loans, market policies and 
state interventions. In large part this is true, but much more color has to be painted into 
                                                 
24 This phenomenon of officially sanctioned male migrants has been carefully crafted by the Pakistani state 
weary of losing the honor of its women. This follows the example of most other South Asian countries with 
large pools of women in the transnational workforce that are subject to mistreatment. Only recently have 
female migrants been allowed passage mainly as professional class workers (accountants, IT, doctors, etc.) 
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this canvas. Indeed, much is to be learned from the subjectivities of labor migrants as 
they navigate globalization. 
 
 
Labor to Work: The Hidden Working-Class 
In the world of race and class are examples of labor diasporas traversing the world. In 
early November 2000 I was sitting with a elderly Punjabi gentleman at a teastand in 
Islamabad. We had gotten to know each other through our chance encounters. He was 
now driving a taxi to make a living and had also spent some 20 years working abroad in 
the Gulf and Europe. We were discussing the news of the day when he began to talk 
about the hypocrisy of politicians. I asked him what he thought about all of the loans the 
Pakistani government had been taking from the World Bank and the IMF. To him these 
sources of money were a way to line the pockets of corrupt political leaders. The debts 
that created from these loans becomes the burden of normal citizens, he argued. People in 
Pakistan found it hard to make a living without opportunities for employment, so they go 
abroad to make a little money. He was clearly exasperated by this situation arguing that 
there was not much anyone could do accept maintain a faith in Islam. When I asked him 
what he meant he replied through ethical reasoning of Islam that condemned political 
corruption. He continued to not only critique politicians but Muslim leaders that were 
equally corrupt from his point of view for going along with the corrupt practices of the 
government. 
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 This analysis revealed the many layers of the situation transnational labor 
migrants find themselves in. On the one hand they are citizens of a nation-state that does 
not provide access to the life-chances necessary to maintain a living. In the process of 
debt accumulation by the state, workers are forced to find capital elsewhere. This 
complex negotiation itself is informed by a set of ethical responses to such a situation. 
This form of religious and secular reason in which the workings of the state are viewed 
through the ethical lens of Islamic discourse is part of labor migrant consciousness. It is a 
form of agency in a highly structured world that bars opportunity and access. For labor 
migrants, this agency propels them into multiple migration circuits simultaneously as a 
citizen of a nation, in this case Pakistan, and as economic migrants seeking capital 
abroad. This history of transnational migration is intimately linked to the relationship 
between Pakistan and the United States. For as was apparent in my interviews with 
transnational labor migrants in Pakistan, the US represents a certain kind of access to 
capital not otherwise available. The US is a particular location of transnational labor 
migrations returns us to the narratives of Myrdal and his ideas of development. 
 Out of the history of post 1965 migration to the US, that saw an unprecedented 
boom in immigrants from many Asian countries, emerges a specific telling prominent in 
the story of US race relations. It revolves around a new American dilemma, the myth of 
the model minority. From this narrative we are told that Asian Americans are hard-
working, disciplined, go-getters with at times family values that are near in composition 
to the Protestant ethic. As a racial wedge between other people of color, Asian Americans 
are the model for the machinations for racial capitalism. The prize of Asians as honorary 
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whites has created a confusing picture of the complexity that is Asian America. Lost are 
the stories of working class immigrants and resistance to structural oppression. In the 
discourse of the model minority as it relates to race and ethnicity, the disappearance of 
working class narratives has been an effective tool in maintaining economic inequality. In 
hiding immigrant working class resistance, the use of the model minority takes on truth-
effects that change the terms of poverty. The logic of individual rights and bootstraps 
theories are taken to their extreme to the point where poverty is simply a state of mind. 
We are told that the model minority is an entrepreneurial class rather than a working 
class. The point of analysis is not only one of terms, but one of how to understand the 
changing nature of work and labor. 
 The tragic events of September 11th have brought out these contradictions in 
phenomenal ways. Firstly, the national conscious has become aware of a sizable Arab 
American and Muslim American community. The issue of immigration policy has been 
turned on its head with greater scrutiny of brown skinned peoples. And one need not be a 
Muslim or of Arab origin to feel the brunt of this gaze. This is amply attested for in the 
numerous racist attacks on victims of mistaken identity: Sikhs, Hindus, Latinos, and 
countless others who looked like they do not belong. 
 For many economic migrants handcuffed by documents and the pursuit of capital, 
their placement into US race relations can be startling. When the dramas of Asia enter the 
dilemmas of America we are reminded of the struggle of the labor migrant. What Myrdal 
mistook as a problem in the conception of the poor – that is poverty as a state of mind – is 
more effectively a different kind of cultural struggle that eluded culture of poverty 
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theorists. Imbricated within the modernity of migration is a discourse of freedom. An 
articulation of cultural and social rights in a world shaped by the structures of capitalism. 
This discourse of freedom is a product of modernity itself. It declares the aspirations for a 
different world promised through the act and sacrifice of migration. Indeed the working 
classes are now searching the globe for capital and more importantly the right of social 
justice. 
In the days after 9-11 anthropologists are challenged with new dilemmas. There is 
clearly a new sophistication in the management of US immigration taking place that 
involves new technologies of state control and coercion. The integrity of civil liberties 
and democratic values are on trial. With the number of detentions into the thousands, 
with some released and others unaccounted for, and massive investigations continuing 
with communities judged by the color of the skin or their place of worship. I am 
reminded of Mohammed Rafiq Butt a Pakistani immigrant who died of heart failure in 
detention on Oct. 25, 2001. He was picked up like many Muslims following the attacks 
because he was unable to provide adequate documents. When asked for his identification 
he provided his passport showing he had overstayed his visa. With no knowledge useful 
to the federal authorities he was on his way to deportation. I wonder what issues of 
justice he sought in his life. I think of the fright that he must have faced in the crisis and 
moral panic. I wonder if he had dreams and what they might have been. I also think of the 
strange twists of healing. Of how a communities introduction into the national 
consciousness takes place through tragedy. Of how racial violence, taunting, the 
destruction of property and the fear of communities are oddly intertwined in creating new 
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popular representations. Yet, the question remains of whether justice in the end will 
prevail. 
 These tales of migrancy are but one facet of a growing working-class diaspora 
that spans the globe. Through this movement a cosmopolitan subjectivity is constructed 
that must negotiate concepts of capital in its many shapes and forms. As identities are 
made, unmade, and remade, class and race concepts are gaining new currencies. The 
work of Pnina Werbner (1990; 1996; 1998; 1999) demonstrates this complexity in 
Pakistani diasporas. Her work highlights some of the theoretical issues that this 
ethnography interrogates in understandings of capital, political imaginaries, 
cosmopolitanism, and transnational religious movements. Emerging out of these concepts 
are discourse of race and class concepts that are constantly shifting and taking on new 
meaning. Tracing these patterns through South Asia to the Middle East, Europe and 
North America, this project outlines how new diasporas from Pakistan are taking shape. 
Through the economic discourse of globalization, social and cultural lives continue to 




Certainly economic theories have played their part in the lives of labor migrants. 
Structural adjustment is not only about capital markets, it is about labor markets and their 
transnational flows. As capital takes shape into commodities through the global 
landscape, what happens to labor? Does it take shape in the commodification of work? 
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What do the life-worlds of labor migrants look like? It is to these questions that I apply 
my ethnographic analysis. Beyond subjects of economic policies are the adjustments and 
the manipulations that craft subjectivities in the experience of labor migration. 
 As a tentative theory of class formation it is instrumental to think of how working 
class narratives enter the realm of modernity, transnationalism, capitalism and 
globalization. These secular narratives are themselves connected to religious narratives 
that maintain identity and cultural worlds. These are important narratives in the 
categories of identity in the transnational worlds of labor migrants. 
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Chapter 3: Traffic in the Diaspora: An Ethnographic History of 




On 5 August 1972 Idi Amin informed his country that “Asians came to Uganda to build the railway. The 
railway is finished. They must leave now.” The state shortly thereafter expelled 50,000 Asians. We tend to 
remember this act only as an example of Idi Amin’s heinousness, and we forget the hand of the British, 
who did two things: They created the idea that desis are only temporary workers whose culture is so 
transient that they can only make their lives in their homeland, and second, they made it very difficult for 
the Asians to enter Britain (whose “Commonwealth” was shown to be an utter sham by this episode). The 
social being of the desi is structured by this imperial racism. 
Vijay Prashad “Of a Girmit Consciousness,” in The Karma of Brown Folk, 100-101. 
 
This chapter is a historical ethnography of the states relationship to the labor migrant 
industry of Pakistan. It elaborates the system of state control in the migration process by 
comparing practices of 19th century indentured labor to contemporary labor migration. As 
a description of the current migration industry in Pakistan, it explores the dimensions of 
how labor migration is patterned and produced in relationship to the state. As I argue, the 
contemporary migration industry is structured through a historical relationship to 
practices in the indentured period. This can be seen in the history of the role of the state 
to migration, particularly in the bureaucratic and legal institutions developed to control 
migration such as recruitment agencies and the crafting of immigration laws. This is 
particularly important to the formation and struggle over labor contracts that is the 
essential agreement between employer and worker in the negotiation of wage work. Thus, 
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this chapter argues for a historical reading of the states relationship to transnational labor 
migration through a comparison of the colonial and postcolonial period. 
 There is a long history of South Asian labor migration that links the experience of 
indentured labor migration of the 19th century to the current patterns of contractual 
international migration. Indentured labor filled the gap created out of the abolition of 
slavery in the Western world by the British in 1836 and in the US by 1865. This labor 
migration of indenture was constitutive of a particular diasporic experience. In this essay 
I argue that the current pattern of international labor migration follows a set of general 
practices that are genealogically related to the experience of indentured labor. Further the 
conditions of contemporary contract labor migration in many ways parallel those of 
colonial indentured migrations. This is in contrast to the suggestion by some writers that 
colonial indentured migration be understood as separate from postcolonial migrations 
from South Asia (Ghosh 1989, Mishra 1996).1 From the standpoint of political economy, 
the relationship of these two histories can be connected through the imperial goals of 
empire-building. During the colonial period this was a position that depended on direct 
capitalist expansion and economic exploitation into new markets. In the postcolonial era, 
empire-building maintains the capitalist mode of production and the further expansion of 
capitalist market logic through the indirect controls of international financial institutions 
                                                 
1 Mishra makes the important distinction between diasporas of exclusion under imperial and colonial 
control and diasporas of border during the postcolonial era (Mishra 1996). The difference in these eras is 
between regimes of state control and the emphasis of how this influences identity formation. This is a 
useful distinction when comparing the professional diasporas that have migrated to the US and UK for 
example, but ignores the complexity of the working class migrations currently taking place from South 
Asia. It also fails to articulate the changing role of state control and analysis of power over historical time. 
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and military intervention.2 Transnational labor migration in the current historical 
conjuncture is a product of such a logic. Empire is the political means of control in the 
economic world of globalization. 
 The parallels of indentured migration and current contract migration require a 
structural analysis of their historical linkages. These two forms of migration in many 
ways share a similar pattern of state regulation and control. Contemporary international 
migration labor is a voluntary form of migration marked by the use of contractual 
agreements between employer and worker. The use of contracts in the contemporary era, 
and in some cases the standardization of this contract, relies on a logic of state regulation 
that begin with 19th century indentured labor. These contracts are generally a wage 
agreement that sets the terms of work and payment. Recruitment is an essential aspect of 
contemporary labor migration that is structurally shaped through colonial practices of 
information and knowledge collection of colonized indigenous communities. This is to 
say that the Orientalist practices of colonial ethnology inform current labor recruitment 
and patterns of labor migration. Recruitment in the contemporary pattern is also of two 
kinds as it was in the colonial era: one, a state sanctioned legal practice, and the other an 
extra-state sanctioned illegal practice. Additionally, labor migration in both eras was 
envisioned as non-permanent, fixed labor, with the expectation that contact workers 
would be repatriated upon completion of their services. Labor migrants are often 
maintained as non-permanent residents through legal policies of the state that regulate 
and enforce this status. Such a status is not easily maintained, however, and legal status 
                                                 
2 Hardt and Negri make this connection in their arguments about the changing nature of empire and modes 
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constantly shifts through a mixture of selective enforcement and the pressures on many 
countries to develop a semi-permanent reserve labor force. Hence, migrants are often 
encouraged to prolong contracts or to go from contract to contract creating a community 
of workers whose status is uncertain. International boundaries are then porous in this 
legal sense of nation-state sovereignty. This explains the logic of the state in controlling 
migration through access to the rights of citizenship, and at other points changing its 
position because of migrant struggles and protest. 
 The experience of indenture relied on the accumulative set of regulations that 
emerged from the 19th century history of the South Asian diaspora. Many of the current 
legal codes and state processes of selection are based in the genealogies of these 
experiences. Recruitment itself and the preferences for workers based in particular 
national and ethnic groups are generated through the discourses of race, class and gender 
established in the colonial era. These discourses remain today in a modified form. What 
is apparent in these similar patterns, however, is that although some of the dynamics of 
labor migration have changed, the general structural apparatus is the same. This reflects 
the relations of power that are in place for labor migrants in a state system that seeks to 
control labor and capital. 
 Through these historical periods of South Asian diaspora, there has developed a 
way of being that Vijay Prashad has called a girmit consciousness (2000). This is derived 
from the agreement (girmit) that South Asian workers (girmitiya) in Fiji signed to return 
to their homelands upon completion of their tour of duty during the colonial period of 
                                                                                                                                                 
of production when discussing its relationship to transnational labor migrations (2000). 
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indenture. This consciousness is driven by an anti-work ethos that in order to survive its 
diasporic condition must persevere in its labors to escape the strictures of migrant life. 
State racism, sexism and class conflict are some of the parameters that establish these 
boundaries in the lives of migrant laborers. In their life-worlds labor migrants are 
simultaneously made through imagined cultural relationships and structured through the 
experiences of state regulated industry. Girmit consciousness is a reflection of this 
historical circumstance and the dynamics of social and cultural change. Such a 
consciousness relies on the development of the idea of a contractual agreement and the 
purpose such an accord has in the values and principles established in the modern 
democratic idea of the social contract. In this relationship is the promise of social and 
economic rights accorded to labor migrants in exchange for their work. 
This chapter examines the history of South Asian labor migration through a 
contemporary ethnographic example. Through this historical reading, an ethnography of 
the migration industry in Pakistan connects how the process of migration itself is 
controlled and managed from the point of view of the home country. Persian Gulf 
countries have served as a source for labor migration from South Asia since the 1950s 
and as early as the 1930s. The movement between these regions began to reach levels of 
mass migration in the 1970s and continues to be an important site in working class 
migrations from South Asia Much of the scholarship on international migration that 
views South Asia as a source for this labor supply examines this trend in terms of the 
potential for economic and social development of domestic economies. Labor migration 
to northern countries such as Europe and North America represent a qualitatively 
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different experience in the step migration from South Asia and the Middle East. This 
chapter examines the role of such migration in creating a labor migrant consciousness. 
This consciousness is shaped by the relationship of multinational capital and 
transnational labor. Such a structure crafts a particular migrant subjectivity that in order 
to mediate this system must pursue forms of social and cultural capital that enhance this 
experience. Further, the agency of social and cultural capital allows the further pursuit 
and exchange of economic capital. The history of migration is based on economic 
demands for certain labor classes. By tracing the work narratives of Pakistani labor 
migrants, how identities are constructed in terms of nationality, ethnicity, race and 
religion, will be addressed. Finally, this chapter examines the South Asian labor diaspora 
as a migration circuit.  
 
 
System of Indenture 
The period of indenture in the South Asian diaspora follows the end of slavery in the 
British colonies in 1837 until its suspension by the colonial Indian state in 1917. In this 
time period some 28 million men and women from the Indian subcontinent would go 
abroad to work in the plantations of East Asia and the Caribbean. This work was both of 
an agricultural and industrial kind in that many plantations were also locations where raw 
goods were refined and manufactured. Comparatively, this migration of indentured labor 
from South Asia and other regions was in stark contrast to the violence of forced 
migration inflicted upon millions of enslaved Africans. The continuation of empire-
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building that required the enslavement of Africans subsequently required the indenture 
predominantly of Indians and Chinese.3 In this context of slavery to indenture, empire 
was already shifting its meaning as the logic of its practices and its relations of power 
remained intact. The logic of empire produced the category of labor as a static category 
that was itself based in historically contingent meanings and conceptions. The category of 
‘free labor’ based in colonial assumptions of freedom and the idea of work was of 
important use in the experience of indentured migration. It functioned as a kind of 
experimental discourse and practice for the colonies and the metropole in which the 
categories of labor and work gained new meanings.4 This shifting meaning allowed the 
state to efficiently control labor populations against dissent and protest of the conditions 
of work through the constraints of these categories. In other words, as the state category 
of free labor shifted, new forms of social control were implemented in maintaining 
efficient and docile workers. As much as this was created through the categories of 
identitiy, they were also an accumulation in the technologies of control through the 
material agreements of labor contracts and the promise of rights provided in the 
implications of a social responsibility to this contract. 
 In this process recruitment served as an important rite of passage for labor 
migrants. Recruitment was of two kinds: formal and informal. Before intervention by the 
                                                 
3 See Walton Look Lai’s (1993) comparative history of indentured Indians and Chinese in the Caribbean. 
4 Kale (1998) makes this important argument in the context of Indian indentured labor. See also Bagchi 
(1999) for his discussion of the duality of the concept of labor. His argument about the cultural histories 
invoked in the labor concept of course goes back to at least E.P. Thompson’s important intervention in 
labor history (1966). In the Indian context Prakash (1990) makes this argument in terms of discourses of 
freedom and the history of the concept of bonded labor and its relationship to cultural inventions of 
tradition. See also Chakarbarty (1989) and Fernandes (1997) for historical analysis of social categories of 
workers in the context of Indian factories. 
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colonial state to establish a formal regulated market, indentured migration followed 
closely the patterns established in slavery. The difference was that with the abolition of 
slavery, wage work was the standard. The problem was that wages themselves were not 
standardized and this created practices that were manipulative and arbitrary. This nascent 
form of human trafficking was the target of regulation by the colonial state. Regulating 
this market was in the interest of the colonial state in that by controlling such migrations 
it could benefit through establishing a migration industry of recruiters and agents that 
could be taxed through labor contracts. It also served the device of controlling this market 
in the interest of regulating and formalizing both the national and the colonial economy 
(Ramdin 2000). 
 The regulatory apparatus that encouraged this migration was based on a system of 
coercion and exploitation. In 1837 the colonial Government of India passed the 
Emigration Act that induced the recruitment of Indian labor to work in the plantations in 
the outlying colonies. This Act stipulated that  
the intending emigrant must appear before an office designated by the Government of 
India, along with the emigration agent, who was required to produce a written 
statement of the terms of the contract. The length of service was to be five years, 
renewable for further five-year terms. The emigrant must be returned, at the end of 
his service, to the port of departure. The vessel taking the emigrants was required to 
conform to specified standards of space, dietary etc. Each ship was required to carry a 
medical man to care for the coolies, An omission from the Act was the absence of 
similar requirements for the ships bringing back time-expired men to India (Tinker 
1974, 64). 
This mandate did not go unnoticed and was met with popular protest and agitation. Much 
of this debate drew its arguments from the anti-slavery movement and argued that 
regulated indentured migration was state-sanctioned slavery with a contract. Within this 
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initial Act there were sufficient ambiguities and omissions to make the conditions for 
worker exploitation all the worse. For example, as in the above passage, the conditions 
for transportation although specified were fairly arbitrary and allowed the possibility for 
the accruement of debts by laborers through the commonplace practice of high-interest 
loans to brokers. The key omission of return passage was a complicated matter for 
indentured migrants to negotiate through their meager wages much of which was remitted 
to their families. 
 The recruitment of laborers depended on the colonial logic of race and ethnicity. 
Workers were attributed characteristics that were assigned the attributes of productivity 
and discipline. As Harish Puri argues, after the historic Mutiny of 1857 the British 
reorganized the Indian army into the fictitious ‘martial races’ (1983, 19). These were the 
soldiers considered to be of the greatest fighting material and also seen as loyal to the 
British. In this classification Punjabis were the chosen race over other martial races such 
as Tamils from southern India that were deemed untrustworthy. Recruits from the Punjab 
province were viewed as strong fighters yet docile in nature. The role of Punjabis in 
military recruitment was subsequently transposed into schemes for worker recruitment 
because of their experiences abroad with colonial military expeditions. Mustapha Kamal 
Pasha has argued for a more structural understanding of how this Orientalist racism 
operated (1998). First, the recruitment of Indians into the military served to establish the 
relationship of the colonial state apparatus with the local Indian population. The principle 
of selectivity was a rational decision based in colonial Orientalist knowledge. As such it 
served to divide populations and simultaneously control them. It was this experience in 
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the colonies of state selection that led to certain groups of labor migrants to be recruited 
in greater number then others in the experience of indentured migrations. This process of 
overt coercion by the British to the state structures that they established allowed the 
consent of indigenous Indians. Therefore, Punjabis functioned as the indigenous 
representative of the colonial state. 
 In addition to the racial components of recruitment it was highly important that 
many of the indentured laborers came from agriculturally depressed areas that were 
famine prone. This is true in both India and China (Look Lai 1993), and was also an 
important factor in the movement of labor to the Americas (Jensen 1988, Takaki 1989). 
This push factor created the work opportunities initially for men to sustain themselves 
and those who supported their families in their home countries. As this form of work 
migration began to expand it attracted younger men who sought to accrue capital in the 
pursuit of greater social status and material gains such as providing the capital to get 
married and build a home for their family. Later in these migrations did women enter into 
the diaspora largely in the informal market of smuggling and trafficking.5 These 
economic components are vital to understanding how it was that cultural discourses of 
race, nationality, ethnicity, gender and class combined in the logic of recruitment. 
 By the 1850s there were depots in Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and soon thereafter 
in Karachi and Lahore. These depots were uniform in design and served the purpose of 
housing migrants until they were sent off to colonial plantations. Here the state mandated 
                                                 
5 See for example Kale (1998, 167-171) on the debates in India that connected class to gender and women 
to morality. In the context of Chinese women in the United States see Cheng (1984). She describes the 
formal and informal movement of women in 19th century and its relationship to the concepts of work and 
labor. 
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that an emigration agent oversee the recruitment of laborers and the appointment of 
recruiters who themselves were required by law to obtain recruiting licenses from the 
Indian Protector of Emigrants. Migrants were kept in these depots until embarkation 
where they were housed and provided with the proper facilities such as a kitchen and a 
hospital. Here labor migrants were brought into the subjectivity of indenture. As Tinker 
writes “the labourer was ready to begin the process of becoming an indentured coolie; 
henceforth he was just one of many human parts in a vast assembly process” (1974, 137). 
This subject formation revolved around the health and well-being of the labor migrant to 
insure their productivity. This was maintained through a series of inspections, 
documentation and the disciplining by agents and recruiters (Tinker 1974, 137-142). 
 By 1917 the imperial and Indian governments ended state-sanctioned indentured 
migrations. By this time the outcry against indenture by Indians in public debates had 
gained momentum, and because the changing political economy of labor migration no 
longer promised certain gains in capital growth, the indenture system came to an end. 
This era marked an important moment in the creation of the international labor market 
system. And although, mass indentured migrations ended, other patterns emerged that 
were less formally controlled by states until after the Second World War. Indeed, the 
interwar period was marked by a global economic downturn. It was with the rebuilding of 
the global economy and the rapid industrialization of many areas of the world after the 




Contemporary Labor Migration 
It is true that contemporary labor migration is not coercive, conscribed or indentured as it 
was in the colonial period. This does not, however, undermine the argument between the 
relationship of the colonial and postcolonial patterns of labor migration. As I argue, the 
colonial regulatory structure far from being completely dismantled, is historically shaped 
in the contemporary patterns and production of transnational labor migration. The 
argument here is that this system of power that shifted from colonial to postcolonial, is 
relatively intact and operates in a similar fashion. As empire shifted its discursive 
practices from slavery to indenture, so did it from indenture to contemporary contract 
labor. Coercion, here, is also of an indirect manner in the way that Gramsci would point 
our attention (1971). That is to say that the process of direct coercion has transformed 
itself into an indirect coercion that is not altogether questioned. There are also specific 
mechanisms within current contract labor migration that mimic the conditions of 
indentured migrations. Current labor migrations are indeed produced and patterned as 
Saskia Sassen argues (1998). Specific economies, whether regional or national, organize 
the movement of human migrations. In this sense coercion is also produced. The choice 
to migrate is not entirely within a spectrum of drastically different options. The options 
are themselves constructed out of the broader issues of macro-economics. That is, 
migration is the only choice, for example, given conditions of under- and unemployment 
and the debt crisis of the state (see Chapter 2). And following the displacement of 
agricultural workers and peasants through mechanization and the Green Revolution in 
South Asia, labor migration follows a pattern that is not only rural to urban, but 
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transnational. The push factors of famine in the indentured period are now replaced by 
the push of technological displacement. This is certainly a complex relationship in the 
global economy of shifting labor patterns and the spread of commodities and 
technologies. 
 Much like indentured migration, labor migration in the current historical 
conjuncture is patterned by a set of interconnected yet contradictory global developments. 
The relationship of labor to capital in the capitalist mode of production insists upon a 
contradictory logic. In these developments an emerging regime of global labor supply has 
been managed and structured. The contradictions of this logic are apparent in the 
streamlining of labor as sources of an international reserve and the simultaneous 
racialization and feminization of this labor. This labor market segmentation is then a 
device for controlling the labor process in terms of wages and kinds of work. Racialized 
practices of labor exploitation are increasingly becoming a source of containment of 
reserve labor forces in the global market (Persaud 2001). These racial and cultural 
assumptions are historically embedded in the practices of labor recruitment. Through 
labor migration then, is a system of racial and class identification that has a transnational 
character. In the case of South Asian labor migrations the sources for these cultural 
racisms is historically linked to narratives of race and class established in the colonial 
indentured period of migration. 
 
 
Ethnography of Labor Migration in Pakistan 
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In the experience of labor migration from Pakistan some commentators have noted that it 
parallels the conditions of indentured servitude (Gilani 1985). This began in the 1970s 
and early 1980s when the bulk of labor migration went to the Middle East as temporary 
construction workers. This period was marked by the large movement of workers for a 
set period of time through state contracted agencies. Later this model was followed by 
large scale construction throughout the Middle East, primarily the Gulf countries. It was 
also in this era that labor migration became of interest to the state, at least initially in 
terms of facilitating interstate contracts and controlling remittances to Pakistan. For the 
state such contracts are big business that require the organization of mass pools of labor. 
At this time, the Pakistani state provided resources for the study of migration and its 
effects on the economy. By and large most reports touted migration as an integral part of 
Pakistan’s successful economic growth and outlined policy guidelines to promote further 
expansion (Arif and Irfan 1997; Azam 1995; Irfan 1986; Kazi 1989). Indeed, as one 
economist argues remittances from workers in the Gulf in large part kept the military 
regime of Zia ul-Haq afloat (Zaidi, 1999, 431). The influence of workers remittances in 
Pakistan throughout the 1980s and 1990s not only created a new middle class and the 
growth of urban centers, but was responsible for economic development in Pakistan’s 
rural areas through the dispersion of money to numerous areas from workers.. The policy 
guidelines created out of this body of migration literature by Pakistan scholars have 
rarely been followed by the state and increasingly resources for migration research has 
been discontinued.6 
                                                 
6 Many researchers have attributed this attitude of the state to catering to the interests of the international 
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 As early as the 1930s following the end of indentured migrations from South 
Asia, labor migrants were recruited in the newly discovered oil fields of the Middle East. 
At this time, British oil companies that were in operation in the Middle East benefited 
from the model of indenture that was previously in place. In the late 1950s migrations 
continued that followed prior colonial links and assisted in the labor migration of 
Pakistanis to the UK to fill labor shortages after the Second World War. This was an 
organized movement of people under systems in which labor migrants were considered 
temporary guest-workers. In the 1950s South Asian workers were also increasingly going 
to the Middle East as temporary workers. This migration was for the most part 
unregulated by the Pakistani government until 1979 with the establishment of specific 
institutions to oversee this movement. Until this moment much of the migration to the 
Middle East from Pakistan was informal and relied on personal networks that included 
word of mouth and kinship networks of both friends and family (Abella 1987). 
 In the boom period of the 1980s and early 1990s recruitment was no longer 
supervised under the state depot system formed in the indenture period. Labor 
recruitment was privatized and handed over to independent employment agencies. The 
state overlooked recruitment and still deployed labor migrants through government 
agencies that handled direct work contracts with other governments. Direct visas from 
employing countries were also an option outside of the private employment agencies. 
This allowed workers to supersede recruitment because they found work through their 
own efforts (often through previous experience) or through the aid of others working 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial institutions that prefer studies on poverty rather than the short-term ameliorative effects of 
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abroad. Direct visas were for some time the most common form of securing employment 
prior to the late 1970s and state intervention. This changed with the mass mobilization of 
workers sent abroad beginning in the early 1980s that required regulation. State control 
then led to the proliferation of recruitment agents as an independent industry. The 
Government of Pakistan’s Bureau of Emigration oversees the control of migration 
through two of its subagencies: in the public sector the Protector of Emigrants, and in the 
private sector the Overseas Employment Corporation. These agencies are responsible for 
licensing recruitment agents and for the legal welfare of labor migrants. 
 Broker activity by private employment agencies has become big business in the 
international migration industry. Organized suppliers of contract labor such as the US 
based Labor Ready have become a model for private recruitment agencies to provide 
temporary labor worldwide (Persaud 2001, 381). Also referred to as body shops these 
operations often lease out the services of workers from unskilled to highly skilled work. 
In the case of leasing out labor, workers are under contract to brokering agencies and thus 
provide a service as part of their agreement with the agency. This shift in labor 
contracting to subcontracting has enormous consequences in the ability to organize this 
labor under more formal, protective means through unions (Stalker 2000). Subcontracting 
also allows for the susceptibility of transnational labor migrants to illegal work 
conditions. This pattern is found throughout the labor migration system where states are 
increasingly withdrawing responsibility to citizens and placing the onus upon the private 
sector. 
                                                                                                                                                 
migration. 
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 As I explored the migration industry in Pakistan I primarily focused on state 
institutions and the private sector. While in the capital, Islamabad, I would interview 
countless bureaucrats to little avail. Many of my interviews would yield little in terms of 
information that wasn’t already available to me through archival information. It was a 
rare moment when a turn of phrase revealed a subtle nuance of the industry, or the 
intentionality of the state apparatus through its functionaries. Most of this information 
was of the policy kind, and the changing nature of the role of the state in controlling labor 
migration. The private sector was similar. In Lahore, where I based most of my 
ethnographic research on the migration industry with transnational migrants, interviews 
with administrators of private contracting companies often led nowhere. But in casual 
conversations I found out the most information. Of course transnational migrants 
provided the most information in terms of their experiences and interactions with these 
institutions. I met many labor migrants as I waited for meetings. I spent countless hours 
sitting with workers who themselves were waiting to meet with contracting agents and 
what the current projects were being contracted for. 
 
Brokers/Agents/Contractors 
The location of contracting agencies took me to far-flung areas of Lahore. Contracting 
agencies themselves often came and went. The industry is such that many do not sustain 
their licensing with the government. There are various reasons for this, most of which 
include some probationary or illegal activity. In documents provided by the Bureau of 
Emigration some 210 agencies in Lahore were licensed in the operation of overseas labor 
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migration as of December 2000. Many of these agencies when I tried to track them down 
had moved or were no longer in existence. When I questioned government officials about 
this they admitted the difficulty of controlling the industry. Licenses exist as a formal 
attempt to supervise the activity of contracting agents. As such they are issued upon 
approval of government officials for three year terms. The problem of this supervision is 
that offices often move, dissolve, or are closed down by the government. This becomes 
difficult to track and is in large part the responsibility of the contracting agency to renew 
their license. 
 In Pakistan the recruitment process takes place in several stages. Labor contract 
demands are usually sent from receiving countries to recruiting agencies and government 
agencies in sending countries. Recruiting agents then advertise the need for labor recruits 
generally through newspaper advertisements and contact lists of active files of labor 
migrants. Many of these advertisement lure labor migrants through promises of work in 
the US, UK, Canada and Australia. Most of these offers are for professional employment 
such accounting, computer programming, and the medical fields. Labor contracts for non-
technical workers to these countries are rare to nonexistent in Pakistan, but because of the 
attraction of these countries such advertisements are quite popular. The reality of many of 
these advertisements is that they offer jobs on a contract basis to labor migrants in the 
Middle East. The assumption and lure of this practice, is the possibility of making ones 
way to these countries from the Middle East. Most often, advertisers seek workers for 
short term assignments in Gulf countries. 
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 Once a quota is filled for potential labor contracts the recruitment agency provides 
a selection of candidates to the employer abroad. The choice of who is hired is up to the 
discretion of the employer and depends upon the occupation. For example unskilled and 
non-technical work is less competitive than say service or professional work. Once the 
employer has made a decision this information is sent to the Bureau of Emigration to 
process work visas and the documentation required for travel abroad (passports, 
identification etc.). Various schemes have been launched by the Government of Pakistan 
to facilitate this process (eg. special ID cards) and to manage investments in Pakistan 
(through property, housing colonies, tax breaks, special bonds). For frequent labor 
migrants the incentives of these schemes is that they also provide insurance and medical 
benefits to family members. There success, however, has been limited because of the 
expenses involved in dues. 
 Recruitment strategies generally follow two distinct patterns. The first referred to 
as deployment is the practice in which labor contractors gather, organize, and move 
workers. This is the kind of labor recruitment by brokers and agents that has already been 
described in the acquisition of potential workers at employment agencies. A second 
practice called a spot-market refers to the gathering of workers at places of convenience. 
In the example of Pakistan, both strategies are used by agencies and are at times 
intertwined. Labor migrants gather at various places in metropolitan locations. In my 
research in Lahore many workers who came from their respective villages and 
communities quickly learned the places in which recruitment information was accessible. 
This is by and large an informal gathering in which certain locations become labor 
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migrant hangouts. These include chai-khannas (teahouses), hotels (working class 
eateries), addas (stands) and chowks (roundabouts), and other public places where 
traditional day laborers can be found. The strategy of the spot market allows workers to 
market themselves in the absence of state support through work allocation. Here wages 
are arranged between worker and employer without any supervision of the state. This 
verbal contract for day labor falls in the category of unprotected labor and are notoriously 
well below established standards of wage work. For labor migrants the spot market form 
makes workers susceptible to fake agents and smuggling rackets. Legitimate labor 
migrant work is also often given to those who offer the best offer in fees (both legal and 
illegal bribes) paid to the recruiting agent. Because the supply for cheap labor is high and 
the demand low, competition is fierce. Many recruitment agencies also simultaneously 
operate through legal contract labor and offer illegal services to traffickers. 
 In my interviews with labor migrants in Lahore many described a network of 
agents both legitimate and fake involved in the labor migrant industry. For some it is 
clear when agents were not offering legal means of work, whereas for others it is hard to 
distinguish between the two. The latter also included a viewpoint that agents whether 
legal or illegal offer the same access to resources. Because the mechanisms through 
which both kinds of labor opportunity are offered are so similar it is near impossible to 
tell the difference in certain circumstances. As some labor migrants confessed the only 
way to tell is when a worker ends up in a certain country and realizes they have been lied 
to. Such testimonials were also common with contract laborers who most commonly 
complained of receiving their wages late or not receiving their wages in full. 
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 From the perspective of the labor migration industry the resemblance between 
legal and illegal outfits is uncanny. Illegal smuggling involved agents who promised 
certain terms of work and were able to produce contracts and illegal documents to allow 
workers to travel abroad. As several migrant workers I interviewed told me, many of 
these rackets operated out of travel agencies. Here forged documents are made and 
workers are sent to countries such as the UK, Canada and the US. Once in these countries 
many labor migrants then seek to obtain political asylum. In recent times Canada has 
become the more accessible of the three because of the level of enforcement of 
immigration law and the difficulty of obtaining asylum. Many workers initially go to the 
Gulf countries and increasingly Southeast Asian countries to work on contract labor and 
then eventually make there way to the next country. The travel agency that books flights 
and then prepares documents also maintains the debts of labor migrants and the accrued 
interest of such debts. One description offered to me in an interview described this 
experience: 
A friend of mine told me about this agent here in Lahore that would make a ticket for 
me to America. When I met the agent and told him I wanted to go to America he said 
first go to the Gulf and then we will make papers for you to go to Canada. Once you 
get there we will find a way for you to go to New York.7 
After working on contract in the Gulf for a year the agent sent him papers that would 
allow him to go to Canada. It was only then that he realized they were forged documents 
after a friend looked at them. He was afraid of the consequences, so he stayed in Dubai 
and then returned to Pakistan. A veteran labor migrant who had been to many Middle 
Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya and the UAE, on both legal 
                                                 
7 Interview May 16, 2001 
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and illegal labor contracts explained that it didn’t matter whether the contract was real or 
not as long as he got paid: 
Sometimes when you go to these countries it doesn’t matter how you get there. I did 
it both ways[legal and illegal] and there were good things and bad things with both. 
With a legal contract there was no guarantee that you would get paid and the Arab 
bosses were harder on us then they were on the workers from other nationalities. It 
was the same with fake papers.8 
He later had to come back to Pakistan because of bypass surgery. He now drives a cab in 
Lahore and sold his documents that he bought as forgeries to a friend in Karachi. As he 
told me if he could still work abroad if he would do it. 
 In the process of interviewing labor migrants this fluidity between legal and 
illegal activity was difficult to distinguish. Explicit explanations in my interviews seemed 
to be patterned in similar fashion with the state simultaneously mediating both legal and 
illegal activity. The UN Convention on Organized Crime in November 2000 defines the 
terms of illegal activity as follows: 
‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring 
or receipt of person, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability.9 
The illegal means of trafficking and smuggling is defined by the use of coercion and 
deception. For labor migrants this is not always a clear sign of illegal activity. 
International trafficking has been estimated to be a $6 to $7 billion dollar industry 
according to figures collected in 1994 (Stalker 2000). Indeed there are ways in which the 
states mediation of legal and illegal activity blurs these boundaries. The relationship 
                                                 
8 Interview November 16, 2000. 
9 UN documents (2000), available at www.undcp.org/palermo/convmain.html 
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between legal and illegal discourses of labor migrant subjectivity is further explored in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Patterns of Labor Migration 
Much of the focus of professional migration from Pakistan has focused on the costs of the 
so called brain drain to the nation.10 But in much larger numbers there has been more of a 
brawn drain of working class laborers. In both categories the lack of employment 
opportunities in Pakistan limit the possibilities. Transnational migration is an option that 
provides opportunities for workers across classes to earn an income. The patterns of these 
migrations are becoming increasingly complex and no longer simply based on the 
concept of migrants leaving their home countries for new lands in one-way migrations. 
New patterns of migration are emerging that are more seasonal and involve the process of 
step migration. Transnational communities are increasingly diverse in their migration 
strategies. 
 State organized migration has led to numerous developments in the patterns of 
labor migration from Pakistan. Temporary migration has resulted in a pattern of seasonal 
migration in which labor migrants will work on contract for a few years and return to 
Pakistan until their savings run out. Other labor migrants will use temporary migration to 
the Middle East and East Asia to migrate to other regions in a pattern of step migration. 
This pattern is near impossible to quantify barring large scale research. Nonetheless it is a 
prominent pattern for many labor migrants to increase their cultural capital and status 
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toward migrating to Northern countries such as the UK, Canada and the US. These 
countries are represented in mythic terms by many migrants who will make it to these 
countries by any means. Indeed, conceptions of these locations is informed by a mixture 
of influences from social networks to mass media. The creation of these imaginaries has 
much to do with how transnational migrants conceive of prospects in these countries. 
 Since the 1960s Pakistanis of the professional classes have been migrating to the 
US and the UK. Increasingly this is the pattern of labor migration that is required in the 
Middle East particularly in the health occupations, accounting, and IT professionals. This 
pattern of semi-permanent migration is also pivotal in the migrations that involve family 
reunification. Whereas working-class migrations are primarily of male workers, 
professionals often will migrate with their families. Nearly all migrations involve the 
knowledge of human networks and contacts in which family reunification is a strategy for 
migration particularly in countries such as the US and the UK. Both of these countries are 
a source for increasing numbers of working class migrations through the process of 
family reunification in addition to other migration strategies (Stalker 2000). Step 
migration is an additional aspect of this strategy to northern countries in which migrants 
make their way to various countries en route to specific locations. This movement 
towards Northern countries for greater life chances and resources has become a kind of 
seasonal migration. For example, many labor migrants will spend part of the year 
working in countries such as the US and returning to their families in Pakistan for 
extended periods of time. 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 The economist Jagdish Bhagwati famously has argued for a brain drain tax that initially received some 
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Economic Role of Labor Migration 
Much of the debate surrounding the economic role of labor migration has centered on the 
material benefits gained by labor migrants. On one hand, remittances sent back to 
Pakistan have played an important role in the national economy as it has in other South 
Asian countries (Bagchi 1999). This source of income has an important role in the 
livelihoods of those who depend on labor migration. On the other hand, labor migrants 
often return to Pakistan with material goods such as electronics and appliances that 
benefit their quality of life. Some argue that this behavior exhibits a tendency toward 
short term solutions of the problem of income for labor migrants and is not a long term 
strategy (Addleton 1992, Lefebvre 1999). Although there is merit in this argument, labor 
migration itself is based on the short-term alleviation of a shrinking income and a 
dwindling living standard by providing access to temporary wage work. It is hardly a get 
rich scheme but a long term strategy that accrues cultural capital in the form of skills and 
knowledge in the hope of future job possibilities. Transnational labor migration has also 
played an important part in the economic development of working-class migrants. 
Through the cash provided by remittances many previously unskilled migrants were able 
to accrue enough money to start small-scale businesses, shops and other industries. This 
upward mobility had an enormous impact on the Pakistani economy in terms of 
broadening the distribution of capital (Zaidi 1999, 431). 
                                                                                                                                                 
attention in the late 1970s in United Nations circles but was quickly set aside. See Bhagwati (1998). 
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 Remittances in the year 2000 were officially tabulated by the Bank of Pakistan at 
around US$1 billion. The figures from 1995 to 1999 were approximately US$1.5 
billion.11 Economists estimate that out of these official figures of remittances, a much 
larger figure of some US$3 to 4 billion was actually entering Pakistan. Much of this 
disparity in numbers is because of unofficial schemes such as informal networks of 
banking called hundi in South Asia and hawala in the Middle East. This is an elaborate 
system of monetary exchange that allows workers to send remittances to their home 
countries with less fees than charged by banks and without the formal paperwork. This is 
a popular way of transferring money from the Middle East where many of the largest 
hundi operators are located. Dubai in the UAE is one of the central locations of this 
network as is Karachi in Pakistan. Since 2001 the Government of Pakistan has tried to 
eliminate these forms of money transfer. For the state this type of money transfer creates 
enormous problems. For one, a large flow of currency is entering the country without the 
state benefiting from such exchange. A larger problem is that this type of exchange is 
difficult to track through a paper trail, thus allowing the exchanges of cash through 
alleged criminal activity untraceable. The network of smugglers and traffickers often 
operate through this form of money exchange and are also connected to its operations. 
 
Construction of Overseas Identities: Transnational Muslims 
Labor migration has also created a subjectivity through the navigation of this system. For 
Pakistani labor migrants working in Gulf countries there is the connection that is assumed 
                                                 
11 See the Annual Report, 1999-2000 of the State Bank of Pakistan, p. 136. 
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to their Muslim co-religionists. A large majority of Pakistani labor migrants come from 
the Punjab and NWFP regions.12 This is important to understand in terms of the 
recruitment of these workers. These two ethnic groups were the colonially preferred labor 
force. The retention of colonial racial concepts of the so-called martial races has been 
mixed. What has remained is a structure of sending labor migrants from Pakistan that 
structurally prefers Punjabis and Pashtos. What was once based on colonial concepts of 
race, in the postcolonial era is transformed into access based on historical preference and 
a conglomeration of racial stereotypes. In many ways, the conceptual category of race is 
self-perpetuated in relation to concepts of work and discipline. Hence, the popular 
conception of Punjabis and Pashtos as hard-working. Simultaneously, such discourses 
within Pakistan of ethnic conflict often have the opposite effect. The discourse of 
discipline versus idleness depends on particular claims to resources and access often 
generated in ethnic competition at the national level. These national discourses in 
Pakistan find their way into transnational locations in a mixture of ethnic and racial 
construction in which cultural conceptions of Pakistanis become naturalized into racial 
categories. 
 When labor migrants are abroad they are seen as Pakistanis, to other nationals 
they are understood in terms of their ethnic identity. Additionally, religion has become an 
important cultural identity from which workers make connections to their employers. 
Labor migrants, for example, adopt cultural practices from their Arab counterparts that 
they view as more religiously authentic than there own. This is visible in the influence of 
                                                 
12 This was provided in documents to the author by the Bureau of Emigration, 2000, and also reprinted in 
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Wahhabi thought and practice on returnees from the Gulf. For example, such practices 
are most readily visible in the approach to the veiling of women (Lefebvre 1999). 
Comportment and styles of dress are often superficially adopted as proper attire following 
extended stay in Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. In this case, Saudi Arabia 
stands as the figure of religious authority in terms of cultural practice. Since the 1980s 
labor migrants have become increasingly influenced by the discourses of Islam prevalent 
in countries such as Saudi Arabia. The predominance of Wahhabi thought has seeped its 
way into many of the practices of Sunni belief in Pakistan. Indeed, such changes in 
practice have contributed to debate within religious communities in Pakistan in terms of 
proper religious practice. These discourses of orthodoxy have played an important role in 
working-class culture and the practice of Islam. 
 The adoption of these cultural practices does not mean that Pakistanis remain 
docile to the actions of their Arab coreligionists. As one labor migrant Masud explained 
to me: 
The best people I ever met when I was abroad who were also like our people 
[Pakistani], from Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, they were all good people. The best of 
course are Pakistanis. We would get along because we were the same. Even though it 
wasn’t easy to communicate because of different languages we understood each 
other. We have the same culture, the same food, we are the same kind of people… 
The trouble was really with the Arabs. I was surprised by this since we are both 
Muslims. The Palestinians and Lebanese we worked with didn’t care about anyone 
but themselves. Then the Arab bosses were even worse. They looked down on all of 
us and treated us badly. They tried to cheat us of our pay and there was never any 
respect. 
Later when I asked him for more details about the conflict with Arabs he explained their 
thinking more thoroughly: 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Survey of Pakistan, 1999-2000 issued by the Government of Pakistan. 
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They are like people everywhere. They would call us names in Arabic we didn’t 
understand. But we knew what they were saying. They would do this when they 
thought we weren’t working hard enough. They would treat us all differently. Some 
of the other Arabs were treated better because they could communicate with each 
other. But the Palestinians were treated the worst because the bosses thought they 
were lazy. Many of them worked harder than any of us, but they were still treated 
badly. We were somewhere in the middle.13 
This complex assessment of cultural ties and hierarchies reflect concepts of class and race 
as they are acted out through cultural and religious practice. In the conflict with Arabs 
discourses of categorization become complex. For example, the racialization of non-
Arabs by Arab bosses was a common theme in my interviews. This followed a logic of 
lazy others in a mixture of biological racism predicated on genetic difference and class 
difference. Faced with this discrimination, workers often found spaces of solidarity. This 
bond between South Asians in the above description is a common portrayal by South 
Asian labor migrants. Such a logic makes sense in terms of shared cultural practices and 
the need for group organization in the face of the divisive practices of Arab employers. 
Here race and class are used to distinguish Arab employers from South Asian workers as 
well as other Arab workers. The hierarchy of race in question depends upon cultural ideas 
of docility, work and discipline. 
 Religious ties in this sense between coreligionists of different nationality is an 
ambivalent practice. On one hand there is an assumed connection at the level of religious 
practice, but on the other religious identity breaks down into other cultural categories of 
difference. Ideas of cultural difference are then assigned value based in the difference of 
the concepts of race and class. These transnational identities allow Pakistanis to borrow 
religious practices from the Middle East but to also maintain a critique of other cultural 
                                                 
13 Interview November 7, 2000. 
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practices. In the same interview Masud started to talk disparagingly of his Arab 
employers who would have many wives. These old Arab men, as he referred to them, 
would then bring young girls from South and Southeast Asia to marry them. Here his 
disgust was in the treatment of male labor migrants while simultaneously desiring women 
from these areas. To him this was not the way of Islam and was more of a tragedy. It also 
reflects a sexual economy of desire in terms of social relationships in which South Asian 
men are vilified as inadequate workers yet South Asian women are seen as desirous. In 
this sense there are multiple levels of disjuncture. Cases from child smuggling to abuse of 
women domestic workers, including violent and sexual abuse, in Gulf countries by Arab 
patrons are constantly referred to not only in the international press but in daily 
discussions of transnational migrants. Such paradoxes add to this point of unraveling the 
supposed pure cultural practices in Muslim homelands and the religious connections 
between co-religionists through the Islamic conception of the umma, or community of 
believers. 
 This work and sexual economy creates an ambivalence, indeed a disturbance in 
many Muslim labor migrants assumptions of the Middle East. For many, Arabs are 
understood to convey the pure cultural values of Islam. In their experiences the 
realization of contradictory practices by their Arab employers leads to a process of 
critique and analysis whereby certain practices are seen as more legitimate than others. 
This form of rational thinking is akin to Hirshkind’s (2001) idea of religious reason. 
These Islamic publics are complex arenas of cultural critique and practice that have a 
logic of their own. In the example of labor migration to Gulf countries, the use of race 
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and class is rarely articulated as such. These concepts are often in the realm of being 
taken for granted. Indeed, for many labor migrants because of the use of race and class 
difference without its conceptual articulation as such, religion becomes the practical 




The contemporary patterns of Pakistani labor migrants are complex and follow many 
paths. Structurally, these patterns are formed in relation to the history of indentured 
migration. This prior history is instrumental to the basis of the legal-juridical control of 
migration as well as the construction of the current migration industry. As I demonstrated 
in my ethnography of the labor migration industry in Pakistan, there are formal 
similarities between the process of contemporary labor migration and that of the 
indentured period. Historically, these two periods are connected through the lineage of 
labor migration regulations established in the colonial period. Moreover, the structure of 
the labor migration industry has parallels to the colonial model in the use of contractors 
and agents. The primary shift is the privatization of contracting agencies away from state 
control of this industry. This privatization has resulted in legal and illegal practices of 
recruitment and trafficking that the state continues to regulate. This relationship of the 
state and the law to legal and illegal practices is the subject of Chapter 4. 
 The relationship of the history of indentured and contemporary labor migration 
provides insight into the workings of capitalism in the demand for a labor supply. This 
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demand is predicated on the constant need of new mechanisms of control and power. 
These devices allow for the spread of capital and markets that require them. In this 
example, transnational labor supplies serve the needs of multinational capital. Further, 
these structures are constitutive of labor migrant consciousness through the concept of the 
contract and the creation of transnational communities. This girmit consciousness has 
become increasingly race and class inflected with the expansion of the global labor 
supply. As such the migration circuit between Pakistan and Gulf countries is complex and 
contradictory in terms of work experience and cultural exchange. As such, the multiple 
patterns of labor migration have created a diverse relationship amongst these Muslim 
countries. One pattern that has now become commonplace is the experience of step 
migration, as a result of limited opportunities in intermediary countries such as those in 
the Middle East, toward northern countries in Europe and North America in which 
service economies offer greater employment opportunities. 
 This process of migration requires the acquisition of social and cultural forms of 
capital in the navigation of this system. Obtaining these forms of capital also creates a 
sense criticality in terms of mediating multiple structures in which transnational migrants 
must find their way through. This critical sense of the world is a form of reason in which 
events are made sense of, categories of analysis are interpreted, and social relationships 
are lived through. For transnational migrants within the histories of labor migration they 
exist as the underside of capitalism and empire-building. Shifting regimes of global 
power are implicated in the demands of migrants, and importantly, which migrants. Such 
is the system of recruitment that is based in histories of racial and class classifications. 
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Chapter 4: States of Migration: The Production of the  




This chapter explores the states production of transnational labor migrants as legal 
subjects. The state functions as a mediator of transnational labor migration through its 
tactics and methods of control. The production of state effects that construct labor 
migrant subjectivities are found, as I argue, in the state and in the national and 
transnational sphere of interstate migration. Specifically this chapter examines how state 
frames the subjectivities of the Pakistani working class labor migration through 
discourses of il/legality. As I argue, il/legality as subject formation is a complex 
relationship that depends on the state control of capital and labor flows. The capital-labor 
relationship is not only one of the economic to the social, but placed in the context of the 
state and citizenship, is also constructed around ideas of legal and illegal. As an 
ethnography of the state and its relationship to migration, it is argued that the legal 
production of illegality crafts the spatial limits of labor migrant subjectivity. In other 
words, the law creates the basis of forms of symbolic violence in terms of the migrant 
laborers access to rights and a certain conception of citizenship. Here economic and 
social rights as opposed to a strictly legal idea of rights are vital to the conception of 
citizenship. Thus this chapter argues that the states control over the legal and illegal 
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discourses of labor migration creates a particular legal subjectivity that regulates such 
transnational flows. 
In the example of the Pakistani state, a postcolonial state apparatus, the arbitrary 
state control of transnational migratory flows is predicated on discursive notions of 
national identity, and mediated by the capitalist mode of production. Indeed the 
theoretical role of the state varies greatly in its practice. Hence, the objective is to 
illuminate the comparative role of the state in the control of labor migration through 
textual and ethnographic analysis. To examine the role of various states in the migration 
process, this essay follows the migrant subject through interstate exchange. This 
examination includes the historical analysis of legal codes that mandate the role of the 
state, and an ethnography of state practices in regards to labor migration. The role of the 
state is crucial to the spatial construction of migrant subjectivity in addition to the 
formation of migrant social and cultural capital. 
 
 
State Practices: Power and Control 
'The state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself 
the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is.' 
Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State,” 1988 
 
To enter modernity, it is supposed that the state manage the nation. For traditional 
theories of nationalism and state formation this organization is predicated on the creation 
of the category of class through the structuring effects of capitalism. The question for 
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these theories is not really one of whether and in what form classes existed in a prior 
form to the conception of class, but in what ways the nation can be crafted through the 
formation of new classes. Here, the idea is that a strong state, based on a robust economy, 
is dictated by the formation and mobility of a large middle class1. These classes promote 
the engines of capitalism and ‘positive’ economic growth. For postcolonial societies, the 
creation of these classes marks a shift from colonial to postcolonial regimes and the 
transition to the increased state control and regulation of capitalist modes of production. 
 Althusser’s influential essay “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses” 
(1971), put forth a theory of the state based on how power relations are reproduced 
through the state apparatus. Class relations are reproduced through the work of the 
ideological state apparatus that interpellates subjects and the imaginary representation of 
the world. This is a process of social formation in which subjects are identified through 
the state. For Althusser the imaginary and the process of interpellation prevent workers 
from seeing the contradictions of their labor. This is the work of the ideological state 
apparatus in maintaining the status quo. This structural approach is important in 
analyzing how the state masks power relations and how it further acts in terms of its 
practices. Its weakness is that it fails to account for the historicity of the subject and 
instead is based in the Marxist universal subject that is the proletariat. As various 
theorists influenced by Althusser argue, subjects, too, have agency to interpret their 
                                                 
1 The middleness of the middle class is explored in Chatterjee (1993) in terms of the Bengali nationalist 
elite. Here he describes a process of the production of the ‘middle’ in a hegemonic structure of domination.  
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contradictions and act through them.2 The state does not control power in an absolute 
sense, although the ideological state apparatus works to maintain this idea. 
Foucault argues in a similar vein in his work on governmentality (1991). Here he 
maps the genealogy of the state and the control of the ‘economic’ sphere in European 
history. In its origin, the meaning of economic was simply the sphere of the family that 
was controlled through legal-juridical, political and social means. As the state and the 
nation began to take shape in accordance with one another the economic shifted in 
meaning to the concept of population. This is an important distinction between the use of 
the terms of the nation and the state. The nation in its capacity as a population is 
rationalized as such through the logic of the state – that is through government rationality 
defined through instrumental reason. Management of the state through governmentality 
introduces the “economy into political practice” (Foucault 1991, 92). Hence, the 
economy is not an objective fact as it purports to be, but rather a means for the state to 
control and manage its population. As Foucault argues this position, he warns that the 
power of the state is more mythical than actual. Indeed such an evaluation matches the 
structural model of Althusser but allows for the possibility of other readings and openings 
by focusing on the tactics and strategies the state wields to maintain its sense of control 
and power. 
Materialist approaches to the state have tended to construct theories based on its 
boundedness, as a structure, apparatus, or configuration of institutions or organizations. 
Recently, theorists have made a call to understand the state through its elusive, porous 
                                                 
2 See for example the work of Wendy Brown (1997) and Judith Butler (1997). 
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boundaries (Mitchell 1991). This recalls Abrams position that the state is indeed a mask 
over actually existing political practices (1988). Both are, it appears, grappling for a 
theory that views the state as a dynamic process with few given boundaries. As Corrigan 
and Sayer (1985) argue, state formation is a central process in cultural revolution and the 
construction of identity. Following Foucault, they argue that social identity is not 
constituted by the state but regulated through its routines. Hence, culture and sociality is a 
central aspect of what the state is involved in. Yet, one must be cautious with this idea of 
culture as an explanatory model. As Kamala Visweswaran has shown, anthropological 
work on the state has too often conflated absolutist notions of culture when explaining 
weak and strong states (1999). This position views the failure of developing identifiable 
civil societies with states that have too much culture. Hence, these ‘affective states’ rely 
on an equation that pairs culture with failing states, and rationality with healthy states. In 
order to avoid this pitfall it is necessary to view the state and its culture as practices and 
processes constantly under renewal. 
In the era of neo-liberal economic practices, national markets are bound by the 
dictates of free market reform and the opening of domestic markets to foreign capital. 
This ideological move is mirrored in theories of transnationalism that argue for the 
inability of the nation-state to keep up with capital flows. Yet, in this focus on capital 
flow and the state, the nation seems to curiously disappear. In such instances the state in 
relation to the effects of transnationalism is undertheorized. The work of Basch et al. 
(1994), Lowe (1996), Lowe and Lloyd (1997), Ong (1999), and Ong and Nonini (1997), 
have been influential in articulating the relationship of the state to transnationalism. 
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Rather than arguing that the state is no longer useful, they argue for the ways in which the 
state has gained renewed significance through globalization. Hence, one can modify the 
earlier statement that the state manages the (trans)nation. The most trenchant critiques 
have been those that pinpoint the effects of neoliberalism as relieving the state from its 
duties of welfare to the nation. The realization of transnational flows has allowed the 
state to increase its control of the (trans)nation while simultaneously decreasing the 
services that were once its domain. As Lowe and Lloyd (1997) convincingly argue 
transnational capital for the state negates the need for a welfare state that acts as a legal, 
political and cultural entity, and instead requires an interventionist state that regulates 
labor, materials, and capital. In this shift the nation in the absence of adequate access to 
resources must become transnational. 
 
 
The Law, The State and Migration 
Recent scholarship in Migration Studies has focused on the ethnographic analysis of 
documentation and the legal role of the state in controlling migration flows. Nicholas 
DeGenova (2002) in an insightful review of this literature explores the implications of 
such studies on a concept he refers to as the legal production of migrant illegality. By this 
he refers to migrant illegality as a distinct category separate from undocumented 
migrants. Documentation is not a necessary condition of legality although it is 
constitutive of it. But from a methodological point of view, studying undocumented 
migrants as opposed to the constructions of illegality is politically suspect. Whereas the 
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study of illegality questions the process of state power, to focus on migrants as 
undocumented leaves open the problems of complicity with state surveillance through the 
ethnographic gaze. 
Illegality is constructed out of many discursive arenas, the primary one being 
legal-juridical discourses. Indeed, the illegality of noncitizens is a subjectivity produced 
in relationship to the concept of citizenship and the nation-state. Illegality as a category 
entails a set of practices as much as citizenship does. Such a relationship is instituted 
through the law and is enforced by way of state control and practice. The relationship 
between the law and that state is not consistent in practical terms. That is, enforcement of 
the law is based on the strategies and tactics of the state. For illegality, state control 
regulates this concept by the selective use of deportability. The construction of illegality 
and subsequent deportability is based on a set of criteria that constructs the illegal 
migrant. This is based on multiple logics that cross the terrain of politics, economics, 
social and cultural debates. Immigration for most nation-states is considered a threat to 
the welfare of its citizenry, whether or not immigration is a tactic of the state to produce a 
fresh workforce. Certainly, some countries under pressure because of declining 
population growth welcome immigrants as workers, but nonetheless, discourses on 
immigrants continue to view them as a problem. For example, under the controlled 
circumstances of the guest-worker system prominent in many parts of the world, 
contracted labor migration as temporary immigration is a solution to certain problems. 
But this migration is also susceptible to the constructions of illegality. For example, a 
temporary worker that has overstayed a work visa. Under conditions of legality this 
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worker is fluidly linked to the one that has overstayed and is now illegal. Yet there is an 
important distinction both for the worker and the state. And depending on enforcement, 
the status of migrant workers becomes an important mechanism of control for the state. 
Not only through direct policing, but through the creation of statuses that are self-policed. 
Illegality then is a mode of subjectivity that creates its own set of practices and processes. 
 To chart such an experience, the role of the state is paramount. As Saskia Sassen 
argues migrations are patterned and produced (1998). This is to say that labor migrations 
are structured according to the economic needs of the state. They are also controlled by 
the social and political debates surrounding migration and the discursive construction of 
the ‘immigrant.’ Her argument goes beyond the push and pull theories prominent in 
international migration research by questioning the usual assumptions of what creates this 
dynamic. For example, she argues that wealth and poverty do not necessarily equate to 
pull and push factors (Sassen 1988; 1998, Ch. 4). Indeed, these relationships are 
embedded in historical relationships and the uneven experience of globalization. But for 
Sassen such structures are based in choices that are socially produced. The choices to 
migrate are themselves based on how migrations are produced. That is, individual choice 
and the option to migrate as a form of agency is located in the structures that constitute 
migrations. 
 The production of legality and illegality is of central importance to the structural 
control of migration flows. As such, the role of the law is not uniform for the state nor are 
there established standards in international law in terms of its application to migration 
and migrants. Legal codes are themselves historically constructed and dependant on 
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cultural constructs that elaborate their function. For the casual, informal sector of wage 
work, the law is the realm in which constraints and openings are to be found. Indeed, 
there is much ambiguity in the practice of the law that has to do with the formalization of 
legal codes and the certainty of their application. Because of this ambiguity certain 
categories appear outside of the law, so to speak. Enforcement of the law then is not 
solely prohibitive, but also a function of how practices get around the law. In this sense, 
the law not only mandates a particular order it enacts a kind of violence, both material 
and symbolic.3 In Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence’ (1978) he argues that 
the state maintains its monopoly over the control of violence through the law:  
that the law’s interest in a monopoly of violence vis-à-vis individuals is not explained 
by the intention of preserving legal ends but, rather, by that of preserving the law 
itself; that violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the ends that 
it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law. (281) 
The law establishes the parameters of legal and illegal activity through the control of 
violence. That is to say that the law maintains the use of violence by the state in order to 
control its populations. To be outside of the law is to be outside of the nation. The nation-
state is itself defined by its population. Movement across borders and within them alters 
the definitions of the nation. The nation, traditionally a static category that is defined by 
the state, is altered through the fact of diasporas and transnational migrations. Changes in 
population and the control of these populations is then reflected in the law. Immigration 
law restricts who belongs, and who can belong given the right circumstances. In these 
circumstances the state acts as a moral force and the law as its secular manifestation. 
Justice as a conceptually separate entity from the state and the law is nonetheless a 
                                                 
3 This is to be taken in the sense that Bourdieu analyzed the role of violence as tied to economic forms of 
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concern. Hence, “natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to ‘justify’ the means, 
positive law to ‘guarantee’ the justness of the ends through the justification of the means” 
(Benjamin 1978, 278). Legal-juridical logic works between these two poles of 
naturalizing and rational, positivistic, categories of the law in formulating its meaning of 
justice. The nation is itself a naturalized concept that is based in notions of race, gender, 
class and ethnicity.4 Thus, in shifting between naturalized and rational categories of 
meaning, the nation is at times susceptible to new entries by groups not formally part of 
the states conception of the nation. What becomes important here are the genealogies of 
how groups of people are identified as belonging and not belonging, legal and illegal, that 
for the state to enforce such a logic must act through force and domination. 
 
 
Il/legality as a mode of subjectivity 
The relationship of the state to subject formation comes through the discourse of power. 
The works of Michel Foucault on the concept of subjectivity offer important insights into 
the processes in operation at the level of the subject and the state. His analysis for the 
study of subject formation follows three modes of objectification: division or dividing 
practices, scientific classification, and subjectification.5 The first two are ideological and 
spatial practices that separate groups through practices and devices of domination meant 
to create differences. The last mode of objectification, subjectification, is the process 
                                                                                                                                                 
dominance (1977, 192-197). 
4 There is a large literature on this point. For example see Anderson (1983), Anthias and Yuval-Davis 
(1989), Balibar and Wallerstein (1991), and Gilroy (1987). 
5 See Paul Rabinow’s “Introduction” to Foucault (1984). 
 136
through which the subject is interpellated in subjectivity but is also a process of self-
formation. In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault argues that power relations are 
constructed through a series of methods, disciplines and technologies that are embodied 
in the subject. Genealogically these devices are at first forces of domination that are 
external to the subject. Eventually such devices are embodied within the subject and self-
practiced. Subjectivity is then a set of knowledge embedded in the relations of power. 
The state creates this sense of politics through the disciplining of the human body and the 
control of population through bio-power. In this sense governmentality is government 
rationality focused on the methods, techniques, and practices of exercising power 
(Foucault. 1991). Subjectivity understood through governmentality is about the art of 
exercising power over subjects conceived of as populations. In this construction there is 
an important link between the concept of human beings as subjects and populations. To 
be an individual is to be part of a group through the embodied practices of power 
relations that discipline both subjects and populations.  
 This relationship allows for a critique of the state through its own methods of 
wielding power. Foucault, also in Discipline and Punish (1979), importantly wrote about 
the concept of illegalities. In this under-read section he describes an example of how 
systems of delinquency are exploited and offers an analysis of the production of 
illegality: 
Delinquency, controlled illegality, is an agent for the illegality of the dominant 
groups. The setting up of prostitution networks in the nineteenth century is 
characteristic in this respect: police checks and checks on prostitutes’ health, their 
regular stay in prison, the large-scale organization of…brothels, the strict hierarchy 
that was maintained in the prostitution milieu, its control by delinquent-informers, all 
this made it possible to canalize and to recover by a whole series of intermediaries the 
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enormous profits from a sexual pleasure that an ever-more insistent everyday 
moralization condemned to semi-clandestinity and naturally made expensive; in 
setting up a price for pleasure, in creating a profit from repressed sexuality and in 
collection of this profit, the delinquent milieu was in complicity with a self-interested 
puritanism: an illicit fiscal agent operating over illegal practices. Arms trafficking, the 
illegal sale of alcohol in prohibition countries, or more recently drug trafficking show 
a similar functioning of this ‘useful delinquency’: the existence of a legal prohibition 
creates around it a field of illegal practices, which one manages to supervise, while 
extracting form it an illicit profit from elements, themselves illegal, but rendered 
manipulable by their organization in delinquency. This organization is an instrument 
for administering and exploiting illegalities. (Foucault 1979, 279-280, emphasis 
added). 
This ‘useful delinquency’ is an industry that is regulated by a system of checks and 
manipulations. It is an industry, not in the formal sense, but can be understood as such. 
To Foucault’s list of illegal practices can be added the trafficking of labor migrants. 
Human trafficking as an aspect of labor migration has become one of the largest 
commodities of import and export in the world. The illegality of labor flows is an 
industry that is regulated by the state and exploited in the production of capital. It is a 
controlled illegality that is reflected in the illegal practices and  informal regulations of 
governments. Immigration controls are a convenient way for the nation-state to controll 
and manipulate the labor of migrants.6 As Foucault in his elegant simplicity continues, 
the organization of delinquency “is also an instrument for the illegality with which the 
very exercise of power surrounds itself” (1970, 280). For the state, power is extended 
through the use of illegality. Hence, the techniques of power are politically constructed 
through illegalities. 
                                                 
6 This is significantly the work of the nation-state as opposed to the state, in that the nation is configured by 
the state through the illegalization of migrants. 
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This legal production of migrant illegality is a flexible construct of the state. The 
politics of this production are shaped by the social and cultural debates that surround the 
discourse of immigration. Il/legality in turn molds the immigrant experience and the 
modalities of work and labor. As a form of subjectivity mediated by the nation-state, 
illegality is the other of citizenship. For both concepts, access to social and economic 
rights are based in modes of subjectivity and identification without any guarantees. In 
other words, social identity as it is constructed through the state and its citizenry, 
selectively offers access to these rights. Indeed, the challenge to struggles for justice that 
vie against these assumptions is to articulate rights in ways that match global political 
economies rather than ones that are modeled on the nation-state. 
 The construction of documentation and modes of il/legality is based in capitalist 
modes of production and its relationship to the state. As Partha Chatterjee argues in terms 
of the role of the interventionist state: 
The dominance of capital does not emanate from its hegemonic sway over ‘civil 
society’. On the contrary, it is its measure of control over the new state apparatus 
which becomes a precondition for further capitalist development. It is by means of an 
interventionist state, directly entering the domain of production as a mobilizer and 
manager of investible resources, that the foundations are laid for the expansion of 
capital. (1986, 49) 
The state relies on economic capital, and thus must manage its movement.7 Capital 
growth is manipulated by the state apparatus into the realm of the nation and civil society. 
But labor is also affected by this management. Indeed, the idea of formal, protected, and 
organized labor via trade unions and government regulation is viewed as a tangible part 
of the nation. Whereas casual, temporary, unorganized labor is seen outside of this fold, 
                                                 
7 This kind of financial control is the aim of structural adjustment policies as well. 
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most often as transnational and illicit. The rhetoric of documentation and il/legality also 
influences how these two zones of formal and informal work are understood. For the state 
they are two poles that are to be manipulated in the further expansion of capital through 
the tactics and strategies of legal-juridical discourses. The end of such a relationship is 
the creation of a specific subjectivity. What is important here are the specific ways 
subjectivities are constructed through notions of labor through alienation and illegality, 
the legal production of illegality, and the formation of the nation through state practices. 
 As a project of reconstructing this history there are multiple layers of alienation. 
There is the Marxist social and economic relationship of labor to labor power, but there is 
also the work of constructing subjectivities through racial and national ideas of 
belonging. Here illegality is a form of alienation that is a hidden aspect in the history of 
capitalism. This is an important aspect of resurrecting the invisible components of 
particular experiences of modernity and capitalism described in the potential of subaltern 
histories of capitalism by Gyan Prakash: 
to think of the incompleteness and failures of capitalist modernity… requires that we 
reinscribe the binary form in which capitalism’s partial success is portrayed, [and] 
that we render visible processes and forms that its oppositional logic can appropriate 
only violently and incompletely. Of course, historians cannot recover what was 
suppressed, but they can critically confront the effects of that silencing, capitalism’s 
foundational status, by writing histories of irretrievable subject-positions, by 
sketching the traces of figures that come to us only as disfiguration…not to restore 
the ‘original’ figures, but to find the limit of foundations in shadows that the 
disfigurations themselves outline. (Prakash 1992, 14) 
The state does indeed suppress these histories that operate in the shadows of alienated 
subjectivities. This experience is crafted and produced through the state apparatus, but 
also in social relations. The legal codes that produce a subject is formulated through 
 140
citizenship and the nation. Such subjectivities as they are produced though power entails 
a set of behaviors, modes of being, embodied practices and a knowledge of a set of social 
and cultural capital. To understand the legal construction of migrant illegality this essay 
examines state bureaucracies and the legal-juridical discourse of the state that are key 
sites of negotiating these subjectivities. In addition I examine narratives of labor migrants 
who must navigate these networks in order to obtain the necessary cultural capital to 
obtain economic capital. 
 
 
Pakistan and the Ethnography of the State 
Ayesha Jalal’s important history of Pakistan’s state formation is a genealogy of the shift 
from a colonial state to the initial years as a postcolonial state (1990). This transformation 
was less of a revolutionary change then it was a scramble for political consolidation and 
the centralization of state power. This strategy, much like most newly created nation-
states, was an economic one. With a dismal budget and the constant threat of bankruptcy 
in its first few years of existence, the Pakistani state needed to develop tactics to rapidly 
accrue money. The development apparatus of the state quickly begin to rely on its 
military and defense spending partly to allay fears of war with its neighbor India, but also 
to bolster a newly formed Pakistani nationalism. In its earliest phases the Pakistani state 
came to rely on a deficit budget and accrued debts to donor nations. Jalal’s narrative, as 
useful as it is, leaves much unsaid about the practices of state power on its population. 
The insight of her historical work is that it provides a comprehensive view of the debates 
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between formal political parties and their struggle for power in the formative phases of 
Pakistan’s state formation. 
 Complementing Jalal’s political history is the structural history of the state found 
in the work of Hamza Alavi. Specifically, Alavi’s arguments have shed light on the 
structural place of class in the state formations of South Asia. This analysis emphasizes 
social change and the impact of colonialism in the interaction of state and class interests 
in postcolonial societies that are part of the peripheral capitalist economies (Alavi 1972, 
1983, 1989). In the case of Pakistan, Alavi argues that the military-bureaucratic 
oligarchic state and its alignments with the interests of propertied exploiting classes 
creates a relatively autonomous state apparatus. This character of the postcolonial state is 
not the instrument of a single ruling class as thought of in traditional Marxist state theory, 
but is a state that 
is relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of the three 
propertied classes—the metropolitan bourgeoisies, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and 
the landed classes—while at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to 
preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely, the institution 
of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production 
(Alavi 1973, 148). 
The emergence of new urban classes in postcolonial societies arrives through the 
industrialization process began in the colonial period.8 The colonial system of industrial 
relations established a pattern that allowed for a great degree of state intervention that 
continued under the postcolonial state (Alavi 1989, 16). The state in this postcolonial 
condition takes on an increasingly economic character, because of its control of 
multinational investment and its role in mediating the interests of the propertied classes. 
                                                 
8 See Weiss (1991) for a cultural history of the Pakistani working class in Punjab. 
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This is so “because the state in the postcolonial society directly appropriates a very large 
part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity 
in the name of promoting economic development” (Alavi 1973, 148). Through a system 
of laws and rules the Pakistani state was able to control and regulate formal labor. 
Because of a reliance on multinational capital, not through direct investment but through 
tied credits and loans regulated by the state and its stake in development projects, 
Pakistan, in what Alavi calls the overdeveloped state (1973), has left itself open to market 
fluctuation and high unemployment. Hence large numbers of the work force were 
indirectly under the control of the state whether in the informal sector or unemployed. 
This urban working class is itself in large part surplus-labor displaced from rural 
agriculture. It is also the primary force of the transnational working class that differs from 
its transnational professional counterpart.9 
 The state of Pakistan as an overdeveloped state then seeks to maintain social order 
and hierarchy through the hyperbolic extension of its power. This is an inheritance of 
colonialism in which 
the “superstructure” in the colony is therefore “overdeveloped” in relation to the 
“structure” in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from 
which it is later separated at the time of independence. The colonial state is therefore 
equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and with governmental 
mechanisms that enable it, through routine operations, to subordinate the native social 
classes. The postcolonial society inherits that overdeveloped state apparatus and its 
institutionalized practices through which the operations of the indigenous social 
classes are regulated and controlled. (Alavi 1973, 147) 
The overdeveloped state as a set of institutional practices to exert power overlaps with 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality. But what makes it overdeveloped is the idea that 
                                                 
9 For an analysis of the political economy of transnational labor migration in the 1980s see Rashid (1983). 
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this is an excessive use of power to maintain control and regulate the economic interests 
of the state. For Alavi this explains the preeminence of authoritarian-military control and 
its perilous relationship to traditional democratic parties that extends this form of power 
to the state apparatus. Perhaps, overdeveloped is not the most appropriate descriptor for 
this use of power because of its connotation of some proper, standard, form of state 
development. The logical inference is that the properly developed state is the 
metropolitan state. The over- in overdeveloped then comes from the history of 
colonialism and the relationship to imperial bourgeoisies. This is surely the correct 
connotation of overextension of power, but it in no way means that the overdeveloped 
state is performing its duties to its citizenry in an adequate manner. In either case, the art 
of governmentality for the state is one that constantly shifts in order to maintain its sense 
of power. Hence, one may argue that Alavi’s argument that the overdevelopment of the 
state is simply the development of the state and its shifting interests according to 
Foucault’s conception of governmentality. That is, the overdeveloped state is in line with 
the governementality of the state through the multiple tactics and strategies deployed to 
maintain state power. This is also a question of historical context and the many ways that 
the state can develop. This is not to deny the important difference in the mode of 
autonomy of the state in postcolonial societies and its analytical usefulness in deriving 
important conclusions in terms of state practices. The historical context of postcolonial 
societies lends itself to alternative forms of state practices. 
But such a reading still relies on the instrumental character of the state to 
understand its interests. That is to say that government rationality is also one of 
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appearances. Importantly, this way has to do with the overvaluing of the state in all 
realms of the public sphere. Here Foucault also weighs in arguing for the need to analyse 
the functional aspects of governmentality but to also realize that perhaps the state “is no 
more than a composite reality and a mythcized abstraction” (1991, 103). Certainly the 
legacy of Althusser’s theory of the state has made it seem as a unified entity that is 
pervasive and inescapable. But there are other places from which subject formation is 
derived that are silenced by the overbearing voice of the state. 
 An ethnography of the Pakistani state must start with such an analysis. Namely 
the bureaucratic structures that shape the state apparatus, the practices of the state, and 
the legal-juridical discourse that the state apparatus is beholden to. Class formation, as 
one important form of social formation in the context of Pakistan, entails regulation by 
the state apparatus through the law to control its population, in a broader sense the nation. 
Such power is manifest in the micropolitics of everyday practice and exchange where the 
state mediates, in this example, the flow of labor migration. How forms of knowledge are 
acquired and then converted into social and cultural capital is important to seeking 
economic capital. This is a process of navigation but also one that is importantly shaped 




The Pakistani state, like most, is elusive. As a cab-driver in Pakistan’s sterile, modern, 
capital Islamabad once told me: “What is the government, the government is everywhere. 
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It is behind you and you don’t see it. It does nothing but lie and cheat.” Conversations 
about the state and politics are pervasive in Pakistan. In a society where political stability 
is so uncertain, it is hard to go without a day obsessively arguing and thinking about it. 
The business of the state is everyday. The ‘government,’ as the state is most commonly 
referred to, is an abstract entity that is critically observed and cautiously approached. 
 The appearance of the state apparatus as a functioning, controlling, and rational 
structure that is efficient and effective is part of its mythology. For many in the 
bureaucracy of the Pakistani state and those outside of it in the non-governmental sector, 
emphasis is placed on the ability of the state to act in terms of good governance. That is 
that the state has a vested interest in the welfare of its citizenry and must engage in 
practices that promote stability and growth. This a policy-oriented tactic that asks the 
state to act in good faith. Actual outcomes and practices of state power are another issue. 
 For the issue of labor migration, the state of Pakistan has a vested interest in 
regulating this industry. Foremost in the perspective of the state, is the solution 
transnational labor migration provides for domestic problems of underemployment and 
unemployment. Labor migration is also responsible for the creation of an independent 
private industry that manages this migration through labor contracts. As a sending 
country the state is interested in regulating the flow of remittances from such labor 
because of the growth that it signals in government statistics, but also because this is a 
source of income for the state through fees collected in money transfers as an indirect 
contributor to the national gross domestic product (GDP). Workers’ remittances since 
1980 have been a large part of the GDP in Pakistan ranging from 8.9% in 1980 to a 
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gradual decline in 1993 to 3.3%. The economic importance of these remittances is also 
reflected in their percentage of merchandise exports that was an astounding 97.2% in 
1985 and dropped to 23.7% in 1993.10 Labor migration has indeed been of prominent 
importance to the state. 
The reliability of these figures must also be brought into question. In the 1980s 
there was a peak interest in labor migration that was also mirrored in scholarship 
promoted by the Pakistani state. As numbers began to decline, so did research funding. 
The state depended on its regulatory apparatus to manage labor migration and left the 
numbers to the unreliable collection of the state bureaucracy.11 In my first meeting with 
the Director of the Bureau of Emigration in Islamabad the ambivalence of statistics 
became obvious. As I sat in his office, and before I could introduce myself, I witnessed a 
conversation with one of his researchers in which they discussed recent emigration 
numbers that were printed in a Pakistani national newspaper Dawn. The numbers that the 
newspaper had printed were different from the ones they had. Because these numbers 
were taken from another source they changed the state numbers reasoning that there must 
have been a typo along the way. Such incidences are not uncommon. It is a regular affair 
to see contradictory statistics in different newspapers and then a correction shortly 
thereafter through clarification from a state agency. Such is the numbers game in the 
                                                 
10 These figures are taken from the Asian Development Bank in 1996 in Bagchi (1999). 
11 For example, researchers in state agencies are often cautious about their statistics because of various 
external loopholes. The most obvious being that the state figures rely on labor migrants who actually go 
through the state system for a work visa. Currently there is no reliable way of telling how many migrants 
leave Pakistan on tourist visas for work abroad. The Bureau of Emigration for many years has been 
working in collaboration with the US government in developing a computerized database to track 
departures from Pakistani airports. How such a database is to be used is yet to be seen. The same can be 
said of remittances. For some time the State Bank of Pakistan has had to compete with informal networks 
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state, where obtaining official numbers for my research was itself an arduous task 
because no one agency wants responsibility for issuing official numbers. But such 
numbers do exist although there meaning cannot be taken at face value. At best such 
figures reflect the states regulation of labor migration, but by no means does it reflect the 
entirety of the population that is involved in such migration. It is more a measure of how 
many people the state is able to regulate than how the entire population of labor migrants 
is regulated through work visas and remittance controls. 
 The legal regulation of labor migration relies on two aspects. First, it controls the 
welfare of the migrant in terms of labor contracts and second it controls the flow of labor 
migration through state regulation that benefits the state (this subject is more thoroughly 
explored in the Chapter 3). The legal code of Pakistan that regulates migration dates back 
to the British colonial era in the late 19th century. The 1837 Indian Emigration Act was 
established in its initial framing to guard the rights of labor migrants. By 1922 the tide 
had turned and the colonial state was pressured to control the flows of unskilled migrants. 
This was the height of the era of South Asian indentured servitude that was sent 
throughout the British commonwealth (Tinker 1977).12 Much in the way that Paul Gilroy 
(1993) has argued that slavery was integral to the drive of capitalism and American 
modernity, the same can be said of this labor diaspora that maintained the economic 
growth through the imperialism of the British. By the time of independence and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of money transfer known as hundi that until recently was the most popular and cost-efficient form of 
sending remittances to Pakistan. 
12 Takaki (1989) has also made this argument for Asian indentured laborers and migrants who filled in the 
gaps after the end of slavery in the US. This American capitalism established its imperialism without the 
obvious extraction of the colonial model. This relationship persists, and explains in one way why it is the 
dominant model. 
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partition of the Indian subcontinent this legal code remained intact. Both India and 
Pakistan shared this same civil code subsequently providing independent amendments. In 
1979 this Act was renamed the National Manpower Act in Pakistan and was updated to 
fit the current logistics of labor migration. Subsequent to this the Act was modified with 
minor amendments to ease labor migration as it coincided with the boom in the 1980s.13 
The two main agencies that operate under the Ministry of Labour, Manpower and 
Overseas Pakistanis are the Bureau of Emigration and the Overseas Pakistani Foundation. 
The latter agency created in 1979 has the agenda of providing for the welfare of overseas 
Pakistanis and offering various incentives for investment in Pakistan. 
 What is remarkable about the history of this labor code are the protections 
mandated to the labor migrant. Many of these were initiated by the British with the idea 
of facilitating this form of work and labor. For example, for early indentured laborers the 
issue of the labor contract was standardized by the colonial state to offset complaints of 
mistreatment by contractors and recruitment agents. The legal code then institutionalized 
certain terms under the supervision of the state. This ranged from the conditions of 
transport to the terms in which contracts become null and void. These protections have 
been modified in the current form of the Emigration Act but the protective spirit remains. 
However, these statutes are rarely referred to, and are often a last resort to state mediation 
of labor problems. Reference to labor migrant rights only arises in the case of specific 
complaints, and more expressly when the state deems the case of reasonable significance. 
                                                 
13 Zafar (1997) is a collection of this legal code in its current form. 
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 The ambivalence of the state is articulated at many levels. On the one hand it 
wishes to promote labor migration in its own interests, on the other it is aware that it is 
dependent on the economies of other countries that are willing to absorb Pakistan’s 
surplus labor and may not recognize specific rights for migrant laborers. This was the 
position of many of the state bureaucrats I interviewed. There ambivalence stemmed 
from an understanding that their role in the state apparatus was primarily as a caretaker. 
The Director of the Lahore Protectorate of the Bureau of Emigration put it this way: 
Our job is to make sure everything goes smoothly. Our people [Pakistanis] that leave 
from here are happy with their jobs and their contracts are satisfactory. But in the end 
there are many things that we cannot control especially in the host country. There it is 
the job of our missions to represent what we have tried to do here.14 
This realist approach reflects the general ambivalence of bureaucrats in terms of their 
position in the state. It is a feeling that expresses the limitations of the state in the daily 
lives of migrants. Sending countries are often beholden to the terms imposed by host 
countries. And in many cases the state must be forced to enter into disputes between labor 
and management, especially considering the complexity of sovereignty issues with labor 
migrants. Labor migrant to the Gulf are technically under the protection of the Pakistani 
government and as such the Pakistani state is responsible for intervening on their behalf. 
 Further, there is a tacit awareness of the status of labor migrants through cultural 
concepts of class and the discourse of illegality. An official of the Lahore Branch of the 
Overseas Pakistanis Foundation expressed the reality of labor migration: 
Many of our Pakistanis get jobs in places like the Gulf, Hong Kong, Indonesia and 
then they wait until something else turns up. They even go to places like Sri Lanka 
until they can find a job or a flight somewhere else. Most of them become illegal but 
                                                 
14 Interview with Sarwar Nasim conducted April 16, 2001. 
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they are just trying to get jobs and make money. Mostly with this idea that they must 
go to the US. 
Destinations within this labor diaspora mark pathways of interstate circulation and the 
process of step migration from one original location to a final destination. Illegality is 
then an assumed condition of this migration. That is working-class migrants are at one 
time or another falling out of legal status. Legality is then an obstacle to working and 
making money and the pursuit of greater access to resources and capital. He continued: 
For us [Pakistanis who are in Pakistan] there are many bad aspects to this. Because 
we cannot provide for our own people here they go to other places to find jobs. The 
problem with this is that Pakistanis are everywhere and they make us look bad. They 
drive taxis, they work construction, whatever they can find. A lot of our engineers are 
waiters. I went to the US once to visit my brother in Miami. I loved it there. But I new 
that everybody was looking at me suspiciously. Not because they were afraid of me 
but because they might be thinking that I wasn’t supposed to be there. That’s what 
happens and we have to pay for it.15 
Such sentiments are not uncommon. They express a class distinction in terms of sociality 
and the discourse of illegality and the sense of a fading national pride. Because of the 
inadequacy of the state, working-class migrants seek life opportunities in transnational 
settings risking deportation because of illegal status. In this example, middle class anxiety 
surrounding issues of legal status is filtered through transnational racial concepts that 
ascribe legality to nationality. Subjectivity here is interpellated in terms of illegality 
whether one is actually under such a conditionality. Further, class is an inference between 
middle class Pakistanis and transnational working-class Pakistanis. The possible illegality 
of the one affects the construction of the legal other. Much of the public debate is 
expressed in these terms in various newspaper articles on the Pakistani diaspora. 
Expressions of the loss of the professional classes to brain drain oscillates with the 
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potential hope such classes can return to their homeland, while the working classes are 
often viewed as illegal and giving a bad name to the Pakistani national.16 
 For transnational migrants, finding their way through the state system is an 
arduous task. Through the various offices of the state, simple matters of the migration 
process become complex negotiations. Much of this requires long hours of waiting and 
more than likely visitations to multiple offices for a single issue. As I waited for 
interviews with various state bureaucrats I became familiar with this experience. At one 
office I encountered a migrant worker who told me of his stressful visits to state offices. 
On this occasion he was seeking back pay from his employer and needed a state official 
to review his request. He had already been to two other offices and spoken to the 
directors of those offices. As he explained to me, each office sent him to another location. 
“None of these people know what they are doing,” he explained to me. This was common 
experience for him as he continued “everything in Pakistan is exhausting.” After he met 
with the director and he was yet again sent to another office, he reacted harshly to one of 
the junior officers. His rage was finally quelled when the officer realized what he was 
asking for and sent him to the proper official. An hour later as I was still waiting for my 
meeting, he came back and spoke to me again. This time he joked about the absurdity of 
the state concluding by offering to expedite my wait for the meeting with the same 
official. The state is also here ambivalent. Rather than a caretaker of the welfare of its 
citizens, its role is to manage situations. Because of this hesitant relationship, citizens 
who must rely on the state come to view it with distrust. Not only because of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Interview conducted April 25, 2001. 
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bureaucratic inability to perform with efficiency, but because of a deeper ideological 
distrust of the aims and interests of the state. The state is barer of legal-juridical discourse 
is seen as unreliable and hence an illegitimate body of control. 
 Legality in terms of outmigration is most expressly the concern of the state in 
policing human trafficking. The Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) branch of Passport 
Control oversees cases and reports of fake agents and documents. They are in charge of 
controlling illegal migration from Pakistan and investigating the sources of forged 
documents. Their agenda is to expose exploitative systems of smuggling, even though it 
is generally migrant laborers who are put in jail. A large part of their policing is of 
documents rather than the labor migrants themselves. Again this ambivalence is 
expressed in terms of an inadequate system by the state’s enforcement agents: 
These are mostly poor people who need money so they are willing to do anything. My 
job is to make sure that they aren’t being taken advantage of. We know how bad they 
end up in debt to agents for fake passports and work visas, so we have to stop this. 
But I don’t blame someone for wanting to have a better life.17 
Enforcement is a separate reality from labor migration. The production of false 
documents is the concern of this agency. Yet the FIA is reputedly often part of scandals 
that involve smuggling and human trafficking. Reports in the press have appeared often 
particularly with the work of the anti-corruption outfit of the Government of Pakistan 
called NAB, or the National Accountability Bureau. Former FIA agents admitted in 
interviews that such corruption within the agency is widespread and referred to it as a 
fairly normal part of daily operations.18 This corruption and complicity in the illegality of 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 See for example a special issue on Pakistani migration reported in Newsline, November 2000. 
17 Interview conducted with Deputy Director Syed Javid Hussain Shah May 12, 2001. 
18 Interview conducted April 21, 2001. 
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human smuggling is where the power of the state and its boundaries are blurred. 
Returning to Foucault on illegalities, this blurring of boundaries is how the state functions 
in regulating its fields of power. The state operates legally by surrounding itself in a field 
of illegality while benefiting and making use of it. 
In an illuminating article Akhil Gupta (1995), he argues that the discourses of 
corruption constitutes how the state is imagined by social groups:  
The discourse of corruption is central to our understanding of the relationship 
between the state and social groups precisely because it plays this dual role of 
enabling people to construct the state symbolically and to define themselves as 
citizens. For it is through such representations, and through the public practices of 
various government agencies, that the state comes to be marked and delineated for 
other organizations and institutions in social life. The state itself and whatever is 
construed to stand apart from it—community, polity, society, civil society…political 
society—are all culturally constructed in specific ideological fields…The discourse of 
corruption here functions as a diagnostic of the state (Gupta 1995, 389).  
This identification of the state’s role in subject formation is also a statement about its 
exertion of power. There is a connection of the liminality and the opaqueness of state 
corruption and human trafficking. These are processes produced through an unchecked 
state capitalism that is itself ambivalent about its citizens. This is apparent in the lack of 
direct critique of the state from within by its own agencies and bureaucrats. State 
efficiency has become such a rigid concept that officials are admonished to not criticize 
the functioning of their agencies.19 
 
 
Ethnographic Encounters with Illegality 
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The ur-text of the complexity of South Asian modernity and its relationship to 
colonialism is the passage in Lord Thomas Macauley’s Minute of 1835 that reads: 
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us 
and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but 
English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect. To that class we may leave it 
to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of 
science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit 
for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. (Young 1979, 359) 
Historians and postcolonial scholars cite this passage with the thoughts of middle class 
formation and the creation of professional elites. Macauley indeed characterized the 
creation of a middle class that is characteristic of the ideal in economic modernity and 
capitalism. This passage also signals the moment of complex hybridity and European 
interpellation. How does one characterize a modernity that is simultaneously British and 
Indian? The complex colonial dynamic between race and culture that Macauley 
articulates says something of the outlook of this alternative modernity. For the British, 
articulating a colonial modernity meant creating an indigenous bourgeoisie that was to be 
aligned in interests in the postocolonial era with other transnational elites. This meant the 
expansion of capital with the economic and political interests of creating a global English 
educated class that would articulate nationalism within the boundaries of the nation-state 
and maintain the interests of elites in the power structure. This educated class however is 
not constrained by the nation-state. As a professional class that shares the interests of the 
ruling elites of the state, it has high mobility and is able to span the globe in the absence 
of opportunities at home (Alavi 1991, Viswesaran 1997). What has also been created 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 I was made aware of an explanation for the lack of candid talk the higher up I went in the bureaucratic 
chain by an official who mentioned a memo to all agency heads to not criticize the workings of their 
agencies. When I told him that this meant that he couldn’t do his job he replied “we do what we are told.” 
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from this colonial experience is a global working class that is transnational in its 
character. Failing adequate resources in postcolonial countries, this labor diaspora is able 
to mediate interstate systems in search for a work and a livelihood. 
 The paths of such migrations are multiple in the case of Pakistani labor diasporas 
largely focusing on East Asia, the Middle East, Europe and North America. Labor 
migration to the Gulf regions have mainly been motivated by the increase of petrodollars 
and economic growth that has facilitated the transition to a service economy. For many of 
the Gulf countries South Asian labor migration is a convenient labor supply for economic 
development. In the absence of local surplus labor, cheap labor is brought in from abroad. 
Since the 1980s the regulation of this labor migration has become increasingly stringent. 
To ensure labor migrants from overstaying the Gulf countries have made citizenship near 
impossible to obtain, and have also maintained a strictly worker migration prohibiting 
families to migrate. With such strict control migrant communities in Gulf countries are 
constructed as primarily illegal communities. Migrations to northern countries such as the 
United States and the UK have been limited by state selection of professional classes. 
This has predominantly meant that for those who do not fit these qualifications family 
reunification and overstaying legal status are the few options.20 
 Many labor migrants have a confidence of the jobs they will find and the ease 
with which this is done. I met Adil in Lahore at a contracting agency. He came from a 
village outside of Gujarat in the Punjab province. This area is infamous for having entire 
                                                 
20 See Cornelius et al. (1994) for an overall view of global migrations. Asian Americanists have also taken 
on the legal history of Asian inclusion in US citizenship and its framing through rights (eg, Ancheta 1998, 
Hing 1993). See also Moore (1995) for an analysis of legal history as it relates to Muslims in the US. 
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villages cleared of males in their late teens to late forties. It is also known for having an 
upsurge in new homes being built that remain vacant for most of the year until its 
residents return from abroad. Adil had not finished the equivalent of the sixth grade. He 
was in his early twenties and told me of how many in his family went to various places in 
the Gulf including the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. One of his uncles went from 
Kuwait to the United States in the late 1980s. There he said he runs several convenience 
stores. He told me how many of the boys that he knew from his village stopped going to 
school because they new they could find jobs abroad. He had never been abroad and was 
excited at the prospect of driving a taxi in Abu Dhabi, a job his contractor found for him. 
He told me no one in his family had ever used forged documents or used an agent that 
would take you where you wanted to for a price. In this example, the reliance on labor 
migration has replaced the reliance on the state for the welfare of its citizens from 
education to employment opportunities. And although Adil claimed to engage in 
legitimate forms of migration., the acute awareness of legal and illegal means of 
migration is apparent. Il/legality is engrained within the discourse of labor migration.21 
 In another industrial city of the Punjab, Gujranwala, I met with a group of young 
teenagers who had a similar attitude. Several of them were related cousins, and their 
friends. As we talked they expressed the similarity of their expectations of going abroad. 
They all came from fairly well off families but did not want to stay in Pakistan, nor did 
they want to study. One of their uncles had some documents made for them to go to the 
United States. He had to bribe some officers in Karachi but then was caught in Dubai 
                                                 
21 Interview June 15, 2001. 
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before he could make it to the US. Even after being sent back he said he would try again. 
When I asked why they would risk being caught they unanimously said that it was not 
important, it was just a matter of money. What mattered was getting abroad, at any cost. 
For these youth the options locally were not important. Their ideal was to go abroad and 
experience the fantasy of what is to be found in the United States, Europe or even certain 
countries in the Gulf. Their masculine bravado of undertaking the migration system was 
also mirrored in their expectations of going abroad. In Pakistan, one explained, they felt 
stifled. But in the US there were opportunities and freedoms that they couldn’t imagine.22 
 In these examples illegality is a perspective to be understood under the confines 
of the nation-state. It is a category of risk from which labor migrants seek their own sense 
of agency to operate within a state system that they see as imminently corrupt. These 
youth articulated their desires to go abroad in terms of how difficult it was to make a 
living in Pakistan. Part of this difficulty lay in a system that benefited corruption and 
nepotism. For them to escape this situation, forged documents are but one part of the 
game within this system. For them this is a system based in materialism—one marked by 
commodities and the ability to demonstrate wealth through material things. Here the 
alienation of illegality is not about a kind of social exclusion it is also about the lack of 
resources to accumulate capital in the form of material commodities such as a house, a 
car, nice clothes, and the accessories that accentuate status in a class based society. This 
is the lifestyle that they aspire too and could not understand why anyone else would not 
want this. Commodity fetishism in the consumer-based economies requires buying 
                                                 
22 Interview conducted January 3, 2001. 
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power. Without this migration becomes the only viable option to acquire desirable goods 
in the global marketplace. 
 
 
Social Life of Migration 
For many labor migrants the navigation of the state system of migration controls is part 
of the process that allows them to continue their pursuit of capital. The boundaries here 
between legal and illegal activity depend on the interest of the migrant and the 
perspective of the state. As I have argued the state operates through a field of illegal 
practices from which it wields its power. This relationship then in many ways blurs the 
controls and boundaries of such control. State ambivalence to labor migration is a 
reflection of this relationship in which the economic rationale for labor migration makes 
sense, yet the means of this movement are arbitrarily controlled. This confusion of the 
state is recognized by labor migrants in testimonials of the similarities between legal and 
illegal activity. One might argue that such a relationship is the result of a lack of 
regulation, yet theories of the state point us into the direction of the masking of states 
practices and power. The myth of regulation and power is part of the states manifestation 
of its control. Part of the illusion of illegality of contractors and brokers is its ability to 
mimic the state through forgeries and false documentation. The power of the public state 
then is replicated in the actions of private contractors. 
 Several outstanding questions emerge from this ethnography of the state and 
migration. What happens when the state depends on migration? Through the states 
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reliance on migration for capital accumulation, new subjectivities are formed through this 
experience of migration capitalism. But what is the responsibility of the state to 
transnational migrants? And with the growth in this trend of outsourcing labor needs to 
transnational migrants, how is the legal status of these workers maintained in the 
international arena? What are the concepts of international or global citizenship? The 
rights of transnational labor migrants are generally under the auspices of the laws from 
their home countries. But this does not suffice in the face of dwindling rights in the 
international sphere and the difficulty with which such rights are actualized. The need of 
international law to confer the status of global citizenship rights upon transnational labor 
migrants is a step in the direction of undoing the duplicity of the current system of 
migration that forces migrants into categories of legality and illegality. 
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Chapter 5: Some Fundamental Fears: Muslims, 




“Sand nigger,” I’m called, 
and the name fits: I am  
the light-skinned nigger 
with black eyes and the look 
difficult to figure – a look  
of indifference, a look to kill…. 
 
From Curriculum Vitae by Lawrence Joseph, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. 
 
This chapter explores the role of moral panics in creating fear and anxiety of Muslims in 
the post-September 11, 2001, context. The construction of transnational labor migrants as 
religious and racial subjects in the US public sphere locates Muslims within the particular 
history of the US racial formation. Terror, fear, panic, and peril are the rhetorical terms 
that organize religious subjects as racial subjects. Here the US state processes of 
racialization are constituted in popular discourses of transnational Muslims. In this case 
diasporas are overlapped in meaning and time in which working-class migrants are 
collapsed with the illegal activities of terrorism. The state in its relationship to migrants 
with histories of multiple migrations becomes a target of fear and panic. The 
homogeneity of racial discourses then comprehends the Muslim subject as a threat with 
the potentiality of terror. Thus this chapter argues that the US state relies on racial 
discourses in the construction of moral panics of terror and Islam in its agenda of 
controlling fear that frames the Muslim subject in terms of immigration and illegality. 
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 In the midst of examples of racial profiling, the illegalization and criminalization 
of Muslims, is a logic and history of a group considered to be a threat. Moral panics as a 
symptom of social control is also an expression of manufactured fear. This anxiety over 
assumed threats is the result of racist common sense that couples racial profiling with 
racial violence. This index is based on a historical lineage and encounter between 
Western modernity and Islam. Modernity, though is a convenient ruse for the workings of 
Western racism. But what are its trajectories, how does racism emerge against the 
Muslim, and how is this different from other racisms? 
 The racial violence that followed September 11 was evidence of a moral panic 
afflicting the US population. This tense time of uncertainty resulted in tragic violent 
assaults upon Arab, Muslim and South Asian communities across the US. Muslims were 
not the sole target in these racial attacks, indeed the racial profiling of those who 
appeared to be Muslims included members of other faiths including Sikhs, Hindus and 
Christians. It also included a wide variety of national and ethnic groups such as Latinos 
and others with brown skin and other “Muslim-like” features. These moments of racial 
violence and subsequent moments of terror threats was as much a moral panic over 




Terror: Theirs and Ours 
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On December 29, 2002 the Federal Bureau of Investigation released an alert in 
collaboration with the Homeland Security Agencies that identified five individuals 
thought to have entered the United States illegally and of a potential terrorist threat. 
Immediately news sources distributed this information nationwide as a terror alert and 
warning of potential terrorism designed to disrupt the New Year’s holiday. The pictures 
of the men along with their names and possible date of birth were copied from the 
original FBI press release and prominently displayed in the electronic and print media. 
The New York Times reported the ambiguous information of this story as such: “an 
administration official said it was unclear if the men were simply illegal immigrants or if 
they were involved in something connected to terrorist activities.” Further the FBI 
warned “that the names and birth dates may be false…one law enforcement official said 
some authorities believed the men may have entered the country from Canada.” The 
unreliability and ambiguity of this information did not prevent the article from assuming 
that this was a terrorist plot. The causality between the status of these suspects as possible 
illegals and/or terrorist and an impending terrorist plot was not brought in question. 
Instead the article continued with the precautionary measures taken as a result of this 
threat. The article ended with: “In New York City, the police increased their 
counterterrorist efforts as a result of the warning…The names of the five men listed in the 
alert have been sent to all police department commands.” The ambiguity of the 
information provided by intelligence agencies itself relies on a system of assumptions and 
stereotypes in the name of precautionary measures. Further in the caption describing the 
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pictures and names1 of the five men, the FBI report states that the men were of Middle 
Eastern descent and entered the United States illegally around Christmas.2 This release 
was significant in that it focused on the illegality of these migrants and the possible, but 
at the time unknown, connection to terrorism. This information, although ambiguous in 
its information, was enough for the US media to spread this alert of a possible terrorist 
attack, creating a heightened alert that resembled more of a panic. 
 By January 2, 2003, four days later and after nothing happened, the national panic 
over the terror alert slightly subsided. The New York Times ran a follow-up piece 
expanding its research on the case. It turned out that this was a case of mistaken identity, 
or more likely stolen identity. One of the five terror suspects, the individual identified as 
Mustafa Khan Owasi, was in fact a jeweler living in Lahore, Pakistan, by the name of 
Muhammad Ashgar. In this report, Mr. Ashgar claimed he had never stepped foot in the 
United States, but had attempted to travel to Britain two months prior on forged 
documents. He was stopped at the airport in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, where 
his false documents were detected and was immediately deported back to Pakistan. This 
article ended by stating that  
FBI agents investigating falsified identity papers are expanding their dragnet for a 
growing list of foreign-born men they believe may have entered the United States 
illegally form Canada. Officials caution they have no specific evidence the men are 
involved in any terrorism plot, but said they may have connections to a fake-ID and 
smuggling ring that involves people with terrorist connections.3 
                                                 
1 The names of the five suspects were as follows: Abid Naraiz Ali, Iftikhar Khozmai Ali, Mustafa Khan 
Owasi, Adil Pervez, and Akbar Jamal. These names are important in that they were thought by the FBI to 
be Middle Eastern names. Here the naming of these individuals was also a practice of racializing them and 
such names as threats. 
2 Neil A. Lewis, “FBI Issues Alert for 5 Illegal Immigrants Uncovered in Terrorist Investigation” New York 
Times, December 30, 2002. 
3 “Pakistani Says FBI Mug Shot is a Case of Stolen Identity”, New York Times, January 2, 2003. 
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In this statement the earlier ambiguity of the FBI had now drawn a closer connection to 
those involved in illegal activity that was yet still connected to terrorist activity. These 
were clearly claims with no evidentiary linkages, but only possibilities and assumptions. 
The earlier misinformation that these were Middle Eastern men was replaced with the 
fact that the picture of Mustafa Khan Owasi was in reality Muhammad Ashgar from 
Pakistan. The disarticulation of nationality in this example articulated in terms of race, 
religion and fear, is one of the elements of how panics solidify concepts of race. National 
origin does not matter as much as the social construction of race. Muslims as a single 
group are here understood oddly enough as one distinct racial group embodied in the 
religious practice of Islam. This goes against the logic of the US racial formation that 
generally assigns race according to phenotypic characteristics. Here broad definitions of 
phenotype is directly combined with the cultural practices of religion. This logic 
homogenizes Islam with the Middle East and terror through a politics of fear. In this 
example the Middle East as a region where Muslims live, and hence whether the suspects 
were actually from Pakistan, generally considered in South Asia, is of less significance 
from the perspective of the US intelligence services. The logic is simply if they are 
Muslim there is a greater potential for terrorist activity. And if they are Muslim, in 
appearance and with Muslim sounding names, they must be from the Middle East. The 
final statement by the Times confirms this by connecting immigration with terror in the 
logic of illegality as a uniform set of practices and networks. Connecting human 
trafficking and smuggling to terrorism doubles the threat. These suspects represent the 
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potential of terrorist violence at most and the manipulation of systems of migration at 
least. Anti-terrorism is then intimately linked with anti-immigration. 
 Almost a week later the Pakistani press began to report the absurd details of this 
case, incidentally, that were sparsely reported in the New York Times. In an article on 
January 8, 2003 The News reported that the FBI had apparently been provided fabricated 
evidence from a smuggler named Michael John Hamdani who was arrested in Canada on 
October 31, 2002, under human smuggling charges. His racket brought people from 
Pakistan to the United States via Canada and Britain. Hamdani, a Pakistan-born 
Canadian, voluntarily submitted himself for extradition to the United States where he 
named the five men the FBI originally thought might pose a terrorist threat. Muhammad 
Ashgar also stated that it was possible that his picture and false identification may have 
been used by another smuggler.4 Then on January 12, 2003, another article appeared in 
The News that was based on an extensive interview with Muhammad Ashgar. This article 
began by contradicting one of the statements reported earlier. It stated that Mr. Ashgar 
reported he went to Abu Dhabi and was caught by authorities with forged documents on 
his way to Europe rather than Dubai. This is perhaps a small matter since the entire affair 
was one of misinformation. But the details are important in this case. Particularly the way 
in which facts were manufactured and how the characterization of events creates a sense 
of fear and terror in the US national psyche. And although both Abu Dhabi and Dubai are 
both in the UAE, it is an important distinction to make. This relates to the earlier 
conflation: the Middle East and Pakistan, Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Mr. Ashgar in thinking 
                                                 
4 “FBI Admits Tip on Illegal Immigrants in Terror Probe was False”, The News, January 8, 2003. 
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through the reliability of the media realized his own need to address this fiasco. He states  
The News interview: “initially, I tried to dismiss it as a mistake our newspapers make 
daily but when I went home in the evening, every television channel was broadcasting the 
photograph with ominous warnings by American authorities…I was horrified.”5 The 
issue of credibility is important here in the sense of the representation of facts. Indeed we 
must ask what the effect of these images are whether false or real. For people like 
Muhammad Ashgar this system of legal control of migration and its implications to 
terrorism wreaks havoc on their lives. This process of moral panic casts the terms of how 
immigrants and terrorists are understood. 
 The mistakes of the FBI were compounded by the panic that was surrounded by 
this assumed threat. How the media handled this initial FBI warning had much to do with 
the panic that ensued. What underlies this series of reports is the unspoken story of labor 
migration and illegality. These are diasporas of folks seeking a better life and willing to 
engage in illegal activity for greater life-chances. The map here is of Pakistanis going to 
the Middle East on their way to Britain or Canada with the hope of making it to the 
United States. The illegality of this migration is now compounded and controlled through 
the mechanisms of state control that work not only to physically bar such movement, but 
to create an ideological terrain in which such migration of certain groups of people, 
namely Muslims, is tied to larger threats and the potential of terrorist activity. 
 This incident is symptomatic of the national panic that took place in the United 
States. September 11, 2001, changed peoples lives in phenomenal ways, one of the most 
                                                 
5  Muhammad Badar Alam, “Fallible Bureau of Investigation,” The News, January 12, 2003. 
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stark is the re-ordering of the US racial formation. In this moment the category of the 
Muslim emerged as a distinct category of race. Arabs from Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
were all of the sudden linked to people from Pakistan and Afghanistan. These same 
people were tied to Filipinos and Indonesians. And all of them centrally linked to 
Palestinians. In the 2002 New Year’s terrorist threat fiasco the connection of terrorism to 
illegal migration reveals some of the new logic on race. To begin with, terror must be 
associated with illegal activity, terrorism is itself illegal. Illegal immigrants because of 
their ties to the underworld of forged documents and smuggling might also be connected 
with the underworld of terrorist activity. The possibility of terror is the new language of 
preemption and social control. And it should not be discounted that the main informant of 
the FBI, Michael Hamdani, was a human smuggler himself. The reliability given to the 
information he provided by the FBI is astonishing. This affirms the practice of any threat 
is taken seriously and the construction of this logic at the ideological level. 
 This narrative though is becoming increasingly familiar. The place that Muslims 
as a category are filling in the US racial formation is historically associated with the 
discourse on immigration, fundamentalism and terrorism. What is further, the racial 
discourse of Muslims in the US is increasingly becoming transnational. In a mapping of 
the terror threats facing the United States and Europe the New York Times charted what it 
called a “Terror Diaspora” that made these connections. This map detailed ‘A World of 
Cells and Plots’ by Al Qaeda operatives that targeted American and European interests in 
recent attempts of terrorism. The map of this diaspora surmised that  
it is a frustratingly uncertain business, hunting terrorism. The impulse is to want to 
connect the dots, so that a recognizable picture of the enemy will emerge. But the 
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very nature of the quarry—secretive, multi-headed, loosely structured and passionate 
about staying so—keeps the picture blurry and incomplete.6  
The impulse to connect the dots when they are not there clearly influenced the judgment 
of intelligence agencies. This kind of rationalism is informed by a racist logic that will 
defy causal links, and for that matter guilt or innocence, to find the ‘enemy.’ Granted 
there are such connections to actually existing terrorist plots, this sketching of the War on 
Terror is also a fear and anxiety of Muslims at large. Such actions of intelligence 
gathering by officials are linked to the production of moral panic in the larger populous. 
As much as this is a crisis of security, of national boundaries and of protection of the 
citizenry by the state, it is also a crisis of certainty. Explaining the actions of a terrorist is 
not as important as stopping them. 
 This language of diaspora connecting Islam and terror was in use early by op-ed 
writers such as Thomas Friedman of the Times who panders to assimilationist and 
culturalist arguments to explain terrorism and its appeal to Muslim immigrants. Rather 
than explore how racism has historically operated in collusion with power to dominate 
Muslim communities and societies, Friedman prefers to argue that Muslim diasporas 
must change their culture.7 This is no doubt the culture of terror as a trait of Muslim 
societies, that for Friedman explains all the violence in the Muslim world. This cultural 
racism operates to place blame on Muslims through a frozen idea of culture without an 
understanding of how power operates. As it homogenizes the problems of Muslims 
throughout the world it arbitrarily places blame on an abstraction called the culture of 
terror. Terror, as Eqbal Ahmad has noted, is a much messier business (2001). This is 
                                                 
6 “Terror Diaspora,” New York Times, March 3, 2002. 
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particularly true when the state is included in definitions of terrorism alongside some 
hard analysis of how terrorism is produced. 
 What is remarkable about the language of such arguments is that they fail to see 
their connection to the botched racial profiling and moral panic associated with the 
mistaken FBI report discussed above. These recent constructions of Muslims as a racial 
group comes from a historical genealogy that comprehends Islam as the antithesis of 
Western modernity. Further, Islam is perceived as a threat to modernity, democracy and 
the freedoms that they bring. These are not new ideas, but are in fact representative of the 
historic confrontation of the Islamic world and the Western world. Both in Europe and 
the United States this construction of a new racism has led to the rise of moral panics that 
places Islam as an enemy and a threat. Moral panics in this instance serve to consolidate 
fear with racial conceptions of criminality in an altered form then first theorized by the 
Birmingham Cultural Studies group. Here, criminality shifts from petty crime to terror 
and crimes against humanity. This thinking fits into the streams of anti-immigrant 
sentiment that have fed racist backlashes on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
 
The Muslim and Moral Panic 
The recent characterization of Muslims in these events displays some of the themes and 
representations central to the logic of contemporary racism. Illegality, terror, 
homogenization of Muslims, Islam, etc., all figure in the ways in which Muslims are a 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 As an example see Thomas Friedman “The 2 Domes of Belgium,” New York Times, January 27, 2002. 
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racial composite. This is eminently about how culture translates into race to manage and 
configure fear, risk and the possibility of terror. This logic has a long history in the 
modern Euro-American conception of Islam and more recently in the geopolitical 
relationship to the Middle East and Muslim countries. The archaeology of the racial 
discourse of the figure of the Muslim and the terrorist have also been expressed most 
recently in moral panics that have swept the United States and Europe since September 
11. 
 It is worthwhile to rethink the chronology of the concept of moral panic to 
understand how it affects the current manifestation of racism and its application to 
Muslim communities. As far back as the 1960s in Britain social scientists were discussing 
the concept of moral panics as they emerge in modern history. In 1972 Stanley Cohen 
described moral panics in terms of fears and anxieties surrounding youth culture: 
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat 
to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, 
politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce 
their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; 
the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. 
Sometimes the panic is passed over and forgotten, but at other times it has more 
serious and long-term repercussions and it might produce changes in legal and social 
policy or even in the way in which the societies conceive themselves. (Cohen 1972, 
9) 
The panics Cohen refers to involve a mixture of legal and illegal activities that include 
drug use, student militancy, political demonstrations, hooliganism and crime of all sorts. 
More recently the concept of moral panic has been used in the British press to describe 
the effects of pedophilia, sex scandals in the Church, sex work and, of course, 
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immigration. Moral panics involve a process whereby social anxieties and fears become 
organized in a fashion that becomes known as rational and logical, in other words it 
becomes in the Gramscian view common sense. This explanation is more than the 
displacement of fear and anxiety on to groups of people as is commonly argued when 
discussing moral panics. As I argue, moral panics embody the very rationality that 
becomes the explanation of events, much in the way that Cohen describes in his work. 
Hence, false terror threats and the moral panics surrounding Muslims emerge out of a 
climate with an indeterminate future and the possibility of terrorism. This explanation 
permits certain actions of the state in terms of social control in place of civil liberties and 
human rights. Social anxieties that use a racist logic than are permissible for more 
effective social control. Popular consent is thus achieved through the function of these 
moral panics, as in the example of the New Year’s 2002 terror suspects discussed above, 
to delineate a simplistic picture of security and terror at least in the public eye. In other 
words, even if the FBI is responsible for false threats, at least they are doing their job in 
the interest of the security of the nation. To do the job of protecting the nation from 
terrorism there must be a set of assumptions from which rational discourse operates. For 
this kind of state intelligence whether the assumptions are logical is not in question, but 
rather the point is whether they offer social control and social consent to the means of the 
state. 
 In the late 1970s sociologist Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the Birmingham 
Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies began thinking of how racial explanations 
were implicated in the concept of moral panics to explain the racist backlash sweeping 
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Britain (Hall 1978). This work was important in grasping the resurgence of some of these 
lurking racisms.8 In their analysis they argued that moral panics arise under conditions of 
economic and political crisis. This analysis integrated Marxist approaches to law, crime 
and the state that unfolded in historical documents, newspaper reports and state 
documents. In the context of a multi-racial England, race is a central component of 
national discourses. This was a time in which ‘mugging’ and petty crime were racially 
coded. Blackness was specifically associated with crime through a popular logic that 
portrayed black youth as dangerous and volatile. Such a proclivity towards crime was 
explained in terms of the proclivity in black immigrant culture to express hostility to 
British nationalism, the expression of British culture. In short, blacks represented a new 
kind of problem. For Hall and his colleagues the critical task was to demonstrate that the 
rise of this new racism came in the context of a new economic order that was failing 
dismally. High unemployment and disparaging working classes led to divisions that 
began to see immigrants as a threat to prosperity, when once they were the hope. This 
economic crisis and the moral panics of black criminality necessitated state intervention 
through police action and the creation of an ideological superstructure to justify 
authoritarian measures. 
 Paul Gilroy’s essay on ‘Police and Thieves’ in The Empire Strikes Back (CCCS, 
1982) collection charted the states response to illegality and criminality and the racial 
construction of blackness. Central to the configuration of black criminality is the concept 
of a law and order society. This is to say that in moments of crisis the upholding of the 
                                                 
8 Stuart Hall also wrote a landmark essay on the role of the concept of race to Gramscian theory (1986) that 
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rule of law is the means of legitimizing the practices of the state apparatus through the 
arm of the police. Here in the ideological terrain of racist common sense, ideas of race are 
mobilized in moral panics as a result of a direct or indirect perceived threat. The rule of 
law, as it pertains to this anxiety, is then of selective enforcement upon particular racial 
groups that are assigned this level of threat. The entire edifice of the law relies on the 
universality of its subjects, yet racial difference has the effect of assigning various 
relationships of these subjects to state power. This is achieved through the ideological 
work of racist common sense. In Gilroy’s examples the visual imagery of panic combines 
criminality, illegality and blackness9: 
the cavalcade of lawless images – stowaways, drifters, pimps and drug 
dealers…extends into the present in the forms of muggers, illegal immigrants, black 
extremists and criminal Rastafarians (dreads). The black folk-devil has acquired 
greater power with each subsequent permutation. (Gilroy 1982, 145) 
The black folk-devil is a mythical category of universality in which criminality and 
illegality is applied to all black bodies. The sense of power Gilroy refers to is of these 
images to wield fear and anxiety. This power over society provides the consent of its 
subjects for the state to remove such fears. 
 Further, the state is implicated in the manufacture of these images of folk-devils. 
As the threat of social instability overwhelms society, this gives rise to the rationalization 
of new forms of state control. This is a process of political and ideological struggle in 
which law and order societies use criminality as a popular signifier to invoke consent to 
state power. This governmentality then justifies racial oppression as a legal means of 
                                                                                                                                                 
is relevant to this analysis.  
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social control. This logic clears the way for blaming migrant communities for their 
conditions and for creating mythical migrant figures as dangerous. The state justifies its 
violent means by arguing that migrant communities are inherently hostile. The source of 
this antagonism, the state explains, is from migrant culture that must adjust (eg. Enoch 
Powell’s racist ideas of assimilation) to national culture. In manufacturing consent to 
these means, the threat of black criminality as a folk-devil is the ideological construction 
of violent actions of the state. This is a progression of thought that not only controls 
criminality in the form of common crime, but polices popular protest and uprisings along 
a continuum that argues a fluidity in cultural terms. Again hostility to the state is the 
tautological sign that explains black criminality and illegality. Thus, dangerous classes 
are to be controlled through increasingly preemptive methods of police and state tactics 
that are then embedded in juridico-legal discourses. Hence the anxiety over black 
communities in Britain led to a series of Immigration Acts in the 1960s through to the 
present in Britain. These laws specifically controlled certain migrant groups, that is 
blacks instead of European migrants. Thus, the British state is able to regulate blacks 
legally and politically as part of the nation through the logic of race and the anxiety 
created over certain communities. This is the formation of the state as a racial state, in 
which the reproduction of citizen-subjects depends on the concepts of nation and 
nationalism as they are challenged by the inclusion or exclusion of new racial groups 
(Goldberg 2001). 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 At the time, blackness in the UK was the predominant political identification of people of color. In this 
essay Gilroy talks of Afro-Caribbean as criminals and Asians as  illegal immigrants. Both are racialized 
pictures of criminality that are reconstituted in moments of crisis. 
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 These concept are an important prelude to Gilroy’s thinking in his essay “Lesser 
Breeds Without the Law” (1987). Here he furthers his thinking on black criminality 
through the cultural concepts of work. The process of state formation is itself a modality 
of moral regulation through the law of the nation (citizen-subjects) and property. Further, 
under the economic system of capitalism, the state intervenes in order to maintain the 
mode of production and the efficiency of labor. Crisis of the state is managed through the 
law, cultural difference and their combined effects in the public. Capitalism of course 
creates class and gender differences but to this must be added the other categories of race 
and ethnicity. These differences are seen as expressions of culture that evoke a certain set 
of practices. The legal effect of moral panics is to maintain law and order against 
illegality and criminality. The challenge of race to nation, then, is that it threatens 
relationships to structures of power and the capitalist modes of production. It is this 
relationship that is masked by the invocation of black criminality and illegality. Indeed, 
as Gilroy argues in an earlier section of this book: 
Racial structuration is thus imposed by capital. But it is compounded and deepened 
by the state institutions and agencies that seek to regulate the ebb and flow of black 
labour in capital’s interests. Thus, the role and position of migrant labour in late 
capitalism as well as the political and legal contradictions around citizenship and 
settlement in Britain have been important objects of concern to this tendency. (1987, 
21) 
The importance of this argument is that it identifies racial difference in much the same 
way as the Marxist understanding of class difference. One is not the effect of the other, 
but a complicated interchange. Race then as a threat to the order of the state and society 
in which the reproduction of the nation is maintained through hierarchies imposed on the 
subjects of the racial state. Hence, an important ideological device of the racial state is to 
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justify its violent means to create this order through the creation of folk-devils and the 
manipulation of moral panics. 
 The working of moral panics are manifest in the US state treatment of Muslims in 
the post-September 11 era. The moral panic over terror that has been placed on Muslim 
American communities stems from changes in the state apparatus and the legal-juridico 
framework. The creation of a Department of Homeland Security and the restructuring of 
the former Immigration and Naturalization Service are indications of the changes in state 
power and control. The threat of terror has translated into greater state control over its 
citizenry in the US. But this comes primarily through the policing of migrant 
communities. Much like the case in Britain and black criminality, the threat of terror is 
thought to exist in certain migrant communities. Hence, the focus on Muslim 
communities and the attention paid to them in the media. But this is also a regressive 
form of surveillance and policing that is rationalized through the threat of terrorism. 
Thus, the folk-devil of the Muslim and the moral panic over terrorism is the justification 
and rationalization of state violence in such communities. Further, the refusal to create 
legal mandates that control racial violence and hate crimes attests to the greater concern 
of the state in controlling communities of color rather than preventing and controlling 
racism.10 The US Patriot Act11 is a clear legal example of this type of state control and 
infringement on the civil liberties of communities of color. It is not an isolated control, 
however, and must be understood specifically in the cumulative set of legal controls of 
                                                 
10 For an excellent analysis of the racial violence that followed September 11th see Muneer Ahmad (2002). 
11 It is ironic to note that Viet D. Dinh the Assistant Attorney General, a Vietnamese refugee to the US, was 
a major architect of the US Patriot Act that imposes draconian measures on migrants. 
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immigrant groups after the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, and even earlier as 
far back as struggles for emancipation by enslaved African descendents on to immigrant 
struggles for legal rights.12 The parallel of Japanese internment in the US during the 
Second World War is but one of the examples of how the state has policed migrant 
communities of color. Indeed these tactics of intelligence gathering, surveillance and 
policing of migrant communities by the state have a long history.13 
 
 
Perils in the US 
In the early part of the twentieth century the terms Near, Middle and Far East became 
strategic classifications of important geographic regions. It spanned the area from Turkey 
to India to Japan, with Europe understood as the center. This was a way of dividing up an 
area that had already been the subject of much fascination – the Orient. A mythic land in 
which the colonial imagination began to construct images and representations of diverse 
and heterogeneous groups of people. In Edward Said’s ground-breaking study 
Orientalism (1978), he established a framework which many scholars have since further 
developed as a mode of analysis and critique of knowledge production. In it Said argues 
primarily in terms of French and British Orientalisms in the Muslim world, what is for 
                                                 
12 The key shift in US immigration law in the later half of the 20th century came in the period from 1952 to 
1965. In 1952, in the context of a red scare and the Korean War, the McCarran-Walter Act set the 
precedent for some of the stringent controls on immigration in terms of nationality. These controls are 
linked to the logic and broad scope of the Patriot Act. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act shifted 
the logic of national quotas to employment quotas. The reality of these legal statutes is that immigration is 
more often a politically determined mix of nationality and employment preference. 
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the most part considered the Near and Middle East. One of Said’s central arguments is 
that the Orient and the East becomes a homogenized whole through the discursive 
practices and processes of colonial scholarship and forms of knowledge production. For 
all its differences, the Orient, it was assumed could be understood and categorized in 
relation to European civilization. The civilizing mission of imperial Europe was to 
colonize the Orient and create it in its image. 
As Lisa Lowe reminds us in her work on British and French Orientalisms (1991) 
this was not just a process of homogenization, but a discourse that was constantly 
dividing and enumerated through scientific and rationalist discourses. Orientalism 
simultaneously homogenizes as it makes divisions; it represents a discursive formation 
that organizes race, class, and gender into a historical project. The differences in form of 
Orientalisms was also apparent in the geographic division of European and American 
interests. European Orientalisms concentrated much more on the Middle East, India and 
China, while American contact with the Orient focused on creating influence and ties in 
East and Southeast Asia. American orientalism, nonetheless constructed representations 
of this entire region based on its domestic experience of Asian migrations to the US and 
through the political and economic relations of the US with Asia. Importantly, these 
different strands of European and American Orientalisms articulate with one another to 
form a similar position in relation to Asia and Asians. Orientalism organizes racial 
difference according to understandings of class, gender and sexuality. The significance of 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 On the relationship of Asian Americans to the War on Terror see the Leong and Nakanishi (2002). On 
the infiltration of the US state into South Asian migrant communities for intelligence gathering see Jensen 
(1988). 
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this bears upon the range of discourses deployed to construct this difference. In this 
approach, it is not so much that Orientalism is one homogenous discourse, but is one of 
the technologies through which discourse is produced. 
American orientalism also significantly combined these effects upon the ‘Other 
Asians,’ as Kathleen Moore puts it (1995), to construct a world of the Orient of Muslims 
and Arabs in America (Schueller 1998; Shaban 1991). This is significant to the shape of 
Asian America, a disciplinary and popular conception that has for the most part taken it 
for granted that ‘Asia’ refers to East Asia, and more recently the Pacific Islands, South 
and Southeast Asia. The world of Muslims and Arabs were combined in this all-
encompassing world of the exotic Orient and importantly contributed to the dissent 
against the legal discourse of American citizenship. As John Tchen argues, American 
Orientalism importantly combined the geographic regions of China, India and the Arab 
world as civilizations that had past their glory (1999: xvi). The next great civilization was 
that of an American nation forged by a manifest destiny that continued westward with the 
rising sun. This reasoning that moved from Asia to America across the globe connected 
these two continents in the forging of a modernity based on the work of immigrant labor 
and people of color. In this way Asia and America became partners in an unequal 
division of labor. 
For Asians arriving in America, Orientalism placed them in unusual categories. 
The term ‘oriental’ has commonly come to refer to some of the first Asian immigrants to 
come to the US – those from China and Japan. In legal, political and popular discourse of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century this also included the misnamed ‘Hindoo’ 
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of the Indian subcontinent. Hindoo was a homgenizing category that referred to South 
Asian immigrants mainly from the province of Punjab. It included those who were 
predominantly practitioners of the Sikh religion in addition to having sizable Muslim and 
Hindu populations (Jensen 1988; Takaki 1989). This racial narrative of the Hindoo is also 
present in the history of the encounter with the ‘Mohammedan’ as believers in Islam who 
came primarily from Arab and South Asian lands (Shaban 1991). 
Perhaps the greatest solidification of the concept of the ‘Oriental’ came through 
wide-spread movements aimed at hostility towards Asian immigrants. Local agitation 
eventually succeeded in slowing ‘Oriental’ immigration and from becoming naturalized 
citizens through state and federal legislation. This organized fear of a ‘yellow peril’ 
resulted in the Asian Exclusion Acts of the 1890s and culminated in the 1917 passing of 
legislation by Congress to bar immigration of anyone from the ‘Asiatic Barred Zone.’ 
This zone was itself constructed by Orientalist practices that racialized geographical 
regions. This law mandated that any immigrant whose ancestry could be traced to the 
Asian continent or Pacific Islands was denied entry as a so-called ‘Oriental.’14 Later this 
racial geography would extend limited immigration to an area referred to as the ‘Asian-
Pacific Triangle’ in 1952 constituting much of East and South Asia. This was an 
important policy for the US government in the post-war era to convey its program of 
racial exclusion and containment. 
                                                 
14 Asia and the Pacific Islands were specifically cited as India, Siam, Arabia, Indo-China, the Malay 
Peninsula, Afghanistan, New Guinea, Borneo, Java, Ceylon, Sumatra, Celebes, and parts of Russian 
Turkestan and Siberia (Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874). 
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The idea of the yellow peril placed Asians within a national and international 
context. While containing the space of Asians as racialized immigrants, this fear was 
defined in relation to a notion of white supremacy. This was important domestically in 
terms of understanding Asians in the white imagination, and also in terms of a geopolitics 
that pitted the United States in competition with Asia. This construction of perils in US 
history culminates in the Cold War era with the threat of various domestic menaces. As 
Robert Lee writes 
Three specters haunted Cold War America in the 1950s: the red menace of 
communism, the black menace of race mixing, and the white menace of 
homosexuality. On the international front, the narrative of ethnic assimilation sent a 
message to the Third World, especially to Asia where the United States was engaged 
in increasingly fierce struggles with nationalist and communist insurgencies, that the 
United States was a liberal democratic state where people of color could enjoy equal 
rights and upward mobility. On the home front, it sent a message to “Negroes and 
other minorities” that accommodation would be rewarded while militancy would be 
contained or crushed. (Lee 1999, 146) 
With the demise of communism and international competition in the global order, the 
new menace that has emerged is the Islamic threat. The perils and menaces of the US are 
now focused on solving this problem both at the national and international level. 
 This racial construction of the Asian and the Muslim as a problem is not a 
particularly new occurrence. For some time scholars of race have argued that the modern 
form of Western racism emerged out of the fifteenth century fear of Islam and Judaism 
(Frederickson 2002; Miles 1989). This did much to consolidate European ideas of 
Christian civilization against the peoples of North Africa, the Middle East and India. 
Race and racism have shifted much since this time, yet the lineage remains an important 
source of historical reference. As geographies of racism shifted from religion to race, 
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Europe went from Christian to white, and the so-called ‘Mohammedan’ from Muslim to 
brown. With groups of people migrating throughout the modern world racial geographies 
have broken down only to be recreated in new ways. The shift in this lineage does not 
deny the meanings attributed to it as a possible rearticulation of racism. Hence in the 
moral panic surrounding the Islamic threat, the Muslim, the terrorist, brownness, 
illegality, and criminality, are all understood under one rubric. The US state in preventing 
terrorism seeks to control Islam and Muslim communities. This has repercussions for 
people of color in the United States in that this position of controlling Muslims is also 
about controlling immigrants. Racial profiling to prevent terrorism justifies the racial 
profiling of all people of color that are seen to pose a threat in the view of the state.15 
 
 
Fear and Fundamentalism 
For some time the Muslim, the Middle East and the economics of oil have been collapsed 
into one symbolic representation. In Edward Said’s classic on media representations of 
Islam in the West, Covering Islam (1981), he argues that Muslims have been continually 
viewed as “oil suppliers, as terrorists, and more recently, as blood thirsty mobs” (6). As 
rhetorical figures these representation are manifestations of the US state’s control of its 
sovereignty through the War on Terror. Such control does not limit itself to the 
boundaries of the nation-state but is a means of control that is imperial in nature. Tariq 
Ali (2002) has argued that the US governments response to the events of 9/11 are more 
                                                 
15 Leti Volpp (2002) argues that in constructing the terrorist through racial profiling the US state is also 
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akin to a kind imperial fundamentalism. In the conflict against religious fundamentalism, 
imperial fundamentalism seeks to ‘discipline the world’ into the world order of US 
capitalism (Ali 2002, ix). This allows the US state to justify wars abroad in the name of 
managing terror, while simultaneously conducting a war on the domestic front. For the 
US state this has meant the proliferation of new technologies of the state to combat 
terrorism on home soil through the control of Muslim communities. The moral panics 
surrounding the example of Muslims as criminals and illegal immigrants who have 
overstayed their visas and terrorists in the makings is not only of a national scope, but 
international. The technologies of the US state are exported to other countries allied in 
the War on Terror. The state control of terrorism as such is now a cross-Atlantic affair 
that involves governments in Europe and North America, with its effects of combating 
fundamentalism an increasingly global intervention of the state.16 
 Fundamentalism is a complex entity. Indeed, in the case of Islam, the term Islamic 
fundamentalism obscures the multiple practices that encompass this religious 
movement.17 More appropriately scholars have began to examine Islamic fundamentalism 
in terms of Islamism. In Bobby Sayyid’s A Fundamental Fear (1997) he presents the 
argument for reframing Islamism as a phenomenon of modernity instead of as an 
opposition to it. Modernity, as he puts it, cannot be escaped. The argument is placed 
within two figures in the debate over Islam and modernity – the father of Turkish 
                                                                                                                                                 
complicit with racist hate violence of its citizens. 
16 See Vijay Prashad’s essays in War Against the Planet (2002) for the complexity of this War on Terrorism 
and its effects not only in the US but areas such as South Asia where the conflict between Pakistan and 
India rages through this battle over fundamentalisms. 
17 The term fundamentalism, one can argue, is also another component of a pejorative approach that refuses 
to comprehend the complexity of religious practice and difference. 
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modernity and nationalism Kemal Ataturk, and the leader of the Islamic revolution in 
Iran the Ayatollah Khomeini. Kemalism as the embodiment of modernity and 
Khomeinism as the epitome of the rejection of modernity places both squarely within the 
discourse of modernity. And as Sayyid argues, this dialectic is important to understanding 
Islamic modernity. For modernity is also a recuperative form that simultaneously 
encapsulates its antithesis. This is not the universal notion of European modernity to be 
replicated throughout the world, but a modernity disarticulated into many forms. This 
raises, for Sayyid, the possibility of modernity in the plural. This project allows multiple 
political readings of both the experience of modernity and of Islam as Aziz Al-Azmeh 
argues (1993). Sayyid continues, “the Islamists’ attack on westernization could be 
separated from questions about modernity; their rejection of westernization would not 
simply imply a rejection of modernization” (1997, 98). Thus Islamic societies incorporate 
the technology of modernity, but differ in relation to its core values. To be sure, there are 
shared values, but there is importantly a culturally based configuration of how modernity 
is experienced. For Islamic societies the experience of modernity is multiple and 
complex. 
 On the face of it, this argument appears axiomatic. But this is a complex argument 
for the analysis of fundamentalism and the fear it creates within moral societies. In the 
case of Islamism, he argues that this contests the notion of one solitary correct version of 
modernity. This is a challenge to the struggle for pluralism in the notion of modernity. 
That is to say that the modernity of Islamism is spatially organized against and with 
Western modernity. Such an argument defies the centrality of many who argue that 
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secular struggles must uphold the values of modernity. Indeed Western modernity is 
thought to be in opposition to the discourses of religion, yet encapsulated within them. 
Islamism is then another reflection of this paradox where religion figures within the 
discourse of modernity. This plurality of modernity presents Islamism as a challenge to 
the hegemony of Western modernity. This in itself is perceived as a threat, a danger to the 
discourses of freedom promised in the assumption of a globally shared humanism of 
modernity. The conflict between Islam and modernity focuses on this threat creating 
anxiety and fear rather than the struggle of the pluralist approach of a shared ethical 
structure. 
 Sayyid, however, romanticizes this idea of Islamism as modernity that challenges 
Eurocentrism. Islamism as “one of the centres in the polynuclear world” (Sayyid 1997, 
157) is an overdetermined category.18 Such emphasis on Islamism negates the complexity 
of Islamic societies and Muslim subjectivities (see Chapter 1). Islamic societies and 
Muslim subjectivities as part of modernity are perhaps better understood through the 
polycentrism that Anouar Majid discusses (2000). This is to say that the Islamic world 
has multiple influences and many centers. To explain this experience one must resort to 
the use of polyculturalism, or the influence of multiple cultural practices in creating new 
forms of cultural practice. This decenters Islamism as one form, or one articulation, of 
postcolonial Islam. This is important in that the fear and anxiety created out of the 
Islamic threat, of Islamism, is reified onto all Muslims subjects. Hence, Islamism as one 
manifestation of Muslim subjectivity is the prevailing force of how Muslims are hailed in 
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the Western public sphere. The threat of decentering the universality of Western 
modernity amounts to a challenge presented by Islamic modernities. Discourses on 
terrorism and fundamentalism are manifestations of this social anxiety. 
 There is also an important technological component to this perceived threat in the 
logic of the military industrial complex. In creating security for national borders, imperial 
Wars on Terror by the US government into Afghanistan and Iraq are justified in the name 
of creating a more civilized world. This maintenance of international order is 
simultaneously a way of increasing homeland security as it is for an international order. 
The framework of the national order in the United States is itself threatened by the 
discourses of multiculturalism and the debates surrounding immigration (see Harris 
2002). Technologies of security are a manifestation of these threats enacted through the 
social force and moral authority of the state. Racisms at home are exported as 
international racisms and the spread of American empire. These are practices that for 
example in the political economy of oil maintain an order of authoritarian regimes and 
practices of racial segregation in Saudi Arabia to suppress Islamist opposition to the 
homogenizing forces of capital (Mitchell 2002). It is this type of global order that has 
pitted Islam as an oppositional force not to modernity but to American empire. 
 
 
Conclusion: Islam in the Public Sphere 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Granted that Islamism in Sayyid’s project is a watered down version of Islamic fundamentalism and 
orthodoxy that includes both secular and religious paradigms. 
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The place of Muslims in the public sphere has become a fraught one. As Nilüfer Göle 
argues with respect to the place of Islamists in Muslim and European societies: 
The question of a social bond with the stigmatized and excluded is the essential 
problem of democracy. In the case of Islam in the public sphere, there is a double 
movement that causes uneasiness: Islamists seek to enter into spaces of modernity, 
yet they display their distinctiveness. There is a problem of recognition to the extent 
that Islamists start sharing the same spaces of modernity…yet they fashion a counter-
Islamic self. In contrast with being a Muslim, being an Islamist entails a counter-
reflexive performance; it involves collectively constructing, assembling, and 
restaging the symbolic materials to signify difference. The symbols of Muslim 
habitus are reworked, selectively processed, and staged in public. Performative acts of 
religious difference in the secular public space defy the limits of recognition and of 
social bonds and unsettle modern social imaginaries. (2002, 186) 
To this idea of performing religious difference must be added the performance of racial 
difference in Europe and North America. The meanings of this racial difference varies, 
but September 11 has done much to solidify the representations of this difference. The 
experience with Muslim communities and Islam of course varies in contemporary times 
in countries such as Britain and the United States. But the role of moral panics in 
connecting Muslim communities with terrorism has functioned in similar ways across the 
Atlantic. Stories explaining the terrorist mind are inevitably narratives of diaspora and 
migration, that nonetheless should be accounted for, but should also be placed in the 
complex histories of migrant communities and the problems they face. The performance 
of religion and race then, to return to Göle, is about enacting a different kind of 
modernity. For Muslims this is also a cognitive response to the pressures of diaspora. 
Indeed the result of moral panics is to create a keen sense of identity that whether 
performed or not is placed on the bodies and minds of Muslims. What is further, in the 
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Atlantic articulation of Muslims as a racial group, a complex articulation of religion for 
Muslims more often than not hides the workings of state and popular racism. 
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Chapter 6:Peace Be Upon You: Religion and Politics  




The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said: "God has created nothing on the face of the earth dearer 
to Him than emancipation. 
Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 969 
 
I have no country to fight for; my country is the earth, and I am a citizen of the world. 
Eugene V. Debs 
 
In this chapter I compare the political utopias of two narratives of Muslim subjectivity, 
the revivalist Muslim and the secular Muslim, in a contrastive analysis of political 
imaginaries in Muslim diasporas. As an example of Islamic modernity I argue that these 
two forms of subjectivity share a similar critique of structures of power in their quest for 
social justice. Here, I refer to Islamic modernity as a structural framework from which the 
agency of subject actors is articulated. Both argue their position in opposition to the state 
in terms of the states ability to meet their needs. By making this argument, both frame 
their subjectivities and the potentialities of such subjectivities in relation to the state. 
Based on research conducted in Pakistan I frame this ethnographic exploration in the 
cultural politics of transmigration and diaspora. Utopia is a guiding force that binds these 
two viewpoints in the actualization of diasporic consciousness. The complexity of 
diasporic experiences informs both of these approaches in the practice of diasporic 
agency and subjectivity. Thus in the relationship of the state to Islamic modernity I 
provide evidence for the complex alignment of two different forms of subjectivity. As I 
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argue, these parallel alignments speak to the inability of the state to address the concerns 
of multiple political articulations emerging from transnational experiences. 
 Islam, by its historical precedent, is diasporic. Yet the problem for such a project 
is the definition of its constituency, the umma (community of believers), and its claim to 
specific rights. Diaspora as a concept is riddled with the complexities of its relationship 
to the nation-state. The issue that joins these concepts of community, diaspora and rights, 
is recognition, that is the ability to name and engage with specific discursive practices. 
Both forms of subjectivity, the revivalist and the secular, aspire to a similar set of rights 
and critique of diasporic experiences. 
 In this example revivalist Islam in the narratives of the Tabligh-i-Jamaat imagine 
religious practice as a device to combat evil, the symbol of oppression. In the diaspora 
the interaction with Euro-American racism calls forth the necessity of virtuous action and 
the model of the divine. Here religious practice incorporates conversion with the 
miraculous as a device to understand racist action. The problem of delineating a process 
of religious faith is not only at issue, but the mobilization of certain concepts to articulate 
a sustainable political struggle. Within these narratives of Islamic religious belief is an 
embedded anti-capitalist critique that situates the believer as the subject of political 
embodiment separate from materialist gain. 
 Such a narrative is not exclusive to the revivalist, but are part of popular 
discussions of Islam. Indeed for the working-class labor migrant, Islam and the world, 
religion and the secular, are complexly interrelated. By examining narratives of labor 
migration of Pakistanis to the Middle East, I argue that a political struggle of a similar 
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type is at stake, yet the means for such a struggle is articulated in terms of class struggle 
and working-class solidarity. The anti-capitalist critique of the Tablghi Jamaat parallels 
struggles organized around workers rights. Race and class oppression in Gulf countries 
comes in different form then the example of Western forms of racism, and in the context 
of different narrative strategies results in alternate forms of action. 
 Here modernity is put in action in the world of the disenchanted worker. Struggles 
for justice are enacted though multiple narratives and discourses of liberation and 
freedom for both the revivalist and the secular Muslim. Through Muslim subjectivities, 
both Islam as a religion and the secular criticism of politics are interactive modalities of 




Outside of Lahore, Pakistan, is a small township called Raiwind that has become well 
known for its large expanses of land that wealthy Pakistanis have converted into ranches 
(most famously by ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family). Raiwind is popularly 
joked to be an American suburb of Lahore mainly because of the size of homes and the 
infrastructure that is far more reliable than in the urban setting of metropolis Lahore. 
Raiwind is also well-known, and perhaps best known, for a large religious compound that 
is one of the main centers of the Tablighi Jamaat. The compound located in the 
commercial city center is quite large including madrassas, a eating area, living quarters 
and cleared areas used for camping for the annual ijtima that boasts a yearly gathering of 
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well over a million attendees. The figures are difficult to measure, but many are fond of 
saying that this is the second largest gathering after the annual Haj in Saudi Arabia.1 This 
group of religious practitioners, although its numbers are largely assembled in Pakistan 
and the rest of South Asia, is more properly understood as a transnational religious 
movement. Their popularity in Europe and North America and their influence in 
transnational migrant communities is a significant to how they are organized in South 
Asia, particularly in a Muslim country such as Pakistan.2 The reach of the Tablighi 
Jamaat in Europe and North America has grown dramatically in the last two decades with 
their influence in mosques frequented by South Asians widespread. This connection to 
the diaspora in interesting ways connects migrants to the state and its interests. For 
example, monetary donations from the diaspora to the Tablighi Jamaat are rarely 
monitored. Simultaneously the Pakistani state has an interest in the Tablighi Jamaat as the 
soft face of Islam. 
 The Tablighi Jamaat is best described as a reformist religious movement founded 
in India around 1927 by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas. The aim of this movement is the 
recruitment of Muslims to a return to the right path of Islam and an active role in the 
community of Muslims. Because proselytizing is prohibited in Islam, Ilyas set out to 
bring back Muslims to the vision of Islam in the early community of the Prophet. This for 
many orthodox Muslims is an important period of emulation that provides individuals 
with a model of bodily comportment and the Islamic community a model of social 
                                                 
1 The Tablighi Jamaat is often criticized for this mainly because of the sacred nature of Haj and the 
comparison to the importance of Haj. For Muslims, Haj to Mecca is a compulsory religious practice that 
must be completed at least once in a lifetime. 
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interaction. This model of community is the idea of an Islamic utopia that guides 
Muslims in their earthly existence. Ilyas, in evoking the model of the Prophet and the 
early Muslim community, sought to engage in a pedagogical model that followed the 
Prophet’s example of virtuous action and thought. 
 What distinguishes the Tablighi Jamaat from other Islamist movements is its 
missionary approach and its programmatic discipline of its followers. Tabligh is the act of 
informing or notifying, and Jamaat refers to a community or group. As a community that 
must spread the word of Islam, Ilyas envisioned a return to a ‘purer’ form of Islamic 
practice and belief. Tablighis enact this return to purity through a series of embodiments 
and performances that seek to encompass proper Muslimhood. As a pedagogy, this was a 
style adopted from the Prophet in which the example of proper action is to be followed in 
intention and bodily comportment by all Muslims. The key modality is that of virtuous 
belief and action.3 Tablighis in order to achieve this perform discursive and bodily 
practices of their own comportment, but must also importantly preach these ideals to 
other Muslims.4 Hence, the Tablighi Jamaat envisions a traveling and migrating Islam 
that transnationally follows Muslim communities that are to be returned to the fold of 
proper Muslim practice and belief. Indeed it is this practice of preaching and discipline 
that is part of the structure that establishes the networks of the Tablighi Jamaat. Where 
ever there are Muslims the Tablighi Jamaat see it as their duty to preach the word of 
Islam. This approach removes them from the model of the nation-state into a movement 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Metcalf (1996) has written on this influence in America and Europe. See also Masud (2000) and Sikand 
(2002) on the transnational effects of the Tablighi Jamaat. 
3 Hirschkind (2001) and Mahmood (2001) examine similar movements in Egypt and the emphasis on virtue 
as a disciplining apparatus of Muslim subjectivity. 
 194
of transnational activity. As such the model that Tabligh ascribes to in Islam is a 
complete world view. It is a way to participate in the world through religious being and a 
practice of forming a Muslim subjectivity that is always in the process of achieving a 
greater relationship to din, or religion, in a relationship to Allah. Islam in this approach is 
a practice that is then an incomplete project for a Muslim subjectivity that must always be 
improved. The goal of such a Muslim subjectivity is to construct a religious worldview 
separate from the material world while simultaneously within it. In other words, the 
Tablighi Jamaat offers a critique of capitalism that shuns extravagance and opulence 
while accepting the realities of the needs to participate in the world of capitalism. 
 My research on transnational labor migration took me to Raiwind in a roundabout 
way. I have long been acquainted with practitioners of this movement in the United 
States, and in many of my interviews with transnational labor migrants in Lahore I 
discovered that many had been to Raiwind. Because of the loose structure of the Tablighi 
Jamaat not all of those I talked to considered themselves Tablighis. Indeed many of the 
transnational migrants joked about the bodily stereotype of Tablighis as wearing an 
imama (a type of turban), bearded, with pants that are pulled up above the ankles. This 
however did not detract from the impact it had on their lives. Many saw their trips to 
Raiwind and their experiences traveling with the Tablighi Jamaat as a form of religious 
and spiritual renewal. It affirmed their faith while also providing them with a framework 
of religious action in a world of secular activity. As one labor migrant told me “Islam is 
everywhere, when you are eating, when you are working, when you are driving, this is all 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 See Metcalf (1993) for a textual analysis of the beliefs of the Tablighi Jamaat. 
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Islam.” More than the ideological construction of an Islamic world-view, the effect of the 
Tablighi Jamaat is to offer an understanding of social relationships in the Muslim 
community and the necessity to interact with other Muslims. 
 It is important to note that both men’s and women’s groups are active in the 
Tablighi Jamaat. The jamaats, or groups, are most often divided by gender and travel and 
offer dawa on this basis. My encounters with the Tablighi Jamaat were mostly with men. 
In Rawind the Ladies Ijtima was located in separate quarters. The women’s section I was 
told was identical to the men’s accept in size. They also had a set of speakers and 
sessions for women to listen to similar to the men’s section. Another difference is in the 
role that women played in the family in terms of educating their children and providing a 
proper Muslim household for their families. As part of this Islamic utopia, gender 
segregation provides for the different needs of men and women as moral actors within the 
religiously mandated concept of the nuclear family. 
 My initial stay in Raiwind consisted of group discussions and lectures provided 
by the various emirs. The message followed the basic tenets of Islam and a rationality 
that structured the path of Muslims to righteous thinking and action. Emphasis was 
placed on spreading the word of Islam and its basic beliefs. Indeed most who I interacted 
with performed these ideas in a discursive model of repetition. Quotes from the Quran 
and Hadith were cited verbatim from lectures. In group discussion repetition of these 
arguments was exemplary in the practice of developing religious reason. In conversation 
religious references were constantly repeated to make sense of their application to 
worldly affairs. This pedagogy of tabligh embodies virtue and the structure of rightful 
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action through discursive reason and rote repetition, a common device used to construct 
religious subjectivities. 
 One individual who I went to visit introduced me to several of the attendees who 
resided abroad. The section for foreigners was unusual in that it was the only area in the 
compound that was air conditioned.5 Afzal, originally from Gujranwala, an industrial city 
in the Punjab province, was now living in Berlin where he ran a gas station. Afzal had a 
PhD. in chemistry from a Pakistani university. He told me that he planned on leaving 
Berlin and wanted to go to either London or New York to stay with relatives. Later Afzal 
introduced me to Ifthikar, a Pakistani Kashmiri from Mirpur, who lived in London and 
was an accountant. Ifthikar’s family left Pakistan in the 1950s and had been brought up in 
Britain. Both were in their mid thirties, married and had several children. Both initially 
engaged with me by offering dawa, an invitation to Islam and rehearsing many of the 
arguments presented in the lectures and group discussions. After several hours of 
discussion about Islam I veered things to their experiences in Europe. They told me of the 
communities they lived in and the importance of spreading Islam to other Muslims. I 
asked them what kind of problems they faced in their communities back home. Both 
commented on the lack of problems and instead spoke of the positive features of the 
communities they lived in. They asked me about the state of Islam in the United States. 
They were curious to know about the state of Muslim communities and how they were 
organizing themselves. Both were keen on finding out more and expressed an interest to 
                                                 
5 Many of the foreigners also consist of wealthy donors who are touted for their mixture of spiritual belief 
and discipline. There are parallels of this phenomenon throughout the Muslim world. In Egypt this air-
conditioned Islam is compared to a newly emerging neoliberal Islam. 
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move there. As I spoke I mentioned the racism against Muslims in the US. When I asked 
them if they had ever encountered racism in Europe, they both replied affirmatively 
stating that there was much racism all over Europe. Afzal was not worried by this. As he 
explained to me this kind of hatred did not matter as long as you were able to lead by 
example. His response to racism was the example that Islam could provide to others: 
One time we went with a Jamaat to Frankfurt. Several of us took a van. As was our 
practice we would try to pray in every small town that we passed. In one very small 
town we were in the middle of salat [prayer] when a group of skinheads saw us. We 
were praying on the street at the bottom of a bridge. The skinheads were standing at 
the top of the bridge and were yelling at us and spitting. But none of us moved. They 
came down from the bridge and tried to hit our imam [who was leading the prayer]. 
He fell down but he didn’t break his salat. He went back to praying. They looked at 
him strangely and didn’t know what to do. This way we showed them that you don’t 
have to say something to someone to teach them something. 
This non-verbal response exemplifies the approach of the Tabligh. Here actions were 
stronger than the power of hate language and racial violence. The correct response from 
the perspective of a Tablighi to racism is the belief and practice of Islam. Ithikhar chimed 
in: 
As you know, we don’t believe in racism in Islam. There are many races in Islam. In 
the Quran it says “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a 
female and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that 
you may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is 
the most righteous of you.” [49:13].6 This means that we are all different but we are 
also the same. When you go to Haj you see Muslims from all over the world. This is 
the glory of Islam. 
For both the correct method to combat racism is the acknowledgement of difference and 
coexistence under the framework of a universal Muslim subject. As they explained to me: 
Muslims are all equal but in practicing Islam we are not, the solution of which is a return 
to the basics of Islam, most importantly prayer. Afzal added a coda to the end of his 
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story. One of the skinheads had apparently been so impressed by the behavior of the 
imam that he decided to convert to Islam and was now a prominent member of the 
Muslim community in his town. As he explained, this was happening all over Europe. If a 
racist skinhead could overcome hatred and prejudice than the correct path of Islam was to 
teach by example.7 For Afzal this was also an extension of his dawa to me as a 
coreligionist. This initial invitation is important to the structure of how one commits to 
the ideological framework of the Tablighi Jamaats agenda of spreading Islam. At the 
discursive level this was clearly an example of the miracle of Islam and the invitation to 
this world of the miraculous. Indeed the achievement of conversion is considered as the 
greatest praise to the work of Tabligh. 
 As a metaphor for combating racism and anti-Muslim hatred, this story performed 
the narrative of virtuous action that structures Tablighi thought. In addition to this it relies 
on an imaginary of an Islamic utopia that is to be forged in everyday action. It is a kind of 
religious reason that provides believers with a worldview of interaction. This reason is 
framed through belief in divine intervention that provides miracles in the obstacles of 
worldly secular existence. Miracles and the glorious possibilities of Islam are part of a 
religious discourse that becomes an explanatory system. Throughout my stay in Raiwind 
I was told many stories that followed this motif of the miraculous. In large part they 
followed this pattern of worldly interaction with those who were not on the right path of 
Islam followed by a conclusion of inexplicable, and at times fantastic, action. 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Quran, translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 
7 Interviews conducted May 9, 2001, Raiwind, Pakistan. 
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 As I waited to be introduced to one of the elders in the Tablighi establishment I 
spoke to a local Pakistani who had lived in the compound for over 10 years. He began in 
the familiar way of discussing the importance of living through Islam everyday. He 
invoked the concept of din, generally the idea of religion but also of faith and belief. I 
asked him about the sectarian differences in Islam and we continued to discuss the 
problems between the Sunni and Shia community in Pakistan. He quoted Maulana Abdel 
Wahab one of the emirs of the Tablighi Jamaat who says “there are no divisions in Islam, 
just one…Shias, Wahhabis, Sunnis are all Muslims, some people say pray this way, some 
people say pray that way, there is only one prayer and one Islam.” This type of unifying 
logic is part of the appeal of the Tablighi Jamaat and its power to form alliances with 
other Islamist groups with differing ideologies. As I asked him about the connections of 
the Tablighi Jamaat to other organizations implicated in violence against Shias and in 
Kashmir, he responded that there was no justice in such actions. To him the only justice 
was in peace. 
 As many scholars and Tablighis state, Tablighi Jamaat is considered a non-
political movement (eg. Metcalf 1996; Lewis 1994). This is perhaps true in terms of its 
position within traditional party politics, but the Tabligh is far from being non-political. It 
has often formed questionable alliances with religious leaders from militant religious 
outfits, who are often in attendance during its larger gatherings, and is also the favored 
religious group of the ruling elite and state bureaucracy. This is perhaps because of the 
enormous appeal to professional and wealthy Pakistanis nationally and abroad. The 
Tablighi Jamaat brings in enormous amount of donations from Muslims in the diaspora 
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as well as wealthy Pakistanis. Such connections should not go without mention especially 
in a climate of the recent successes of Islamist political parties in the electoral process in 
Pakistan. Tablighi Jamaat in many ways is a safe alliance for the state because of its 
unifying approach. These alliances do not however detract from its alliances to militant 
groups engaged in violence of the sectarian and terrorist kind. As one Tablighi once 
confessed to me: “this is the state of the Muslim community and we must continue to talk 
to everyone to show them our way.” 
 As unifying concepts of the political imaginaries of the Tablighi Jamaat, miracles 
and the belief in the greater Jihad of peace, often referred to in the religious studies 
literature as quietism, are important devices of faith and spiritual renewal. As devices of 
political engagement they offer reference points to the possibilities of religious impact in 
secular, worldly, experience. These are important elements in the diasporic experiences 
of Muslims in the encounter with the non-Muslim other that perceives Islam as a threat. 
Within Islam the Tablighi Jamaat offers a source to overcome sectarian differences, albeit 
from a distinctively Sunni vantage point. This embodiment of religious practice for the 
practitioners of the Tablighi Jamaat then serves as a political alternative to militant Islam 






In late May 2001 in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, some 1000 Indian and Pakistani 
workers took to the streets to demand back payment of their wages. These all-male 
workers, and many of their relatives back home in Pakistan and India who rely on their 
remittances, had not seen their salaries paid for the previous four months. The Bartawi 
Group, a large Emirates construction company that had over 5000 South Asian workers 
under contract, illegally withheld payment of wages to its workers because of its own 
supposed liquidity problems. For three days the workers decided to halt work at the 
construction site until they were either paid or bused to their respective embassies to 
complain. These initial talks with the management went nowhere. By Tuesday May 22 
the workers took things into their own hands and decided to walk to the Ministry of 
Labour to make a formal complaint. The workers marched through the modern 
downtown of wealthy Dubai with its high-rise office buildings and five-star hotels mostly 
built by South Asian laborers. 
 The workers took this step at their own risk since in Dubai public demonstrations 
and strikes are illegal. Certainly these workers chanced losing their jobs, spending time in 
jail, and deportation. Finally, the management company, embarrassed by all of this, sent 
buses to transport the workers. Many of the workers were suspicious of where the buses 
would actually take them so they continued by foot. By the time they reached the 
ministry they were informed that the company had decided to pay them their wages for 
the last two months and the rest would be provided by the end of the month.8 
                                                 
8 “Unpaid Construction Workers take Complaints to Ministry,” Gulf News, May 23, 2001; “Dubai 
Labourers Protest Over Delay in Salary,”  The News, May 23, 2001; “Company Settles Wages with 
Protesting Workers,” Gulf News, May 28, 2001. 
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 I had often heard of such acts of spontaneous solidarity of South Asian workers 
from my interviews with labor migrants in Pakistan. This was an interesting moment that 
solidified some ideas of the narratives of transnational working-class consciousness in 
my ethnography. Such camaraderie for these bachelor societies of all-male workers, is a 
process of masculinization in patriarchal work spaces. Men as workers are placed within 
hierarchies of difference that takes for granted gender. Although those from the 
subcontinent take with them their national and ethnic identities, in the eyes of the Arab 
management they are racialized as inferior South Asians, and in this case working-class. 
For the workers the homogenizing effects of race and class structures proved to be in 
their favor in the face of conflict with their Arab bosses. The awareness of their similar 
circumstances allowed them to take action in collective solidarity. It also demonstrated 
how solidarities are formed when South Asians are abroad. In work camps where South 
Asian workers live while in Gulf countries, communities are organized through ethnic, 
regional and national boundaries. But there is also much interaction. Through the 
circumstances of transnational labor migration the boundaries of difference are compiled 
into the categories of worker and laborer. Many times workers lives are split between 
work and the camps in which they are forced to live. It is through these experiences that 
South Asian labor migrants come to know one another. They work together, eat together; 
and build trust and understanding with each other. Yet the differences of homelands 
remain. It is only at strategic moments that solidarities are spontaneously formed through 
prior relationships. 
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 In my interviews I came across countless examples of Pakistanis who after 
working in the Middle East recount tales of camradarie and friendship with other South 
Asians. This is a unique experience that involves the structures of patriarchy and the 
manufacturing of specific masculinities. Here workers discover the uniqueness of other 
national, ethnic and religious groups and accept them, while also sharing common 
cultural practices and similar economic conditions. Workers self-identify as caretakers 
within their families and hence the proper role of masculinity. The acts of collective 
solidarity are built on this kind of secular utopia based in the right to work and the right 
to a better life not only for individual workers but for their families. For South Asians 
who go abroad this is the primary basis of leaving their homelands. Out of this utopia 
emerges a discourse of freedom that relates to the experience of modernity. For these 
labor migrants, freedom means making a living wage to support themselves and their 
families. Work and the compensation of a wage is an aspect that is for working-class 
Pakistanis a transnational experience. In the absence of employment and upward mobility 
in Pakistan, workers move outward. Their decisions of where to go and what they will get 
in return is based on the effects of imagined locations and the work they provide. 
 In constructing these imaginaries, ideological fantasies are important aspects of 
thinking through the possibilities and choices of migration and work.9 The fantasies 
associated with migration construct migratory destinations through discursive and media 
technologies. For many migrants word of mouth and personal networks play an important 
role in constructing these imaginaries. For example, working-class migration to the Gulf 
                                                 
9 See Hansen (2001) who offers an example of this in India. 
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for Pakistanis is imagined as both a place to make money and a difficult place to live. For 
many it is the convenience of proximity. But in the long run many prefer to go elsewhere. 
There is a consciousness of this that has developed through a history of mass labor 
migration to the Gulf that began in the 1970s. Many workers assume that the Middle East 
is the ideal location because they are Muslim countries. But as many Pakistani workers 
soon realize hierarchies of race and class are in operation. As one labor migrant explained 
to me: 
We all go there expecting to be embraced as Muslim brothers looking for work. After 
being mistreated so many times by your [Arab] bosses you realize that being a 
Muslim means nothing to them. Arabs look down at desis [South Asians] and think 
we are lazy and dirty. 
Another worker explained his Muslim subjectivity differently: 
The best experience I had was when I went to Saudi Arabia to work in construction. 
You feel at peace doing work there because these are the holy places of Islam. You 
feel like you are doing something for Muslims…When I was there I worked in 
several places in Mecca building hotels for people coming for Haj and Umra 
[pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina].10 
The difference in these two narratives is social and spatial. For Pakistani Muslims, travel 
to Gulf countries is mediated through the concept of a shared Muslim umma, or 
community of believers. The reality of social divisions in the example between racial and 
class hierarchies between Arabs and South Asians, is then displaced by the religious 
obligation to the holy lands of Islam. Constructing this community is almost literally 
imagined through the process of labor and work. Here secular and religious narratives 
combine to differentiate social and spatial boundaries and meanings. The secular activity 
                                                 
10 Interviews conducted December 13, 2000. 
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of work then becomes a religious act of duty when it pertains to the organization of 
religious practice. 
 On another occasion I spoke to a group of Pakistani Christians who were hoping 
to find work abroad but had never been. They were eager to find out from me the 
possibility of going to the US and what the process was. As I explained it to them they 
visibly became more excited. One told me a story of his cousin who was now in Chicago 
making more money than he could imagine making in Pakistan. I countered with the 
difficulty of getting visas to the US and the work that was available. He responded 
This is our nation, our county. How can we leave it? We could go to the Middle East 
but the wages are much lower than in America. At least in America you make a 
decent amount of money no matter how they treat you. 
Another said he would like to go to the US for a few years and then come back and settle 
down in Pakistan. He explained he once had the chance to go on political asylum but 
because he thought he would not be able to return to Pakistan did not go through with it. 
An important aspect of the desire to migrate to the US is the fantasy of opportunities 
available and a willingness to persevere hardship to have this access. 
 The symbol of the United States as a destination is a powerful one, over and 
above other sites of labor migration such as the Middle East, Europe, Australia, East 
Asia, etc. This was made apparent by a taxi worker from New York that I spoke to 
Lahore. He had just come back from New York and was on vacation, as he put it. He 
spent nine months in the US working and three in Pakistan with his family. He had spent 
five years in the Middle East and told me he didn’t like it. The best decision he made was 
to go to the US. Driving a cab in New York was hard but he loved it there. He planned on 
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taking his kids there eventually for a better education. As he explained, it was hard to be 
away from his family but important for the future of his children.11 Such experiences are 
attractive and formative of discourses in migration imaginaries. This is clear in the 
attention paid to the differential status and position of returnees. Thomas Blom Hansen 
(2001) discusses this in terms of Indian Muslims and their construction of global horizons 
that enframe understandings of self and others. For many returnees this is a performance 
of cultural and social capital, a demonstration of success and achievement. This status 
and position is structured through a hierarchy of global horizons. The US is undoubtedly 
at the top of this list not only because of the imagined opportunities but because of its 
appearance on the global stage of politics. The global might of the US as an imperial 
political power is understood in terms of its economic power. The lure of this power is 
the promise of greater life-chances and a lifestyle of upward mobility. 
 In these examples the secular utopia of the right to work is understood as a 
freedom that structures the choices of migration. As it frames social action it creates new 
alliances and solidarities organized around this discourse of freedom and work. These 
potential solidarities are a practicality of the experience of work and the relationship of 
workers to structures of power. Inherent in this is a mode of secular criticism of the 
political world and the analysis of power. 
 
 
Conclusion: Secularism and Muslims 
                                                 
11 Interview conducted November 7, 2000. 
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Secular practices abound in transnational migrations. Such a political separation is not 
only the provenance of the state, but is an example of analytical thinking and reason. 
These social practices are created in the worlds of labor migrants to navigate the 
structures of the state that control and regulate migration. The ideological construction of 
subjectivity depends upon particular embodied practices and the discursive construction 
of particular ideas of utopia. For the revivalist Muslim this utopia promised emancipation 
through proper action and belief. In the example of the secular Muslim as a working-class 
migrant, ideal situations of utopia are based in social opportunity and work. This idea is 
widespread among migrant workers and explains a different approach to the politics of 
justice. In the situations of labor strikes and demonstrations, the ability to form alliances 
and solidarities across lines of religion, nationality and ethnicity, speaks to a different set 
of objectives than the example of the revivalist Muslim who seeks the unity of the 
Muslim community. These differences are also a variation of positionality in which the 
purposes of one group are vastly separate from the other. 
 There is, however, an interactive modality of these two utopias. Here the 
articulations of justice offer the possibility of parallel systems of reason and critical 
discourse. In this modality there is the important slippage between secular and religious 
reason that imparts a sense of self. These discourses formulate subjectivities on multiple 
levels while also formulating critiques of power and structure. This secular critique of the 
world allows the possibilities of these two kinds of utopia to meet one another through 
the idea of a shared agenda of social and economic rights. The assumed distance from 
these two forms of utopia, the revivalist and the secular, is also marked in the use of 
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religious and secular reason. One does not exist without the other for many of these 
migrants. Nonetheless they appear as categories that have been attributed legitimizing 
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